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Introduction
Classic economic argument ties the value of information to its potential to change fu-
ture decisions. A decision-maker reaps no benefit from being informed better if this
does not entail a new course of action. On the other hand, a decision-maker profits -
in expectation - from being informed better whenever the new information makes him
change his mind about some subsequent action choice. In this view, information may
not hurt a decision-maker, or, as Radner and Stiglitz put it, “information is harmless”1.
The sole reason for people to remain uninformed is the limited or costly availability of
information. In consequence, whenever undesirable outcomes are or have been linked
to a lack of sufficiently informed decision-making one of the most popular policy rec-
ommendations is to provide free information.
This work collects three essays on two barriers to informed decision-making. In par-
ticular, it investigates potential reasons for making choices that are un-, or at least less
informed than possible, despite the free availability of information.
Information avoidance is the first barrier that is discussed. When being offered free
information people may be unwilling to acquire information and prefer to make deci-
sions in ignorance of it. Such behavior suggests costs to information acquisition beyond
the costs of producing or researching information. This work considers psychological
costs associated with information acquisition, namely the emotional reaction that is
anticipated to be triggered by information reception.
The second barrier to informed decision-making that is investigated is the neglect of
available information. While a person may be willing to base his decisions on as much
information as possible that person may be simply unable to do so. Given the avail-
ability of information such inability must then be the result of an inaptitude to process
the information. This work considers limitations in cognitive resources to process large
amounts of information as the source of such inaptitude. A full incorporation of all
available information relevant to a decision may be well beyond the cognitive means of
a decision-maker. Alternatively, the cognitive costs of an incorporation of all available
1Radner and Stiglitz (1984), p.33.
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information may fall short of the incremental benefit from making a fully as opposed to
a slightly less informed decision. As a result the decision-maker neglects some part of
the available information. This thesis thus highlights two different reasons for making
less-informed judgments and investigates some of their implications.
Chapter 1 investigates active avoidance of information as a source of uninformed
decision-making. Next to providing input for subsequent decisions information may
trigger undesirable emotional responses. An optimal decision on information acquisi-
tion then weighs benefits from better decision-making against the costs of an inferior
emotional well-being.
The essay investigates the decision to undergo a medical test. Although such tests
convey important information, a significant number of people are found to turn down
an opportunity to test for free. The essay employs a model proposed by Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009) to determine news utility, a concept suitable to depict the emotional
response to information. This allows deriving the value of information as a function
of the decision-maker’s prior belief and the information’s precision. Information gains
value from enhancing decision-making, as proposed by the classic view, but also from
alleviating adverse emotional responses in the future. It looses value by potentially
triggering adverse emotional responses upon reception.
Choosing parameter values in a way to approximate the setting of a screening test,
a condition is derived under which rejection of testing is optimal. This condition is
satisfied when the decision-maker is offered to be tested for a severe disease for which
treatment is beneficial, yet ineffective in curing the disease. This best describes situa-
tions in which care, but no cure is available. Comparative statics reveal the timing of
tests to be another major determinant of test uptake. Both theoretical predictions are
well in line with stated reasons to decline testing.
The chapter derives the value of information for a person with reference-dependent
preferences in the context of medical decision-making. It discusses the interdependency
between the value of information from a decision-making and an emotional point of
view. Finally, it derives testable predictions on the desirability of information and test
uptake.
The following two chapters investigate the (partial) neglect of information that re-
sults from the inaptitude of people to process large amounts of information. Here,
uninformed or less-informed decision-making is not the result of active avoidance. It
is the lack the cognitive capacity to process more information that results in decisions
that are less than fully informed.
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Chapter 2, based on cooperation with Carsten Dahremo¨ller, proposes a model that
depicts how a decision-maker simplifies a multi-dimensional choice problem in order to
be able to make such a complex decision. The model posits that the decision-maker
focuses on those dimensions in which differences are deemed most important, and those
in which the available alternatives differ the most. The resulting attention allocation
reflects scarcity of attention through neglect. Further, it reflects an underlying op-
timality in the allocation of attentional ressources as focus is drawn towards those
dimensions that are most important.
The chapter further investigates how a monopolist optimally designs her products when
facing customers with such limited attention. The resulting design features simplicity.
A customer may value additional qualities of a product, yet if he does not incorporate
those in his purchase decision, i.e. if they do not translate into a higher willingness-to-
pay for the product, it is not optimal to include those qualities into the product design.
Further it is shown that the monopolist tends to suffer from the limited attention of
her customers while the customers are generally better off. This is in strong contrast
to the previous literature that highlights the exploitability of inattentive customers.
It is further argued that the monopolist may, under quite general conditions, profitably
employ bait goods. These products are solely designed to increase the customers’ at-
tention and to draw attention to more profitable attributes while themselves being
highly desirable, yet too expensive to purchase. Since these bait goods tend to be
high-end, state-of-the-art products the monopolist increases the willingness-to-pay for
the more moderate primary good via a compromise effect. The model thus offers an al-
ternative to the existing approaches explaining the effect based on reference-dependent
preferences or contextual inference. Finally, it is argued that the optimal attention
manipulation does not generally draw most attention to the most profitable attributes.
The second chapter proposes a model of limited attention based on the assumption that
a decision-maker needs to simplify a complex decision in order to make it. It highlights
the shortcomings but also the benefits of simplified decision-making. In an application
to the question of optimal product design, it derives the implications of such limited
attention in a market setting and offers a novel explanation for the compromise effect.
The final chapter applies the model of Chapter 2 to the setting of health plan choice.
This choice situation is often associated with high complexity since plans may differ on
a large number of potentially relevant aspects. The most distinguishing feature from
the previous chapter is the focus on a setting in which choices are made under uncer-
tainty. In fact, most of the complexity involved in health plan choice is based on this
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uncertainty. Further, the chapter seeks to show how the model may explain empirical
evidence from the domain of health plan choice.
The model of limited attention predicts an undervaluation of insurance by inattentive
customers. The advantages of plan purchase are distributed across many dimensions
while the disadvantage of plan purchase is concentrated in a single dimension: the
premium. This leads customers to focus on the premium dimension while not taking
into account all of the benefits of being insured. This can lead to insurance not being
purchased despite it being individually optimal. By a similar logic, the model predicts
low quality, low premium plans to be suboptimally attractive to inattentive customers.
Both predictions are well in line with empirical evidence from Medicare Part D plan
choice. Another observation that has been made in the domain of health plan choice
and that is hard to reconcile within classic models are dominated choices. The model
predicts such behavior as customers may happen to neglect exactly those dimensions
in which the domination occurs. Finally, the model predicts submodularity in the
willingness-to-pay for insurance, a prediction that conforms to experimental evidence
on insurance choice.
The last chapter shows how the model of limited attention may explain diverse empir-
ical patterns that have been observed in the choice of health plans. Furthermore, it is
a first attempt to discuss the complexity inherent in decisions under uncertainty and
its implications. Finally, it is a showcase example for a setting in which uninformed or
badly-informed decisions can be observed despite, or, as the model suggests, exactly
because of an abundance of available information.
The essays collected here discuss two barriers to informed decision-making despite
free availability of information: avoidance and neglect. Both the reasons for and several
implications of such behavior are discussed. Although the free provision of information
often seems a promising intervention to further informed decision-making, the essays
collected here may warn against it being considered a panacea.
I. On the Value of Information:
Why People Reject Medical
Tests
In this chapter a model of reference-dependent preferences pro-
posed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) is used to derive the value of
information when a decision-maker is loss averse over changes
in beliefs. This allows to model the anticipation of potential dis-
appointment upon receiving bad news. It is shown that this emo-
tional impact changes if information is instrumental, i.e. if it is
affecting the decision about a subsequent action. The questions
whether information is desirable from a decision-making or from
an emotional point of view can thus not be separated. The model
is applied to a patient’s choice problem to undergo medical screen-
ing. The availability of effective cure and the timing of testing are
predicted to be significant determinants of test uptake. This is in
line with empirical research concerning patients’ motives to de-
cline testing.
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1. Introduction
Medical diagnosis is an important part of health care provision. Tests are conducted
to guide medical decision-making, particularly to identify the very need of a medical
intervention. The actual use of medical information, or the lack of it, has created a
couple of puzzles though. One of them is the unwillingness of some patients to take a
medical test. Despite extensive campaigns to raise awareness people are reluctant to
take up screening tests for breast or colon cancer. Similarly, most people acknowledge
the benefits of testing for genetic predispositions for diseases such as Huntington’s dis-
ease or breast cancer, yet uptake rates fall far below expectations. Finally, refusal of
HIV tests remain a concern despite awareness campaigns, the offer of free and anony-
mous tests, and even the general acknowledgment of the benefits of these tests on the
side of both physicians and patients. These observations are not easy to reconcile with
the predictions of standard decision theory concerning the value of information. As
a result, psychological barriers to testing have drawn increasing attention as possible
explanations.1 Psychological motives are among the most frequently reported reasons
to decline testing. Reasons such as “fear of knowing one’s status”, “fear of a positive
test result”, “concern about the ability to cope with a positive result”, and “emotional
reactions” are commonly cited. Some studies suggest that it is the unavailability of
effective treatment that drives the fear of being tested positive.2 The anticipation of
the emotional impact of information thus seems to be an important factor determining
attitudes toward information. This work seeks to investigate this particular nuance of
attitudes toward information and its interaction with the desirability of information in
terms of improved decision-making.
The model we employ was introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), henceforth KR.
It suggests that people derive (dis)utility from changes in beliefs about future outcomes.
We interpret this utility from a change in belief as the emotional reaction to information.
This enables us to model different incentives for information acquisition. On the one
1See e.g. Neumann, Hammitt, Mueller, Fillit, Hill, Tetteh, and Kosik (2001), Lerman, Seay, Balshem,
and Audrain (1995), and Geer, Ropka, Cohn, Jones, and Miesfeldt (2001) on barriers to testing for
genetic predispositions for Alzheimer’s Disease, Huntington’s Disease and various forms of cancer.
See Deblonde, Koker, Hamers, Fontaine, Luchters, and Temmerman (2010) for a review of studies
on HIV testing in Europe. See Weiser, Heisler, Leiter, de Korte, Tlou, DeMonner, Phaladze,
Bangsberg, and Iacopino (2001) as an example of a study on HIV testing in Africa (Botswana)
and Zapka, Stoddard, Zorn, McCusker, and Mayer (1991) as an example of a study on HIV testing
in the North America (USA). These studies are selected as they report reasons given by subjects
for obtaining or rejecting an HIV test.
2See e.g. Neumann, Hammitt, Mueller, Fillit, Hill, Tetteh, and Kosik (2001), and Zapka, Stoddard,
Zorn, McCusker, and Mayer (1991).
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side, information is an input to subsequent decision-making, here with regard to a
treatment choice. On the other hand, information may trigger an unfavorable emotional
response. We derive the value of information as a composite of its value in terms of
improved decision-making and its value in terms of emotional self-management. We find
that these two components are interdependent, thus instrumentality and emotionality
of information affect each other. In addition, the value function enables us to make
predictions when to expect test refusal. It turns out that treatment effectiveness, in
addition to treatment efficiency, plays a major role for the uptake of screening tests.
This is because, as suggested by survey responses, the expected emotional response to
the information provided by a screening test is particularly severe when there is no
effective treatment available. Finally, the timing of testing turns out to be decisive for
the desirability of testing as it affects the intensity of the emotional response.
This work joins the growing literature on reference-dependent preferences. The idea
of outcomes being evaluated relative to a reference point has been prominent since
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007) suggest to endogenize the reference point as being previously held expectations.3
While empirical research has found support for this hypothesis (Post, van den Assem,
Baltussen, and Thaler (2008), Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011), Crawford and
Meng (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012)), theoretical work has focused on the implications
of such preferences (see e.g. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) , Heidhues and Ko˝szegi
(2010) on pricing strategies, and Herweg, Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010) on optimal
contracts). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) further extend the model to account for utility
being derived from changes in expectations. It is this extension that allows us to
model emotions that result from changes in beliefs, in particular from the reception of
information. KR use the model themselves to investigate information preferences. In
contrast to this work they concentrate on noninstrumental information, i.e. information
that is not affecting subsequent decisions. When they allow information to affect
decision-making in a consumption-and-savings model they concentrate on the question
how the subsequent action choice is affected, but leave out the question concerning the
desirability of information itself. Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009) propose a
model of selective attention in which an investor can influence the speed of adjustment
3In contrast to models of disappointment in which the reference point is the certainty equivalent of the
lottery, such as Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) among others, the reference “point” is
characterized by the whole lottery that represents the decision-maker’s expectations. An outcome’s
evaluation can then lead to mixed feelings in the sense that an intermediate outcome compares
worse against a better but better against a worse counterfactual. See Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)
and Herweg, Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010) for more elaborate discussions of this distinction from
disappointment theories a` la Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986).
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of his reference point by paying more or less attention to information. They confine
analysis to noninstrumental information suggesting that if the information serves as an
input to subsequent decision-making it gains an additional option value. We show in
this chapter that this suggestion neglects the interdependence between an information’s
value in terms of instrumentality and emotionality. Close to our work Panidi (2008)
analyses patients’ desire to visit the doctor using a reference-dependent preferences
framework. Similar to Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009) she neglects how the
existence of a subsequent choice (here the possibility to treat), to which the information
serves as input, changes the emotional impact of the information. Matthey (2008)
proposes a different model of utility being derived from changes in beliefs, which she
calls “adjustment utility”. Apart from the observation that this adjustment utility may
induce a distaste for positive but false information, Matthey (2008) focuses on the
implications of such preferences for subsequent action choices but neglects their impact
on information choice which is the main topic of this chapter.4
A different strand of literature that investigates the role of emotions in people’s
demand for information uses the concept of anticipatory utility (Ko˝szegi (2003), Caplin
and Eliaz (2003), Caplin and Leahy (2004), Ko˝szegi (2006), Barigozzi and Levaggi
(2008), Barigozzi and Levaggi (2010)). It suggests that individuals derive utility from
holding specific beliefs. The psychological motive that affects informational choices is
thus the maintenance of a positive - though potentially illusory - belief and not the
avoidance of psychological distress (disappointment) resulting from bad news. The
difference amounts to modeling different emotions as potential reasons for information
avoidance. Anticipatory utility models anticipatory feelings such as anxiety, hope, or
suspense. In contrast, this work seeks to model anticipated feelings, in particular the
anticipation of shock, disappointment, or relief as a response to information reception.
The distinction between anticipatory feelings and anticipated feelings is discussed by
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2007). In addition to a different approach
as to which emotions are modeled, this chapter highlights a trade-off that has been
neglected in the literature on anticipatory utility. When deciding whether to acquire
information, the decision-maker does not only face a trade-off between managing his
emotions today and making better decisions (that pay off tomorrow). As we consider
a situation in which individuals learn the truth eventually, information acquisition
also has implications for emotional states or reactions tomorrow. Thus, a decision-
maker faces another trade-off between managing today’s emotions versus managing
4Interestingly though, Matthey (2008) highlights the propensity of such preferences to induce a
psychological cost associated to deviations from previously made plans. Although these are not
within the focus of this work such penalties from deviations can be observed at different instances
in the analytical part of this chapter.
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tomorrow’s emotions. A direct implication of neglecting this trade-off is to ascribe
negative value to information that does not influence decision-making.5 Finally, the
literature on anticipatory utility models information aversion as the primary incentive
for information refusal.6 As such, it can only identify the degree of information aversion
and the decision-making value of information (i.e. the cost of an inefficient action), as
reasons for information refusal. The first, in particular, is hardly a a variable on which
to base advice for practitioners who seek to diminish test refusal. In contrast, the model
presented in this chapter explicitly derives and discusses which factors drive emotional
reactions to information, and thus allows some insight into potential policy variables,
such as the speed of tests. Admittedly, this comes at the expense of a more complex
derivation of the value of information. Yet, we regard the additional insight concerning
the factors that drive emotional responses and ultimately test refusal to be worth that
cost as they suggest policy variables. Since we regard the literature on anticipatory
utility to be very close to the idea discussed here, we will underline differing predictions
at several instances.
This work thus seeks to complement the existing literature by investigating individ-
uals’ inclination to take a medical test if the information conveyed by the test both
serves as an input to subsequent decision-making and triggers an emotional response.
It highlights the interdependence between these two consequences of information choice
and makes predictions concerning the determinants of test refusal.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the model. In section 2, we
derive the value of information as a function of prior beliefs and the testing technology.
At the end of this section, we apply the model to an analytically simple case, the value
of perfect information. Section 3 applies the model to the case of a screening test, and
derives a condition under which rejection of a screening test is optimal. Section 4 shows
comparative statics in order to illustrate how different parameters, such as treatment
benefits and costs, severeness of disease, and the timing of the testing affect test refusal
and, more generally, the value of information. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
A decision-maker faces a problem spanning over three periods t = 0, 1, 2. In period 0,
he has the possibility to test for a disease. Let b ∈ {i, n} denote the information choice
where i denotes the decision to test, n denotes the decision not to test. If he decides in
favor of the test he will receive its result in the following period, period 1. Regardless of
his information choice he has to make an action choice a ∈ {NT, T} in period 1, where
5In contrast, proposition I.1 describes the possibility of a positive value of such information.
6Technically, information aversion means that the utility function over beliefs is concave.
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NT denotes “no treatment” and T denotes “treatment”. He will make this treatment
decision based on his period 1-belief about his health status. If he decided in favor of
the test this belief will contain the information conveyed by the test. If he declined
to take the test he has to choose an action without further information. In the final
period (period 2), health outcomes realize based on his action choice and his health
status.
There are two states of nature θ ∈ {θh, θs}, meaning healthy (θh) and sick (θs). Let
p0 ∈ (0, 1) be the subjective (prior) probability an individual assigns to being sick
when making his information choice in period 0. The individual decides whether to
obtain a signal s, a medical test, that conveys one of two possible messages {s−, s+}.
The signal s−(s+) is conclusive towards state θh (θs), i.e. s− denotes a negative, s+
a positive test result. If the patient chooses to be tested he expects to receive a
negative (positive) test result with probability q− (q+). Let p1 ∈ {p−, p0, p+} denote the
(posterior) probability an individual assigns to being sick in period 1, i.e. after potential
information reception, where p− (p+) is the posterior probability the individual assigns
to being sick after having received a negative (positive) test result. Furthermore, let
− (+) denote the false negative (false positive) rate of the test, i.e. the probability of
receiving message s− (s+) given state θs (θh). It is assumed that these error rates are
objective characteristics of the signal, i.e. they are known statistics, with − + + ≤ 1.
Thus, the posterior (state) probabilities p−, p+ and the probabilities with which the
decision-maker expects to receive each test result, denoted by q−, q+, can be calculated
via Bayes’ rule given the characteristics of the signal (−, +) and the subjective belief
p0 of an individual.
p− =
−p0
q−
, p+ =
(1− −)p0
q+
q− = (1− +)(1− p0) + −p0, q+ = +(1− p0) + (1− −)p0
Conditional on the state obtaining, the two actions (no treatment, treatment) lead
to different levels of material utility m ∈ R in period 2, henceforth called payoffs or
material outcomes. Let these be
θh θs
NT A B
T C D
Assume an ordering of payoffs A > C > D > B and define the following differences
between payoffs.
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First, the differences across actions given a state are denoted by
∆h = m(no treatment, healthy)−m(treatment, healthy) = A− C > 0
∆s = m(treatment, sick)−m(no treatment, sick) = D −B > 0.
∆h denotes the net benefit of not being treated (or the net cost of being treated) to
a healthy patient. For simplicity, we assume that treatment yields no benefit to a
healthy individual. This allows ∆h to be interpreted as the costs of treatment such as
potential side effects and/or unpleasantness of the treatment procedure. ∆s denotes
the net benefit of treatment to a sick individual. Both ∆h and ∆s are strictly positive,
so the optimal action differs across states. Assuming treatment costs to be independent
across states, the sum (∆h + ∆s) can be interpreted as the (gross) benefit of treatment
to a sick.
Second, define the differences in utility across states given an action by
rNT = m(no treatment, healthy)−m(no treatment, sick) = A−B > 0
rT = m(treatment, healthy)−m(treatment, sick) = C −D ≥ 0.
These will be important for determining the psychological evaluation of an outcome.
The difference in well-being of an untreated healthy and an untreated sick individual
(rNT ) can be interpreted as a measure of the severeness of the disease. The difference
in well-being of treated healthy and a treated sick individual is denoted by rT . It is
a function of the effectiveness of treatment. If rT = 0, the treatment constitutes a
perfect cure as a treated sick is as well off as a treated healthy individual.7 The larger
rT the less effective the treatment.
In classic decision theory the optimal action choice as well as the optimal information
choice, and thus the value of information, are a function of ∆h, ∆s, and the beliefs p0
and p1 of the decision-maker (DM). In contrast, if the DM exhibits reference-dependent
preferences (RDP), they depend on rNT and rT in addition. We will now discuss the
preferences of the decision-maker.
Incentives for Decision-Making
In each period, the forward-looking decision-maker has an objective function encom-
passing the utility in the current and all future periods.
U t =
2∑
τ=t
uτ , t = 0, 1, 2
7Note that a perfect cure is not necessarily costless.
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There are two sources of utility. First, material utility is derived from state-contingent
consequences of the action taken as was described above. Second, there is gain-loss
utility derived from changes in belief regarding material utility. This means that news
regarding one’s future well-being affect well-being today, or, in the current context,
getting a positive or negative test result affects a person’s utility in the period these
results are obtained. This gain-loss utility will be interpreted as elation or disappoint-
ment upon reception of good or bad news.
Changes in the belief about the future health outcome m can occur in all three
periods. They can be the result of the reception of new information: in period 1 when
a test result is received and in period 2 when the true state of nature is revealed. They
can also result from a deviation of actual from planned choice: in period 0 when the
information choice is made and in period 1 when the treatment choice is made.
The utility function will be modeled in a way proposed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)8,
where the utility derived from changes in beliefs about future outcomes is called prospec-
tive gain-loss utility (PGLU), and the utility derived from changes in beliefs about
current outcomes is called contemporaneous gain-loss utility (CGLU). An individual’s
utility in period t is an additively-separable function of material utility and gain-loss
utility obtaining in this period
u0 = γ0v(F0, F−1),
u1 = γ1v(F1, F0),
u2 = m+ v(F2, F1),
where m ∈ R is the level of material utility occurring in period 2, v(·) is the level of
gain-loss utility resulting from a change in belief about m, Ft : R→ [0, 1] , t = 0, 1, 2 is
the belief the patient holds at the end of period t concerning the level of material utility
m in period 2, F−1 is the belief regarding material utility held immediately prior to
information choice in period 0, and γ0, γ1 ∈ [0, 1] are coefficients weighting the relative
impact of prospective gain-loss utility compared to contemporaneous gain-loss utility.
Following a suggestion by KR, we assume 0 ≤ γ0 ≤ γ1 ≤ 1, indicating a decline in the
impact of changes in belief on well-being the larger the distance between the time the
change in belief occurs and the time the material utility to which the belief refers is
realized.
Following KR, the gain-loss utility from a change in belief is a function of how the
new belief compares against the old belief. Formally, let F : R→ [0, 1] be a cumulative
8For simplicity we only consider a single-dimensional outcome in period 2, say utility from health
status. While health status is clearly a multi-dimensional objective it will be treated as single-
dimensional here for the sake of simpler exposition.
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density function over material utility levels and define the function v : F × F → R,
where F is the set of all possible cumulative density functions F (m) over material
utility m, by
v(Ft, Ft−1) = η
∫ ∞
−∞
µ [Ft−1(m)− Ft(m)] dm
where η is a coefficient weighting gain-loss utility in relation to material utility. Analysis
is simplified by assuming a two-piece linear representation of µ:
µ(z) = z if z ≥ 0
µ(z) = λz if z < 0
with λ > 1 measuring the degree of loss aversion.9
Planning Behavior
Contemplating the decision whether to take the test or not, a forward-looking DM
with above preferences realizes that this decision can affect his utility through three
channels. First, the information conveyed by the test may affect his decision whether
to treat, thereby affecting material and gain-loss utility in the final period. Second,
even if the treatment choice remains unaffected, gain-loss utility in the final period will
be affected. As this gain-loss utility is derived from the resolution of the remaining
uncertainty, the information choice influences this source of utility by changing how
much uncertainty there is prevailing until the final period. Third, as the information
conveyed by the test changes his belief about his health he experiences gain-loss utility
from the reception of information. In other words, he experiences an emotional response
upon information reception.
In addition to contemplating the consequences of his behavior, the DM needs to keep
in mind two things when laying out his plan how to behave in both instances of choice.
First, he cannot rationally plan to make a choice that is not optimal at the time of
choice. Second, once he has set up a plan, he will form beliefs about his future health
status. Any future deviation from the plan will then result in a change in this belief
producing gain-loss utility at the time of the deviation.
KR have proposed the concepts of personal equilibrium and preferred personal equi-
librium to accommodate the restrictions just described. Formally, denote by dt a“plan”
for behavior starting in period t, i.e. a state-contingent strategy regarding all possible
9The exact approach of KR is define a function mF that attributes levels of material utility to each
percentile of a belief F and then compare the functions associated with two beliefs percentile
by percentile. Under the assumption of two-piece linearity of µ both approaches yield the same
gain-loss utility while the approach employed here spares the detour of deriving mF . A proof of
equivalence is in the Appendix.
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decisions that might occur in period t and thereafter. Let Dt be the set of feasible
plans.
Definition I.1. 10 Define the sets {D∗t }Tt=0 in the following backward-recursive way. A
plan dt ∈ Dt is in D∗t if, given the expectations generated by dt, in any contingency,
(i) it prescribes a continuation plan in D∗t+1 that maximizes the expectation of U
t, and
(ii) it prescribes an action in period t that maximizes the expectation of U t, assuming
that future plans are made according to (i). A plan dt ∈ Dt is a personal equilibrium
(PE) if dt ∈ D∗t . A plan d1 ∈ D1 is a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) if d1 ∈ D∗1
and it maximizes the expectation of U1 among plans in D∗1.
Adapted to our setting this means that the plan d1 prescribes a state-contingent
treatment decision a ∈ {NT, T} in period 1. This plan being a personal equilibrium
requires that for any information set at which the DM finds himself in period 1 it must
be optimal to follow the prescription a the plan makes for this information set given
the expectations the DM with plan d1 has at this information set. To give an example:
a plan can only prescribe to seek treatment after a positive test result if, given the
belief jointly determined by the information of the positive test result and the plan of
the DM to treat in this instance, the DM finds it optimal to choose treatment. One
step earlier, a plan d0 comprises a planned information choice and a vector of planned
treatment choices, d0 = (b,~a). The vector of planned treatment choice ~a comprises
the planned treatment choice a for each possible information set in period 1. To give
two examples: a plan d0 may prescribe to test, and seek treatment upon a positive
and abstain from treatment upon a negative test result; or it may prescribe not to
test and abstain from treatment. Again, for d0 to be a personal equilibrium it must
be optimal to follow this plan given its anticipation. Note that more than one plan
can constitute a personal equilibrium. In this case we assume that the DM chooses
his preferred personal equilibrium, that is the plan that maximizes the expected utility
from its implementation.
With these restrictions in mind, we now consider the three channels through which
the information choice may affect utility. First, we will investigate which treatment
choices can be part of personal equilibria. This is important as an information’s propen-
sity to influence the action choice constitute an important part of its value.
The Treatment Decision
In period 1, the DM decides whether to seek treatment. He bases his decision on the
expected consequences, both material and psychological. First, each action results in
10This definition is identical to the one given in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
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different material utility in the final period. Second, unless the DM is certain about his
health status in period 1, the remaining uncertainty is resolved in period 2. Thus there
is a change in belief accompanied by gain-loss utility in the final period. The extent of
this gain-loss utility is a function of the action chosen. Finally, if the DM decides to
deviate from the planned choice there is an immediate change in belief accompanied
by gain-loss utility in period 1. Suppose e.g. the DM has made the plan not to seek
treatment. The expected utility of the two options “no treatment” and “treatment” are
then given by:
E1U1(NT |NT ) = E1 [u2(NT )]
=(1− p1)A+ p1B expected material utility in period 2
− p1(1− p1)η(λ− 1)rNT expected gain-loss utility in period 2
E1U1(T |NT ) = E1 [u2(T )] + γ1v (F1|a = T, F1|a = NT ))
=(1− p1)C + p1D expected material utility in period 2
− p1(1− p1)η(λ− 1)rT expected gain-loss utility in period 2
+ γ1η [−λ(1− p1)∆h + p1∆s] immediate gain-loss utility due to deviation
Given the plan not to treat it is optimal not to treat if and only if E1U1(NT |NT ) ≥
E1U1(T |NT ). Let p∗NT be the probability p1 for which the DM is indifferent between
the two options “treatment” and “no treatment” given he previously had the plan not
to treat. Similarly, let p∗T be the probability p1 for which the DM is indifferent between
the two options given he previously had the plan to seek treatment. As part of the
proof of the following lemma we show that these probabilities are well-defined. Finally,
define
VT = E1U1(T |T )− E1U1(NT |NT ) = −VNT . (I.1)
We will see that the values VT (VNT ) are an important part of the value of information.
Denote by p∗ the probability p1 at which VT = VNT = 0. The three probabilities
(p∗, p∗T , p
∗
NT ) are all bounded away from zero and one, and have a clear order.
Lemma I.1. 0 < p∗T < p
∗ < p∗NT < 1
Proof. See Appendix.
The inequality shows that the probability of being sick below which it is optimal not
to treat given the expectation not to treat, p∗NT , is strictly larger then the probability
of being sick above which it is optimal to treat given the expectation to treat, p∗T .
Hence, given a belief p1 > p
∗
NT it is optimal to choose T irrespective of the planned
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action. Equivalently, it is optimal to choose NT irrespective of the planned action if
p1 < p
∗
T . This implies that the DM cannot rationally plan to take action T (NT ) at
information sets in which he entertains a belief p1 that falls below p
∗
T (exceeds p
∗
NT ).
For information sets where p∗T < p1 < p
∗
NT , he can plan to take the action he prefers at
the planning stage as, once the plan is set up, he can expect himself to follow through
on it.
From Lemma I.1 it follows that if the DM selects to test and his posterior probabilities
are “extreme enough” his treatment choice must differ across information sets.
Corollary I.1. (1) If p+ > p∗NT and p
− < p∗T , a plan d0 ∈ D∗0 prescribing to test (i),
must also prescribe
NT if s = s−
T if s = s+,
i.e. an individual planning to test must plan to make his treatment choice dependent
on the test result.
(2) For all prior beliefs p0 ∈ (0, 1) there exist error rates − > 0, + > 0 such that an
individual planning to test must plan to make a signal-dependent treatment choice for
all tests with smaller error rates.
The corollary says that if the DM chooses to test and the posteriors are such that
p+ > p∗x and p
− < p∗y the DM will choose to seek treatment upon a positive test result
and abstain from treatment upon a negative test result. Part (2) says that for any
prior p0 there exists a test that, if taken, influences treatment choice. Any test that is
more accurate than this test will also influence treatment choice.
We can also make the following prediction concerning any plan that prescribes not
to test.
Lemma I.2. A plan d0 ∈ D∗0 prescribing not to test (n), must prescribe
NT if p0 < p
∗
T if p0 > p
∗
as continuation plan d1.
The reason is simple. Suppose it is part of a personal equilibrium to choose not
to test. If this is true the DM expects to make the treatment choice based on the
prior p0. Then by part (ii) of the definition of personal equilibrium he chooses the
continuation plan, here the action choice, that gives him highest ex ante utility among
all plans he will eventually follow. Thus, he will plan to seek treatment if and only
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if VT = E1U1(T |T ) − E1U1(NT |NT ) > 0 which is equivalent to p0 > p∗. Lemma
I.2 characterizes personal equilibria that involve test refusal when there is an option to
test. It is easy to see that the result extends to the setting where there is no such choice.
Lemma I.2 thus pins down what the DM would do if he could not test, assuming that
in this case the DM would choose his preferred personal equilibrium. Hence we speak
of action T (NT ) being the DM’s default action if p0 > (<)p
∗.
The considerations we have made so far focused on what treatment choices we can
expect for a given belief p1. They are important when determining how a given test
influences this choice. It is this potential influence that is a major part (in classic
decision theory the only part) of an information’s value. We will now turn to another
consequence of choosing to test: the impact on the emotional response to learning the
truth in the final period, or, more technically, the impact on contemporaneous gain-loss
utility.11
The Emotional Impact of Learning the Truth
Even if the test has no influence on the treatment choice, it still has an influence on
utility in the final period. Unless the DM is certain about the state of health at the
time he makes his treatment choice the remaining uncertainty is resolved in the final
period. This results in a change in belief and thus triggers an emotional response. The
information choice affects this final emotional response indirectly as it already resolves
part of the uncertainty earlier. To give an example: if the test is perfect and turns
out, say, positive the DM already knows with certainty that he is sick in period 1.
Thus he cannot be disappointed anymore in the final period by learning about his
bad health. More technically, as the information conveyed by the test changes the
reference belief, the gain-loss utility from the evaluation of the final outcome against
this reference lottery must also change. Given some treatment choice, this change in
contemporaneous gain-loss utility (CGLU) due to choosing to test (i) instead of not
11It is exactly such an impact of information choice that the literature of anticipatory utility neglects.
Of course, anticipatory utility seeks to model “forward-looking” emotions, i.e. utility from beliefs
about the future. Yet, if we think that our psychological well-being and, as an expression of
this, utility is a function of our beliefs, why is it only a function of beliefs about some future
event? It is equally reasonable to assume that living with a particular disease is psychologically at
least as challenging as dreading this disease to break out in the future. If one, however, suspects
uncertainty to be the driving force of dread, it needs to be underlined that this is not what is
modeled by anticipatory utility.
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testing (n) is
E0 [v (F2, F1|i)]− E0 [v (F2, F1|n)] =
q+q−η(λ− 1)(p+ − p−)2rNT if NT chosenq+q−η(λ− 1)(p+ − p−)2rT if T chosen.
(I.2)
The derivation is not difficult, but tedious. The results indicate that the DM gains
from learning about his health status earlier apart from potential gains through making
better decisions. This is because the information shifts the reference belief F1 closer to
the final belief F2, at least in expectation. This diminishes both gains and losses, but,
as the DM cares more about the latter under loss aversion, the net effect is positive.
So far we have investigated two ways in which the DM gains (in expectation) from
taking the test. We will now turn to the downside of testing: the expected emotional
impact of information. This will turn out to be the major psychological cost of testing
in this model.
The Emotional Reaction to the Reception of the Test Result
When patients test for a serious disease the reception of the test result usually triggers
an emotional response. One advantage of the model of reference-dependent preferences
proposed by KR is to offer a possibility to model this emotional response as the (dis-)
utility derived from the change in belief triggered by the reception of the test result.
The focus of this section is thus to derive the expected emotional impact of information,
in formal terms E0 [v(F1, F0)].
The following observation will help the analysis. Under Bayesian updating the prior
belief F0 equals the expected posterior belief: F0 = q
−F−1 + q
+F+1 = E0 [F1] where
F−1 is the posterior belief after a negative, F
+
1 the posterior belief after a positive
test result. With this in mind, the binary signal structure allows us to make a useful
simplification.12
E0 [v(F1, F0] = q− · q+v(F−1 , F+1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
v(F−1 ,F0)
+q+ · q−v(F+1 , F−1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
v(F+1 ,F0)
. (I.3)
The emotional impact of a negative result is thus a function of how the (factual) belief
after these news compares against the (counterfactual) belief the DM would have had,
had he received a positive test result. Similarly, the emotional impact of a positive test
result depends on how the factual belief compares against the counterfactual. This
observation is helpful as it allows us to confine attention to how the two posterior
distributions F−1 and F
+
1 compare against each other.
12It is important to note that this simplification is only valid due to the binary signal structure.
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Note that the distributions F−1 , F
+
1 are not only a function of the posterior beliefs
p−, p+ but also of the treatment choice the DM plans to make in each contingency. The
emotional response to information thus not only depends on the informational content
of the signal but also on what one plans to do with this information. Let us distinguish
two cases. First, call information instrumental if it affects the treatment choice, i.e.,
in this context, that the DM seeks treatment after a positive test result and abstains
from treatment after a negative test result. Second, call information noninstrumental
if it does not affect treatment choice. In that case the DM sticks to the action he would
have chosen without any further information, the default action, no matter how the
test turns out.
The Emotional Impact of Receiving Noninstrumental Information
The second case turns out to be the simpler of the two. If the information does not
result in a change of action, both F+1 and F
−
1 have the same support, the two material
payoffs associated with the default action. The information received then only tells the
DM how much probability weight to put on the high and the low outcome associated
with the default action.
F (m)
1
p+
p−
B
m(sick,no treat)
A
m(healthy,no treat)
m
F−(m)
F+(m)
Figure I.1.: Difference between Posterior Beliefs when Information is Noninstrumental
(default action NT )
Suppose e.g. the default action was NT (don’t treat). The gain-loss utility derived
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in period 1 (see Figure I.1) is
v(F1, F0) =
η [(p0 − p−)rNT ] = q+η(p+ − p−)rNT if s = s−η [−λ(p+ − p0)rNT ] = −q−ηλ(p+ − p−)rNT if s = s+.
When information is noninstrumental, the emotions arising upon reception of the
test result are a function of (a) the probability with which the alternative message was
expected, (b) the distance between the posterior probabilities the two signals induce,
and (c) the distance between the higher and the lower payoff associated with the default
action. We can conclude that the emotional reaction is more severe, the more surprising
the news (a), the higher the degree of certainty with which the news leave the receiver
(b), and the more is at stake (c). Note that the emotional response to a negative test
result is unambiguously positive and the emotional response to a positive test result is
unambiguously negative.
Taking expectations over u1 at t = 0 the expected utility in period 1 depending on
one’s default action is
E0u1 = γ1
[
q−v
(
F−1 , F0
)
+ q+v
(
F+1 , F0
)]
=
−q+q−γ1η(λ− 1)(p+ − p−)rNT if NT is default action−q+q−γ1η(λ− 1)(p+ − p−)rT if T is default action.
The Emotional Impact of Receiving Instrumental Information
The case is different when the information is instrumental, i.e. when the DM seeks
treatment after a negative and abstains from treatment after a positive test result. In
this case, the distributions F−1 and F
+
1 do not only differ in the probability they assign
to being sick but also in the outcome associated with each state (see Figure I.2).
The gain-loss utility (PGLU) induced by the reception of a message is then
u1 =
q+γ1η [−λp−∆s + (p+ − p−)rT + (1− p−)∆h] if s = s−q−γ1η [p−∆s − λ(p+ − p−)rT − λ(1− p−)∆h] if s = s+.
The interpretation of this formula is easier if one remembers that this constitutes a
percentile-wise comparison. A negative test result fares worse than a positive test
result in the lower percentiles. This is because s− induces no treatment and s+ induces
treatment, and the worst-case under a negative test (untreated and sick) fares worse
than the worst-case under a positive test (treated and sick). On the other hand, a
negative test result fares better in the middle and higher percentiles because (a) it puts
more probability weight on the preferred state of the world (healthy) and (b) it results
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1
p+
p−
B
sick,no treat
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sick,treat
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healthy,treat
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healthy,no treat
m
F−(m)
F+(m)
Figure I.2.: Difference between Posterior Beliefs when Information is Instrumental
in a higher payoff in the preferred state of the world. Taking expectations of u1 at
t = 0 the expected utility in period 1 is
γ1E0v (F1, F0) =− q−q+γ1η(λ− 1)
[
(1− p−)∆h + p−∆s + (p+ − p−)rT
]
(I.4)
=− q−q+γ1η(λ− 1)
[
(1− p+)(∆h + ∆s)− (1− 2p−)∆s + (p+ − p−)rNT
]
.
(I.5)
Note the difference between the emotional impact of noninstrumental and instrumental
information. While a negative result under noninstrumentality is unambiguously good
it is accompanied by mixed feelings under instrumentality, unless the test is perfect.
The same is true for the emotions generated by a positive result. While the effect
is unambiguously bad under noninstrumentality it is accompanied by mixed feelings
under instrumentality. Let us define the difference between the expected emotional
response to instrumental and and the expected emotional response to noninstrumental
information, and call it emotional differential.
ED(NT ) =− q−q+γiη(λ− 1)
[
(1− p+)(∆h + ∆s)− (1− 2p−)∆s
]
(I.6)
ED(T ) =− q−q+γiη(λ− 1)
[
(1− p−)∆h + p−∆s
]
(I.7)
Since the emotional impact of noninstrumental information depends on the default
action, so does the emotional differential as the difference in emotional impact. The
emotional differential will turn out to be one component of the value of information.
The existence of this emotional differential suggests that instrumental information“feels
different” than noninstrumental information controlling for the informational content.
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Observation 1. Beyond the content of information, the emotional response to infor-
mation depends on whether the information is instrumental.
We have now investigated the three channels through which the information decision
affects utility. In the following section we connect the pieces to derive the overall value
of information. This enables us to see when it is optimal to reject testing.
3. The Value of Information
The value of information (in utility terms) is computed by subtracting the expected
utility of refusing to test from the expecting utility of taking the test. To calculate
the expected utility of each information choice we need to know what treatment choice
follows. Lemma I.2 helps us to answer this question for someone opting out of testing.
He will seek treatment if the prior p0 is above p
∗ and he will not do so if the prior
is below that threshold. The question concerning the treatment choice following the
decision to test is essentially the question of whether the information is instrumental.
As for some beliefs p1 both treatment choices can be (credibly) made part of a plan, this
question is far from trivial. We will proceed as follows. First, we derive the value of a
test assuming that it is noninstrumental. Second, we derive the value of a test assuming
it is instrumental. Finally, we apply the concept of preferred personal equilibrium to
deduce which of the values is the appropriate one for a DM with a given prior p0 facing
the option of taking a test with given characteristics (+, −). In order to illustrate the
concept, the section concludes with an application to an analytically simple case: the
value of a perfect test.
The Value of Noninstrumental Information
A test is noninstrumental if the default action is taken no matter how the test turns out.
Formally, the value of noninstrumental information (VoNI), the difference in expected
utility between the two alternatives of information choice {i, n}, is given by
V oNI =E0U0(i)− E0U0(n)
= γ1E0 [v (F1, F0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
PGLU
+E0 [v (F2, F1|i)]− E0 [v (F2, F1|n)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in CGLU
=
 q−q+η(λ− 1) [(p+ − p−)2 − γ1(p+ − p−)] rNT if NT is defaultq−q+η(λ− 1) [(p+ − p−)2 − γ1(p+ − p−)] rT if T is default.
Note that the value of noninstrumental information does not depend on what informa-
tion choice was planned if the test is noninstrumental, i.e. E0U0(i|i) = E0U0(i|n) and
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E0U0(n|i) = E0U0(n|n). This is because a deviation from an anticipated information
choice does not result in a change in the belief F0 regarding future material payoffs.
One can make the following prediction concerning the desirability of noninstrumental
information.
Proposition I.1. (Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009)). The value of noninstrumental infor-
mation is positive if and only if
γ1 < p
+ − p−.
As noninstrumental information is not affecting the treatment choice and thus mate-
rial utility, its sole value lies in its potential to affect contemporaneous gain-loss utility,
i.e. its potential to mitigate disappointment in the final period. This, however, comes
at the cost of earlier disappointment when receiving the test result which is felt the
more intense the larger the weight on prospective gain-loss utility γ1. The benefits of
the information, meaning its potential to manage one’s own reference point, increase
in the distance between the potential posterior probabilities (p+− p−). The larger this
difference the more probable the reference point is shifted closer to the actual outcome.
Lending the terminology of Eliaz and Schotter (2010) the test’s value increases in the
confidence with which it leaves individual.13 In line with empirical results provided
by Eliaz and Schotter (2010) and Eliaz and Schotter (2007), the value of noninstru-
mental information (a) increases in the distance between the posteriors (p+ − p−) and
(b) increases in the time distance between test results and outcome resolution if γ1 is
negatively correlated with this time distance as we assume.
The result stated in Proposition I.1 generalizes an example provided by Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2009) in which there is no action choice.14 If an information has no impact
on subsequent decision-making it is sought if it is precise enough, but avoided if it is
too imprecise.15 KR conclude that agents may seek to cluster information in order to
receive one informative signal as opposed to a large number of less informative signals
(avoidance of piecemeal information). However, as is pointed out in the next step, the
more informative a signal, the more likely it is to affect behavior if optimal actions differ
13Instead of assuming a preference for confidence, i.e. making the difference between the posteriors an
argument of the utility function, as is done in Eliaz and Schotter (2010) the RDP model endogenizes
this “confidence effect” of information as a desire to manage one’s reference point.
14KR assume a prior p0 = 1/2 and posteriors q, 1 − q, q > 1/2. An interesting implication that is
missed by this assumption is that, holding the quality of the signal fixed (i.e. its error rates),
noninstrumental information looses value the more extreme the prior.
15This is an effect that is exactly opposite to the one predicted by models of anticipatory utility
(see e.g. Barigozzi and Levaggi (2008)). With anticipatory utility, the value of noninstrumental
information is strictly negative and decreasing in the signal’s precision.
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across states. But, instead of simply adding an instrumental value of information, the
potential to affect behavior also influences an information’s emotional impact. To see
this, it is necessary to derive the value of an instrumental signal.
Value of Instrumental Information
Remember that a test is instrumental if a positive result leads to treatment and a
negative result leads to no treatment. To determine the value of such a test one needs
to compare the expected utility of each information choice. Similar to the value of
noninstrumental information there is a term relating to the change in CGLU in the final
period and a term capturing the emotional impact of information. In addition to these
two terms, the value of instrumental information includes another two terms. First,
the information choice affects material utility in the final period through its impact
on treatment choice. Second, if the actual information choice differs from the planned
information choice, there will be a change in belief at t = 0 resulting in prospective
gain-loss utility (PGLU).
Take e.g. a DM who planned to take the test. The value of instrumental information
(VoII) given by the difference in expected utility between the two possible information
choices is
V oII(i) = E0U0(i|i)− E0U0(n|i)
=E0 [u2|i]− E0 [u2|n] + E0 [u1|i]− E0 [u1|n] + u0(i|i)− u0(n|i)
= E0 [m2|i]− E0 [m2|n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in expected material in t=2
+ E0 [v (F2, F1|i)]− E0 [v (F2, F1|n)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in expected CGLU in t=2
+ γ1E0 [v (F1, F0|i)]− 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in expected PGLU in t=1
+ 0− γ0v (F0(n), F−1(i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in PGLU in t=0
. (I.8)
Similarly, given the plan of choosing not to test (n), the difference in expected utility
between the two possible choices is
E0U0(i|n)− E0U0(n|n) =E0 [m2|i]− E0 [m2|n]
+ E0 [v (F2, F1|i)]− E0 [v (F2, F1|n)] (I.9)
+ γ1E0 [v (F1, F0)] + γ0v (F0(i), F−1(n)) .
Denote by W the value of instrumental information neglecting the term capturing the
gain-loss utility in period 0 due to a deviation from the planned information choice.
W ≡ E0U0(i|i)− E0U0(n|n) (I.10)
While V oII captures the value of information at the moment of choice, W can be
interpreted as the value of instrumental information at the planning stage. The latter
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is important to determine the DM’s preferences over plans. The former is important to
determine whether a plan prescribing instrumental testing is self-enforcing, i.e. whether
such a plan is a personal equilibrium.
The value of information W can be simplified to
W (NT d) =q+VT (p
+) + VoNI(NT d) + ED(NT d) (I.11)
W (T d) =q−VNT (p−) + VoNI(T d) + ED(T d) (I.12)
where T d(NT d) denotes T (NT ) being the default action. The exact derivation is
given in the Appendix. The equations show what determines the value of instrumental
information. The second term gives the value of this test if it were noninstrumental.
With reference to the discussion of the value of noninstrumental information we refer to
it as the information’s confidence value. This term is amended by the term q−VNT (or
q+VT respectively). It captures the test’s impact on utility by changing the treatment
decision away from the default action for one of the test results. We refer to it as
the information’s instrumental value as it is reminiscent of the classic economic idea of
information deriving its value from influencing decision-making. Finally, the last term is
the emotional differential capturing the difference in emotional impact stemming from
the information being instrumental. The triple structure we find contrasts with the
suggestion of Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009) that the value of instrumental
information can be found by simply adding the instrumental value to the value of
the information if it were noninstrumental. This procedure neglects the emotional
differential between instrumental and noninstrumental information.
While above considerations focus on the part of the value of instrumental information
that is independent of the planned information choice the value at the moment of choice
includes a term capturing the (dis-)utility arising from deviating from the planned
information choice. The value of information at the moment of choice is thus affected
by which information choice {i, n} was planned by the DM.
V oII(NT d, n) = W (NT d) + γ0ηq
+
[
p+∆s − λ(1− p+)∆h
]
(I.13)
V oII(NT d, i) = W (NT d) + γ0ηq
+
[
λp+∆s − (1− p+)∆h
]
(I.14)
V oII(T d, n) = W (T d) + γ0ηq
− [(1− p−)∆h − λp−∆s] (I.15)
V oII(T d, i) = W (T d) + γ0ηq
− [λ(1− p−)∆h − p−∆s] (I.16)
Equipped with these equations and the concept of preferred personal equilibrium we
can now determine which of the equations actually applies to a given test.
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The Value of a Test
Lemma I.1, I.2, and Corollary I.1 become very helpful when determining the value
of a test with error rates (−, +) to a DM with prior p0. First, the two posterior
probabilities (p−, p+) can be calculated via Bayes’ rule. Second, the default action of
the DM can be deduced using Lemma I.2.
There are two rather simple cases arising when the posteriors are extreme. First,
if both posteriors are above p∗NT (below p
∗
T ) the information must be noninstrumental
as no plan prescribing the test to be instrumental would be followed through (Lemma
I.1). Second, if p+ > p∗NT and p
− < p∗T the information must be instrumental as no
plan prescribing the test to be noninstrumental would be followed through (Corollary
I.1). In all other cases, the difference between W and V oNI determines whether the
DM perceives the test as instrumental or not. We can thus distinguish four cases and
their respective conditions for test refusal.
1. If p− > p∗NT , the only credible continuation plan, given that information is chosen,
is to treat no matter how the test turns out. The value of the test is V oNI(T d)
and ignorance is the PPE if and only if V oNI(T ) < 0.
2. If p+ < p∗T , the only credible continuation plan, given that information is cho-
sen, is not to treat no matter how the test turns out. The value of the test is
V oNI(NT d) and ignorance is the PPE if and only if V oNI(NT ) < 0.
3. If p+ > p∗NT and p
− < p∗T , the only credible continuation plan, given that infor-
mation is chosen, is to treat if tested positive and not to treat if tested negative.
The value of the test is given by V oII. Ignorance is the PPE if and only if
V oII(ad, n) < 0 and W < 0.
4. If p+ < p∗x or p
− > p∗y, there is more than one credible continuation plan d1 ∈ D∗1
given that information is chosen. The DM will prefer the test to be instrumental
if W > V oNI. If the DM prefers the test to be instrumental, the value of the
test is given by V oII and ignorance is the PPE if and only if V oII(n) < 0 and
W < 0. If the DM prefers the test to be noninstrumental, the value of the test is
given by V oNI and ignorance is the PPE if and only if V oNI < 0.
It is interesting to consider an analytically simple example that falls into the third
category: the value of a perfect test (− = + = 0). KR show that someone with
γ1 < 1 always prefers a perfect, but noninstrumental signal to remaining uninformed,
and someone with γ1 = 1 would be indifferent between receiving perfect information
and remaining ignorant (compare Proposition I.1). In addition, perfect information
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allows the individual to always make the right treatment choice. Perfect information
must therefore have instrumental value. Taking these two considerations, intuition
might lead us to expect that the value of information is strictly positive and that
ignorance is never a part of the preferred personal equilibrium if the test delivers
perfect information. It can be shown that there are cases in which this intuition is
wrong.
The Value of Perfect Information
A test with error rates − = + = 0 delivers perfect information about the state of
health. The intent of this section is to discuss the value of such perfect information
(VoPI). It can be shown that someone who is sufficiently confident to be healthy (p0 <
p∗) never rejects a perfect test while this might not necessarily be true for someone
who entertains considerable doubts with regard to his health (p0 < p
∗).
Proposition I.2. Preferences for perfect information. An individual with prior p0 < p
∗
never rejects perfect, instrumental information. On the other hand, for a person with
p0 > p
∗, and γ1 > C−DA−D =
rT
rT+∆h
there exists a degree of loss aversion λ∗ < ∞ above
which this person prefers to ignore perfect, instrumental information.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, why can it be optimal to reject perfect information for someone with T as
default action while this cannot happen for someone with NT as default action? Both
the instrumental value as well as the value for confidence of perfect information are
positive if γ1 < 1 regardless of the prior. The difference lies in the emotional differen-
tial. While it is strictly positive for someone with NT as default it is strictly negative
for someone with T as default action. Remember that the emotional differential mea-
sures the different emotional impact of instrumental information compared to if it were
noninstrumental.For someone with NT as default, good news feel worse but bad news
feel better because of instrumentality. For someone with T as a default, bad news feel
worse but good news feel better because of instrumentality. Due to loss aversion, the
DM cares primarily about the emotional impact of bad news. Thus, making good news
better while making bad news worse by an equal amount results in a more detrimental
emotional impact in expectation and vice versa. If the patient with default T cares suf-
ficiently about the emotional impact of information (γ1 is large enough) and the degree
to which he cares more about bad compared to good news is large enough (the degree of
loss aversion λ is large), the rise in expected emotional disutility due to instrumentality
outweighs the benefits of improved decision-making and higher confidence. It is then
optimal to reject perfect information. This cannot happen to someone with default NT
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because instrumentality implies improved decision-making as well as a more favorable
emotional impact, i.e. a positive emotional differential.
It is still unclear whether people actually exhibit a degree of loss aversion that is
high enough to make rejection of perfect information an optimal choice. There is some
literature providing estimates of loss aversion. The results most commonly support
estimates of λ of around 3, at least for monetary outcomes. A degree of loss aversion of
3 would be below λ∗ assuming reasonable parameter values. Proposition I.2, however,
illustrates the point that (a) the degree of loss aversion can have a positive or negative
impact on the value of information depending on the prior belief p0 and the extent to
which the DM cares about the emotional impact of information γ1, and (b) the value
of information does not necessarily increase when information becomes instrumental.
While the second observation has also been made in the literature on anticipatory
utility, the first observation points to a potential shortcoming of that literature. It has
been shown by Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) that models of anticipatory utility are unable
to accommodate information preferences that differ with the prior belief. Examples of
such behavior are presented in Eliaz and Spiegler’s article. Proposition I.2 indicates
that the model of reference-dependent preferences may be able to accommodate such
observations. The reason is simple and has been foreseen by Eliaz and Spiegler (2006):
in the model we use here it is changes in beliefs that are important, thus utility depends
both on posterior and prior beliefs.16
4. Screening and the Test as Gate-Keeper
The section on the value of perfect information underlines that the instrumentality of
information has two major effects on its value. First, there is a positive effect through
improved decision-making. Second, there is an effect through a change in the emotional
impact of information. While the example of perfect information illustrates the general
working of the model it might not be appropriate for the cases of test refusal presented
in the introduction as there exists no perfect test for most diseases. In addition, when
looking at screening tests for HIV, colon, or breast cancer, patients should not expect to
be treated without being tested positive. This is because (a) their prior probability of
being sick is small, and (b) their action choice without a positive test result is restricted
to “no treatment”. The first reason underlines that the tests we are concerned about
are screening tests, i.e. the test of patients that do not show symptoms of the disease.
The second reason highlights that for diseases such as HIV or cancer positive tests
16Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) voice concerns with regard to adding prior beliefs to the utility function
in addition to posterior beliefs. We comment on these in the conclusion of the chapter.
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work as a gate-keeper to treatment. It is thus important to investigate under what
circumstances the model can explain the refusal of an imperfect test by someone who
is rather certain to be healthy and with “no treatment” as default action.
Asymptomous screening is a type of medical test that is repeatedly a matter of
discussion. On the one hand, it concerns testing patients that do not exhibit any a
priori evidence of a disease as it amounts to testing a population that has a very low
prior probability of being sick. On the other hand, there are diseases for which the
benefits of identification of the disease are huge either because it facilitates containment
of the disease (e.g. HIV) or it allows early treatment that comes with huge benefits
compared to remaining untreated (e.g. breast cancer). It is often found that for
diseases for which physicians recommend screening and patients generally acknowledge
its benefits actual uptake rates fall below approval rates of patients.
This section seeks to replicate this setting in the following way. First, the patient’s
prior belief p0 is assumed to be close to zero. This and the fact that treatment is only
possible after a positive test result make NT (no treatment) the patient’s default action.
Second, we want to replicate a setting in which a physician recommends a screening
test but the patient refuses. As a consequence the physician must face incentives
different from the patient. We assume that the physician uses an expected utility
model of decision-making while having a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function given by m. This can be imagined as a situation in which the physician’s
incentives are such that he seeks to maximize the patient’s expected health status
E [m]. He does not take into account the prospective or contemporaneous gain-loss
utility arising from different decisions and health outcomes. This could be because
he faces an incentive scheme (e.g. through the reimbursement/payment schemes of
the medical system) that is purely focused on physical health outcomes. It could also
be the result of the physician seeing himself primarily as a provider of physical health
services leaving psychological services and considerations to specialized colleagues. The
recommendation of the test is thus based only on its potential to improve expected
physical health outcomes E [m] ignoring its psychological impact through gain-loss
utility.17
Recall that the value of perfect information is strictly positive for someone with
default NT . Thus ignorance can, if at all, only occur for tests with imperfect precision.
However, to simplify calculations, we assume a false-negative rate − = 0 that implies
p− = 0. This assumption should not be a significant one in the screening setting as
17There are, of course, numerous other sources of incentive misalignment between patient and physi-
cian. In order to single out the effect of emotional responses to information we assume gain-loss
utility to be the sole source of incentive divergence in this setting.
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the prior p0 is already assumed to be close to zero and p
− < p0. Furthermore, if at all,
it biases the results against ignorance as it increases the precision of the signal. Under
these assumptions we can find the following condition for the rejection of a screening
test.
Proposition I.3. Rejection of Screening. Assume an individual with RDP preferences
and a physician using an expected utility-based decision model. Assume further that
p0 < p
∗ such that without the test both agree on “no treatment” being the optimal
action. Finally, assume that there is no false-negative error − = 0. The physician
will recommend a test whenever the false-positive rate is such that p+ ≥ ∆h
∆h+∆s
. Given
a prior belief p0, there exists a range of tests, i.e. there exists a range of false-positive
rates +, for which the physician recommends the test while the patient refuses to take
the test if
∆s < q
−rNT
(
γ1 − ∆h
∆h + ∆s
)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition for test refusal is interesting when comparing it to the reasons pa-
tients give for refusing a medical test. First, the lower the perceived risk the more
likely is information refusal.18 The RHS is decreasing in p0, the subjective probabil-
ity of being sick, through its impact on q− making ignorance more likely the lower
p0. Second, although recognizing the benefits of treatment, people reject information
if treatment does not constitute a “cure”. As was explained in the model setup, the
fraction ∆h/(∆h + ∆s) can be interpreted as the cost-to-benefit ratio of treatment. If
benefits of treatment are large relative to costs, γ1 will exceed this ratio making the
RHS of the condition positive. In addition, rNT = rT + ∆h + ∆s, where rT can be
interpreted as a measure of effectiveness of treatment. If rT = 0 treatment constitutes
a perfect cure. Now, suppose rT is large relative to ∆h + ∆s, i.e. there is a beneficial
treatment which does not cure the disease (“care” instead of “cure”). This is the setting
where it is most likely that the RHS exceeds the LHS, i.e. the condition for ignorance
holds. Summing up, the setting in which the model predicts rejection of screening tests
to occur despite recommendation by a physician are those in which a patient may test
for a disease that (a) is severe, (b) for which there exists an efficient treatment but (c)
this treatment is rather ineffective compared to a perfect cure. This seems to match the
18Note, however, that this is conditional on p0 being close to zero, i.e., conditional on the individual
to have low risk. As section 2.5 and I.2 indicate there is a stronger incentive to refuse information
for high risks, i.e., those with p0 > p∗. The model thus provides an explanation why, on the one
side, one finds evidence for larger rejection rates among high-risk populations, yet, on the other
side, not being at risk is a frequently mentioned reason for test decline.
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situation with the medical screening tests presented in the introduction: the diagnosis
of a predisposition for Alzheimer’s disease, for various types of cancer, or the diagnosis
of HIV. There is a treatment available that is quite beneficial, but there is no perfect
cure. Thus the model’s prediction is in line with the stated reason of “there is no cure”
for information rejection.
5. Comparative Statics
We are now interested in how certain parameters of the model affect the value of
information and the incentives for test refusal. We look both on the impact of a
variation in the parameters on noninstrumental and instrumental information. For
simplicity, we look at the value of instrumental information W at the planning stage
thus abstracting from the utility from deviation at t = 0. In addition, for instrumental
information we confine ourselves to the value of perfect information. Concerning the
question which parameters to vary, it helps to have a second look at the model setup
where the interpretation of the different parameters is discussed.
First, we look at a variation in the health outcomes m. More precisely, we ask what
happens if the benefits of treatment, the costs of treatment, and the severeness of the
disease change. Second, we investigate what happens when the parameters γ0 and γ1,
that capture the impact of prospective gain-loss utility, are varied as these are assumed
to be connected to the timing of testing. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Effectiveness of Treatment
An increase in the effectiveness of treatment (a) increases ∆s, the net benefit of treat-
ment, and (b) decreases rT , that is the smaller the more effective the treatment.
Observation 2. Treatment Effectiveness. If the test is noninstrumental, a change in
treatment effectiveness has no impact on test uptake. If the test is instrumental, an in-
creased treatment effectiveness increases the incentives for test refusal among those who
would treat without further information but reduces incentives for test refusal among
those who would (or could) not treat without being tested positive.
It is important to highlight the difference of this result to the result obtained in
a standard decision theoretic framework when assuming von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions. In the latter framework the value of information is positive, thus
information desirable, whenever the probability of sickness after a positive test p+ is
larger than ∆h/(∆h+∆s). The question whether to obtain a test is, hence, a function of
the accuracy of the test through p+ on the one hand, and the efficiency of the treatment
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through the cost-benefit ratio ∆h/(∆h + ∆s) on the other hand. A test can thus be
desirable in a standard framework if treatment is highly efficient, though not necessarily
highly effective. In contrast to this, a patient with reference-dependent preferences
will be affected by treatment effectiveness, in addition to treatment efficiency, in his
information decision. This becomes most obvious when considering the importance of
treatment effectiveness for the rejection of screening tests as described in the previous
section.
Costs of Treatment
The desire to be tested is also a function of the expected costs of treatment. A variation
in these costs can be investigated while holding rT and rNT fixed. A rise in the costs of
treatment increases ∆h, but decreases ∆s, the net benefit of treatment to a sick, when
treatment costs are identical across states as is assumed.
Observation 3. Treatment Costs. The value of noninstrumental information is inde-
pendent of treatment costs. In contrast, if information is instrumental, an increase in
treatment cost has a negative effect on test uptake for those who have “no treatment”
as a default action. The effect on those with “treatment” as default action depends on
the degree of loss aversion.
One can, again, compare this result to the predictions of a standard decision-theoretic
framework. As a rise in treatment costs decreases the efficiency of treatment, it leads
to lower incentives for testing for someone with NT as default and higher incentives
for someone with T as default. If patients have reference-dependent preferences the
incentives in favor of testing for someone with NT as default decrease stronger in
treatment costs and the incentives for testing for someone with T as default increase
less in treatment costs compared to the predictions of standard decision theory.
Severity of the Disease
Finally, we are concerned whether the severity of the disease itself (rNT ) has an impact
on the value of information. It is easy to show that this effect is rather simple.
Observation 4. Severity of Disease. Holding the characteristics of available treatment,
i.e. the benefit-to-cost ratio (∆s + ∆h)/∆h, and the relative effectiveness (rT/rNT ),
constant, a variation in the severity of disease has no impact on uptake rates.
Note that Observation 4 does not imply that the value of information is independent
of the severity of the disease. It highlights that the sign of the value, and thus test
uptake, is not a function of how serious a disease is, but of how likely it is, how the
prospects (treatment potential) look like, and what kind of test is available.
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Timing of Testing
KR suggest that the impact of gain-loss utility depends negatively on the distance
between the point in time gain-loss utility is realized through a change in belief and
the point in time the material utility is realized this belief is about. Denote by τ1(τ0)
the time distance between information reception in period 1 (information choice in
period 0) and the resolution of health outcomes in period 2. KR thus suggest that
∂γ1/∂τ1 < 0 and ∂γ0/∂τ0 < 0. Taking up these assumptions we can address questions
concerning the timing of testing.
First, consider a variation in the speed of testing. Fixing the time of information
choice τ0, an increase in the speed of testing implies an increase in τ1. In addition, one
can investigate the desirability of earlier tests. To vary the time of the test, without
varying its speed, both τ0 and τ1 need to be varied simultaneously by an equal amount,
say τ . While the effect of a variation in the speed of testing is straightforward, the
effect of earlier tests is more ambiguous.
Observation 5. Timing of Tests.
(i) The value of information, be it instrumental or not, is increasing in the speed of
testing. Faster tests induce higher uptake rates.
(ii) If information is noninstrumental, earlier tests have higher value. Information
rejection is less likely the earlier the test is conducted. If information is instrumental,
earlier tests have a higher value if
q−(λ−1) [(1− p−)∆h + (p+ − p−)rT + p−∆s] [−∂γ1
∂τ1
]
>
[
λp+∆s − (1− p+)∆h
] [−∂γ0
∂τ0
]
when “no treatment” is the default action, and
q+(λ−1) [(1− p−)∆h + (p+ − p−)rT + p−∆s] [−∂γ1
∂τ1
]
>
[
λ(1− p−)∆h − p−∆s
] [−∂γ0
∂τ0
]
when “treatment” is the default action.
The impact of an increase in the speed of testing is straightforward. As γ1 is the
weight on the emotional impact of information, that is, in expectation, always negative,
the value of information always increases in the speed of testing. The lower the weight
on prospective gain-loss utility in period 1, the higher the value of information. Thus,
the faster the patient receives his test results, the more desirable is a test. The impor-
tance of the parameter γ1, and thus the speed of testing, is underlined by the fact that
it plays a role in every condition for information rejection (see Propositions I.2 and I.3)
we have found. Each of these conditions says that γ1 needs to be sufficiently large to
make ignorance the PPE. The model thus identifies the speed of testing as a crucial
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factor in mitigating the emotional distress associated with information reception, and
as a key variable in influencing test uptake.
The effect of the time of testing is similar to the effect of testing speed if information
is noninstrumental, as for noninstrumental information there is no gain-loss utility in
period 0. As ∂γ1
∂τ1
< 0, the value of a noninstrumental test increases the earlier the test
is conducted. As was already discussed in the section on the value of noninstrumental
information this effect is in line with empirical findings by Eliaz and Schotter (2007).
Concerning the value of instrumental information, a change in the time of the test
leads to an equally-sized change in τ0 and τ1. There are two effects. The first one is
familiar from the change in the speed of testing. It has a positive sign. The second
term has a negative sign if the test’s error rates are low enough, i.e. p+ is large enough
and p− small enough. Assuming sufficient accuracy it is not straightforward to see
which effect dominates. One can, however, make the following predictions. Suppose
∂γ0/∂τ0 = ∂γ1/∂τ1. If rT is relatively large compared to ∆1 + ∆2 the first effect
dominates. Thus, again, for diseases for which there is no perfect cure available, the
second effect will dominate. Second, suppose γ0 (γ1) is a convex function of τ0 (τ1),
i.e. the impact of gain-loss utility declines non-linearly in the time distance. Thus
∂γ0/∂τ0 > ∂γ1/∂τ1 which implies that the first effect is given a higher weight. Under
these conditions, unavailability of a perfect cure and/or a higher responsiveness of the
emotional impact in period 1 compared to period 0 to changes in timing, earlier tests
are regarded with higher value by the patient. As earlier tests decrease γ1 this results
in higher uptake rates of tests.
These considerations are in line with observations concerning increased uptake rates
for faster HIV tests.19 Patients seem to prefer faster tests even if the increase in speed
comes at the cost of reduced accuracy. While this observation can also be explained by
travel/time costs associated with collecting the test result when a second appointment
is necessary, Observation 5 suggests an additional psychological motive for the observed
preference for faster tests.
6. Conclusion
The chapter investigates how anticipated emotional responses to information affect in-
formation preferences. It seeks to highlight the connection between instrumentality and
emotional impact of information and how they jointly determine the value of informa-
tion. It is shown that instrumentality influences the emotional impact of information
19See e.g. Kassler, Dillon, Haley, Jones, and Goldman (1997) and Greenwald, Burstein, Pincus, and
Branson (2006).
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and this influence depends on an individual’s prior belief. The impact of loss aversion
on testing decisions may thus be quite different across people. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible to isolate different determinants of refusal rates. A large value of the parameter
γ1, measuring the impact of prospective gain-loss utility, can be identified as a major
determinant of test refusal. If the emotional effects of information play a large role
one may look into ways how to dampen these effects. One possibility would be to
address timing issues, in particular the speed of testing. It is also worth noting that
uptake rates vary with treatment characteristics. Here, the availability of cure plays
an important role. This is a result in contrast to the value of information in classic
decision theory that does not depend on the size of potential benefits, i.e. on the gap
between actual benefits and perfect cure. In this light it is worth remembering that it
is “absence of a cure” that is stated as a rational for test refusal, and not that available
treatments provide little benefit.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) raise concerns about incorporating prior beliefs in addition
to posterior beliefs into the utility function in order to explain anomalies in informa-
tional choice. Incorporating priors in addition to posteriors into the consequence space
is problematic from a revealed-preferences perspective as there is no choice problem
that could reveal a preference over different priors. We agree. Yet, we find it important
to note that this is not what the model of reference-dependent preferences we employ
here does. In particular, the prior is not a part of the consequence space. The conse-
quence space in the information choice remains to be described by posterior beliefs as
in models of anticipatory utility. It is the preference order over this consequence space
that depends on the prior.
With an ongoing debate on whether to transfer responsibility for medical decisions
towards patients (“shared responsibility”) it needs to be underlined that physicians’
and patients’ decisions can be quite different. If physicians use decision models based
on expected utility theory thus not fully incorporating patients’ preferences they will
disagree with patients even if they are able to perfectly elicit the desirability of differ-
ent health outcomes. The model presented here offers the patient’s intent to balance
material (or here: physical) and psychological concerns as a possible explanatory.
Finally, while we concentrate on the issue of evaluating medical information here,
conclusions can be transferred to the evaluation of information in similar settings, i.e.
to decision problems that exhibit a clear state preference on the side of the individual.
It is worth investigating information preferences that result from reference-dependent
preferences. With mounting evidence that a person’s reference point is a function
of his expectations, it is, at least partly, a result of prior information. Hence, when
an individual’s preferences are influenced by prior information acquisition and these
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preferences determine future information acquisition, mutual interdependencies arise
between information choice and information preferences. It would be worth investi-
gating the results of these interactions in settings different from the one investigated
here.
II. Product Lines, Product Design,
and Limited Attention
We analyze how firms design their product lines when facing
customers with limited attention. We assume that consumers
simplify complex problems by neglecting some relevant aspects.
Whether and to what extent a customer considers a particular
attribute depends on the dispersion of that attribute in the set of
alternatives. A firm may thus influence its customers’ attention
through the range of products it makes available. We show that a
firm can increase its profit by introducing goods that have the sole
function of manipulating consumer attention and discuss how a
firm can profitably employ such manipulating goods.
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1. Introduction
Most products have a whole set of attributes and features that are valued by the
customer. For example, a car can be equipped with features like a sunroof, electric
windows, or with a certain number of horsepower or safety features. Apart from these
rather salient characteristics there are many others that are less noticeable. Examples
would be the average durability of the gear box, the seating comfort, or the design of the
cigarette lighter. Hence, such complex products like a car have a plethora of different
attributes that all add to the overall quality of the product. Although information
is freely available for lots of these attributes, consumers usually focus on a few key
variables when making their purchase decision. Such systematic neglect of important
information can arguably be classified as limited attention.
We propose a model of limited attention and analyze its implications for product de-
sign. As most consumer products have several characteristics, any purchase decision is
a complex problem of trading off advantages in some dimensions against disadvantages
in others. We posit that the way in which a decision-maker pays attention to different
aspects of the problem reflects a need to simplify such complex decisions. The result-
ing attention allocation embodies both the decision-maker’s valuation of the different
aspects of a product, including its price, and the extent to which the available options
(products and outside option) differ. We investigate how a firm optimally designs its
product line when facing customers whose attention is determined in such a way.
We start with the optimal design of a single product that is offered by a monopolist.
The optimal design reflects both customers’ valuation and the production cost of a
characteristic as in conventional models. In addition, the optimal design reflects the
extent to which customers consider a particular attribute (the attention allocation)
and how a particular design changes this attention allocation. The customers’ ten-
dency to focus on a few key characteristics creates an incentive for the firm to offer
simple products. Such an incentive towards simplicity is interesting in light of a de-
velopment of converging industries in which products include more and more features
that substitute for previously distinct devices, such as cell phones including cameras1,
and an increasing debate over “feature fatigue”.2 Further, we find customers to profit
from their inattention as it curbs the monopolist’s ability to exploit its market power.
1While such a development makes life more convenient for customers by replacing two previously
distinct devices by one device, it adds difficulty by making that one device more complex.
2There is a discussion whether customers actually value simplicity or complexity. See e.g. Thompson,
Hamilton, and Rust (2005) or Rust, Thompson, and Hamilton (2006). For an opposing view see
e.g. Norman (2007). Our model of limited attention may add to this discussion a framework that
allows to conceptualize a cost of complexity.
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This is in strong contrast to the previous literature cited below that underlines firms’
capabilities to exploit inattentive customers.
After considering the optimal design of a single product we investigate how a firm
can profit from expanding its product line. We show that there is an incentive to
offer more than one product to a set of customers with homogeneous preferences. This
incentive to offer differentiated products stems from the possibility to influence the
attention allocation by appropriately changing the choice set of the customers. One
of the central propositions of the chapter is that firms will offer at least two kinds
of products. There is a primary good that is intended to be sold to consumers. In
addition, firms produce what we call bait goods. These are not intended to be sold but
have the sole purpose of manipulating consumer attention in a way that is favorable
to the firm.3 These bait goods tend to be high-end, state-of-the-art products that
exploit technological boundaries. This finding may explain why shops usually put
their must valuable, high-end merchandise on display. Optimal information provision
or the minimization of search cost would suggest to put the product that is most
commonly sold in the most prominent space. Yet, we see electronics shops featuring
their largest plasma TVs and car dealers placing their most attractive sports cars in
the most prominent shop spaces. Our model suggests that firms use such high-end
products strategically to boost their customers’ willingness-to-pay.4 Finally, we find
that the optimal attention manipulation weighs the incentive to redirect attention to
more profitable characteristics of the product against the incentive to maximize the
attention that is paid to each characteristic of the product.
We join an emerging strand of the economic literature that incorporates limited at-
tention into economic models. Gabaix (2011) develops a model of limited attention in
which attention is the optimal solution to an attention allocation problem. Our ap-
proach draws heavily on his work, as the attention allocation we assume can be derived
from an attention allocation problem with cognitive costs similar to the one proposed
by Gabaix (2011). However, our modeling of the attention allocation differs from his
approach as we employ some modified assumptions we deem appropriate to reflect the
3The assumption that a bait good is only used to manipulate consumer attention is useful to simplify
the analysis. We later present an extension in which the bait good can also be profitably sold to
some consumers. One example would be luxury goods that are sold to a small population of rich
consumers and at the same time serve as a bait good to the larger population of less wealthy
consumers.
4Similarly, Vikander (2010) reports a story about Audi advertising its $118,000 R8 in the half-time
of Super Bowl XLII. The advertisement spot cost Audi six million dollars. Since only a minority of
Super Bowl viewers are able to afford such a car one may wonder why Audi did not choose other,
far less costly marketing channels to reach potential customers.
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costs of complexity. A more detailed comparison is deferred to later. In addition,
the focus of our work are the implications of limited attention on market outcomes like
product design and price. Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) propose a model of focus-weighted
utility that exhibits some parallels to our model. In an earlier version (Ko˝szegi and
Szeidl (2011)), they show that a firm has an incentive to concentrate the advantages of
its products in one dimension while spreading the disadvantages across as many dimen-
sions as possible. While such an incentive is also present in our model (yet for different
reasons, as we will explain in the next section), we derive more detailed results regard-
ing the optimal product design. Zhou (2007) studies a monopolist’s optimal product
design if an advertising technology is available that highlights some of the product’s
characteristics. He investigates the potential and consequences of screening if customers
are differently susceptible to such advertising. In our model, the way how customers
allocate their attention is not determined by advertising, but by the attributes of the
offered products. As this describes a more specific manipulation “technology”, we are
able to investigate the scope and limitations of such a manipulation. Also working on
limited attention, Spiegler (2006a) and Spiegler (2006b) study the optimal industry be-
havior if consumers act according to the S(1) sampling routine developed by Osborne
and Rubinstein (1998). Beyond the attention heuristic employed, we deem the most
important difference to be the welfare implications of limited attention. In Spiegler
(2006a) and Spiegler (2006b) customers can be exploited by firms which obfuscate
their products. Similarly, Rubinstein (1993) describes a firm’s incentive to use com-
plex pricing schemes to extract additional profits from boundedly rational customers.
In contrast, we highlight that limited attention may primarily hurt the firm while ben-
efiting customers, despite a firm’s ability to manipulate attention. Eliaz and Spiegler
(2011) propose a model that also features products with the sole function to attract
attention. Consumers only consider the products of a subset of the firms in the market.
Therefore, a firm uses attention grabbers if it wants consumers to consider its prod-
ucts. In contrast we investigate a firm’s potential to attract or distract attention from
product characteristics (including the price), thereby manipulating the desirability of a
purchase. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer
(2013) develop a framework of limited attention to account for choice set effects. Their
idea of limited attention is inspired by psychological findings concerning the perception
of alternatives. These papers explain context effects through changes in the reference
point that in turn influence the perception of different alternatives. Our framework
models the impact of cognitive restrictions - not errors or biases in perception - on
market outcomes. We will discuss the differences in more detail in the next section.
There is a large literature on choice set effects (Simonson (1989), Huber, Payne,
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and Puto (1982)) and their impact on behavior in various settings (Herne (1997), Mc-
Fadden (1999), Benartzi and Thaler (2002)). Several explanations for compromise
effects5 have been proposed - ranging from extremeness aversion (Simonson and Tver-
sky (1992)) to information inference from choice sets (Wernerfelt (1995), Kamenica
(2008)). Kamenica (2008) shows that information inference creates an incentive to
offer premium loss leaders. Though not explicitly relating his model to the compro-
mise effect Vikander (2010) proposes a model of status effects and describes a firm’s
incentives to advertise premium products to an audience which is not able to afford
the purchase. We show that in our model there is an incentive to offer premium prod-
ucts which are not necessarily intended for sale. Yet in our framework this incentive
is based on a firm’s ability to manipulate its customers’ attention, and not on a firm’s
attempt to signal product value (Kamenica (2008)) or increase its products’ prestige
value (Vikander (2010)).
Johnson and Myatt (2006) describe how a firm may optimally design its product(s)
to increase or decrease the dispersion of customer valuation. They find that a firm
wants to concentrate its product’s value in a single characteristic if a firm is confined
to offer products with fixed expected value and there exists one characteristic for which
customer tastes vary strongly. Furthermore, they investigate a monopolist’s incentives
to expand or contract its product line as the taste dispersion changes. In contrast, we
discuss an incentive to expand the product line without any taste dispersion.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and
analyze the underlying attention process. Section 3 is dedicated to the derivation of
the optimal product design if only one product can be supplied. This is extended
in Section 4 where a firm can introduce an additional product that is designed to
manipulate consumer attention. We continue by discussing some possible extensions
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Role of Attention
We assume a difference between experienced utility and decision utility. Experienced
utility measures the satisfaction or welfare that customers derive from a choice. In con-
trast, decision utility depicts the way in which customers choose between alternatives.
Decision utility thus not only depends on the welfare a customer derives from an alter-
native, but also on the way choices are made, and thus encompasses choice procedures,
perceptions of alternatives (at the moment of choice), salience of attributes and alter-
5The compromise effect posits that expanding the choice set by a product which is more extreme in
one attribute than any of the previously available options makes products which are mediocre in
that attribute look more favorably.
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natives, and the like. The distinction is supposed to depict the contrast between utility
as a measure of welfare and utility as a tool to model choice (behavior).6 In our model
the attention paid to attributes results in the difference between experienced utility
and decision utility. The limited cognitive ability of humans to decide optimally on the
plethora of information that is available to them forces them to focus on a subset of a
problem’s dimensions. We do not model any costs of obtaining information or costs of
searching. Instead, we assume that all product information is readily available, but that
consumers have problems of converting product information into an overall assessment
of desirability. While we introduce the process of attention allocation and consumer
choice and the underlying intuitions in the main text, we prove in the Appendix that
the proposed attention allocation can itself be derived from an optimization problem.
The decision-maker faces a problem of deciding between a finite set A of alternatives
a ∈ A. Each of these alternatives is described by a vector of attributes (xaj )j∈J ∈ Rn.
J denotes the set of attributes according to which it is possible to distinguish between
the alternatives a ∈ A, and n = |J |. Let experienced utility of an alternative a ∈ A be
denoted by
u(a) =
∑
j∈J
vix
a
j .
The term vj ∈ R measures the (marginal) value of attribute j to the decision maker
(henceforth DM). The comparison of and choice between all alternatives in A is thus
an n-dimensional problem.
The consumer’s choice is based on decision utility however. Formally, the decision
utility of an alternative is a function of the experienced utility of and the attention
paid to each attribute:
u˜(a) =
∑
j∈J
mjvjx
a
j . (II.1)
The term mj ∈ [0, 1] is the attention parameter associated with dimension j. If mj = 0,
dimension j is completely neglected. In this case, any differences between alternatives
in dimension j will be irrelevant for the decision. We normalize the attention such that
mj ≤ 1, ∀j.7 Since attention is normalized such that mj ≤ 1, an attention allocation
of mj = 1 means that the DM fully considers differences in dimension j when making
her choice. Note here that we are back in the rational model if mj = mj′ > 0, ∀j, j′.
6For a distinction of the concepts of experienced utility and decision utility, see Kahneman and
Tversky (1984) and Kahneman (2000).
7Note that this normalization is without loss of generality since a decision utility with some attention
vector m yields the same choice behavior as a decision utility with an attention vector α ·m for
α > 0.
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To construct the attention allocation (mj)j∈J , let µj measure the maximal utility
difference in dimension j between any two alternatives in the choice set A:
µj = vj
(
max
a∈A
xaj −min
a∈A
xaj
)
.
We assume a complete ranking of dimensions according to µj. Let r : J → {1, ..., n}
be the function that assigns an attention rank to each dimension such that:
µj > µj′ ⇒ r(j) < r(j′)
where r(j) denotes the attention rank of the attribute j.8 Having determined the
attention order we now turn to the cardinal measure mj of attention based on the
attention hierarchy. Define:9
mj = max
{
0, 1− κr(j)
µj
}
.
The threshold κr(j) is the minimum level of µ that a dimension with attention rank r
needs to have in order to be taken into account. The threshold κr(j) can be thought
of as the cognitive cost of considering the r-th dimension of a problem. We make the
following assumptions with regard to the thresholds κr:
Assumption II.1.
(i) κ1 = 0: There is always one problem dimension that is fully considered.
(ii) κr < κr+1, ∀r ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}: The attention threshold is increasing with each
additional dimension that is considered.
Let us give some motivation for our modeling of mj. First, note that we do not
model a problem of strategic attention allocation. While an optimization problem
may, to some extent, underly the way in which attention is distributed, we assume it
to be given at the moment of choice. Instead, we assume a particular rule how the
attention parameters mj are determined and give empirical and analytical reasons why
this rule is sensible.
Note that we do not intend to model perceptional mistakes or biases. The DM is able
to perfectly determine differences between alternatives in each dimension. The limita-
tions in the cognitive process arise when the DM needs to integrate the information
8If there are dimensions j, j′ that tie, µj = µj′ , we assume the application of tie-breaking rules.
Assume e.g. vj 6= vj′∀j, j′ ∈ J and µj = µj′ ∩ vj > vj′ ⇒ r(j) < r(j′). The exact tie-breaking
rule is of less importance. What is important, is that the attention ranking is a strict order, i.e.
∀j, j′ ∈ J, j 6= j′ : r(j) 6= r(j′).
9To let mj always be well-defined let mj = 0 if µj = 0 and κr(j) > 0, and let mj = 1 if µj = 0 and
κr(j) = 0.
On Barriers to Informed Decision-Making 44
about differences between alternatives in multiple dimensions with his own evaluation
concerning the importance of each dimension in order to reach an evaluation of each
alternative. This task necessarily includes making judgments as to how an advantage in
one dimension trades off against a disadvantage or adds to an advantage in another di-
mension. Such judgments require the decision-maker to reach a conclusion with regard
to the commensurability of different dimensions. For example, when deciding between
different cars a decision-maker needs to make a judgment as to how an advantage of one
car over another in terms of speed compensates for a disadvantage in terms of safety,
or how it adds up to an advantage in terms of price, etc. As the number of relevant
dimensions increases, so does the cognitive effort of evaluating all resulting trade offs.
We argue that this need for commensurability judgments produces the complexity of a
high-dimensional choice problem. We seek to model how a decision-maker deals with
such complexity by simplification through neglect and prioritization of aspects of the
decision problem.1011
The attention allocation is to reflect a need to simplify a complex problem in order
to be able to solve it. A sensible way to simplify is then to concentrate on those
dimensions that are most important to the choice problem at hand. Therefore, the
decision-maker will focus attention on those dimensions in which the largest utility
differences occur: ∂mj/∂µj ≥ 0.12 If the utility differences are sufficiently small, they
are in a literal sense “negligible”, such that µj ≤ κr(j) ⇒ mj = 0. However, since there
are no commensurability judgments needed in a one-dimensional problem, and thus
the DM faces a simple problem, there should be no difference between experienced and
10This might be the largest conceptual difference from other models of salience and limited attention.
In our model, the reason why the weightings mj vary across dimensions is not that differences
between alternatives are perceived as being larger or smaller than they actually are. In contrast,
the weightings mj express the extent to which differences between alternatives are appreciated in
the decision process.
11This is in contrast to previous literature on “choice overload” that highlights the number of al-
ternatives as the basis of complexity and therefore suggests pruning the choice set to achieve
simplification. If complexity is based in the necessity to make commensurability judgments be-
tween dimensions, as we argue here, pruning the choice set may not simplify the problem since as
little as two alternatives can vary on a large number of dimensions.
12Empirical results on this issue differ. Results of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) indicate that
consumers indeed often tend to pay higher attention to more dispersed attributes. They report
that consumers are more sensitive to changes in the excise tax, which is included in the posted
price, than to changes in sales tax, which is added at the register. As the posted price is larger
than the additional tax that is added at the register, the two alternatives “buying”/“not buying”
differ more in the posted price dimension than they differ in the additional tax-dimension. Thus,
the more salient dimension seems to be the more dispersed one. For experimental results that
challenge this assumption, see however Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011).
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decision utility. This motivates part (i) of Assumption II.1. Incorporating more and
more dimensions into the decision requires more and more commensurability judgments
which becomes increasingly difficult. This is reflected in part (ii) of Assumption II.1.
Furthermore, it motivates our assumption of a strict attention hierarchy. Allowing for
dimensions to “share” an attention rank would result in the possibility that a decision-
maker could perfectly solve a choice problem with arbitrarily many dimensions if it
just so happens that µj = µj′ ,∀j, j′ ∈ J .
sider an additional attribute when the complexity of the problem increases. This
assumption implies that there is an attention hierarchy as it matters which attributes
are considered “first”.13 Attributes that are ranked higher in the attention hierarchy
have to meet stronger requirements for being taken into account. In addition, we
assume that this increased complexity cost is reflected in a lower attention weight
given that the attribute is in fact considered. Thus, differences in attributes that are
ranked higher are appreciated to a greater extent.
One implication of assuming the ranking to be strict is that attention must vary
between dimensions unless both are neglected (∀mj > 0 : mj 6= m′j, ∀j′ 6= j). This is
important because it implies that behavior is indeed distorted by limited attention. To
see this, recall from the functional form of the decision utility (II.1) that if attention
would be uniformly dampened (e.g. with mj = 0.5, ∀j ∈ J), decision utility would
just be a uniform transformation of experienced utility. In this case, a decision based
on experienced utility is always the same as one based on decision utility. For limited
attention to have a behavioral effect we need at least two dimensions j and j′ which
are allocated different levels of attention, i.e. mj 6= mj. Our assumptions imply that
any two dimensions that are considered receive a different level of attention.
Comparison to Other Models of Limited Attention
The proposed model of attention is conceptually very close to two models that have been
proposed in the literature. We incorporate the characteristics of these models that we
deem fit to depict the simplification process (and its cause) we have described above.
In addition, we discuss where the models differ and why we deem these differences
important. The first model on which we build is Gabaix (2011). We take over the
idea of sparsity, meaning that some problem dimensions are neglected by the DM if
they are not “important enough”. A major difference of our approach to the attention
process of Gabaix is that the threshold κr(j) associated with a dimension j depends on
13Note that the attention hierarchy is not meant to literally depict the timely sequence of how the DM
takes attributes into account. Instead the attention hierarchy depicts how important an attribute
is in the decision.
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its relative importance, i.e. on how large its value and dispersion are compared to other
dimensions’ values and dispersions. While we retain the assumption that the vector of
thresholds (κ1, ..., κn) is exogenous, we impose a structure that we deem appropriate to
reflect the notion of rising complexity costs as reflected in Assumption II.1. First, the
decision-making process should not be distorted if the problem is not complex. Second,
we argue that an increase in complexity should be reflected by an increased difficulty
to consider more and more dimensions of a problem. This motivates our assumption
of increasing thresholds κr(j).
A second difference is the distinction between the attention, captured by mj, and the
valuation of a dimension, vj. This distinction might seem superfluous at first glance
as neither can be observed in isolation. Yet this simple distinction spares us the need
to normalize our parameters to make salience independent of scaling. We find this
feature desirable as we are concerned that some of the behavioral implications that
Gabaix derives are based on this rescaling. In that sense certain behavior is predicted
to occur not because people are inattentive but because this inattention is argued to
be scale-independent.
Another model with which our model shares important characteristics is focus-
dependent utility of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013). They posit that the weighting of a
dimension (mj) is a strictly increasing function of the maximal utility difference as-
sociated with that dimension (µj). Our model shares this feature conditional on a
dimension being considered, but not fully considered (µj > κr(j) > 0). However, one
major difference is that our model also allows a dimension to be fully neglected. We
find this characteristic important as we see little sense in focusing attention if this
does not entail a simplification of the problem to be solved. While the focusing model
of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) (and also the salience model of Bordalo, Gennaioli, and
Shleifer (2012) discussed below) may approximate zero attention weights for appro-
priately chosen parameters, there is a crucial difference between modeling neglect and
approximating it. First, in all these models, including ours, the modeled biases result
in a propensity to make judgment errors. Yet, in contrast to other models we point
at a benefit of such a bias: the increased simplicity of the choice problem stemming
from neglect. In Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013)’s model the focusing decision-maker solves
a problem that is equally complex as the original problem yet is biased away from
the original problem. Apart from these conceptual difference, an important difference
between modeling and approximating neglect concerns their behavioral predictions.
Suppose we find a decision-maker indifferent between two options that differ on a large
number of dimensions. Models that only approximate neglect would predict a strict
preference whenever one of the options is changed by only a very small amount in one
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out of, say, a million dimensions. In contrast, our model predicts the existence of some
dimensions in which small changes will remain unrecognized and thus will not result in
the indifference to be broken. A second difference to the model of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl
(2013) is the assumption of the attention hierarchy to be strict. This means that it is
not possible to have two (or more) dimensions that receive the same, positive amount of
attention mj. Allowing for this to happen, Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) predict unbiased
choices in “balanced” choice problems.14 Their model thus predicts unbiased choices in
arbitrarily complex problems, conditional on these problems being balanced. We deem
such a model property to be at odds with our idea of how complexity problems arise
and therefore insist on a strict attention hierarchy.
Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013)
present a model of salience-based choice. In contrast to our model, the modeling of
salience is inspired by observations on perception (and not cognition) and assumes
choice to be the result of multiple binary comparisons. More technically, the weight-
ing does not only depend on the available choice set but also on the current binary
comparison. Thus, an attribute’s salience in an alternative may be quite different de-
pending on which two alternatives are currently examined. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and
Shleifer (2013) applies the model to explain choice set effects such as the compromise
effect. As others before15, he explains choice set effects by assuming that the choice
set influences the decision-makers reference point, and thereby the evaluation of the
individual alternatives. In contrast, our model does not involve the specification of a
reference point. Choice set effects occur since the decision-maker focuses on a subset
of the relevant problem dimensions, and the focusing procedure depends on which al-
ternatives are available. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) provide an interesting
and important discussion how ordering principles governing the weighting of attributes,
that are a main issue in our setting, may conflict with perceptional phenomena like
diminishing sensitivity. In contrast, we assume the perception of differences to be given
and concentrate on the obstacles arising from the need to integrate multiple perceived
differences into an overall evaluation of desirability.
Closer to our understanding of attention is the model of rational inattention of Sims
(2003). Like him, we do not seek to model costly information acquisition or informa-
tion production (if one wants to understand perceptional biases in this way), but the
14In a balanced choice problem the two available options differ by the same amount of utility in each
dimension in which one alternative has an advantage over the other, and by the same utility differ-
ence in each dimension in which this alternative has a disadvantage compared to the other. Utility
differences must thus be equal across advantage dimensions, and across disadvantage dimensions,
but may differ between advantage and disadvantage dimensions.
15See e.g.Drolet, Simonson, and Tversky (2000) and Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004).
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problems associated with processing available information. Yet, while he focuses on
the limits of data processing-capability, we seek to model the cognitive costs associated
with solving a complex optimization problem.16
3. Optimal Product Design of a Monopolist
We want to investigate the problem of a monopolist designing a single product to be
sold to customers with the described attention process. Suppose there is a set I of m
qualities (save the price) that a product can have. Together with the price the purchase
problem thus features up to m + 1 dimensions: J = I ∪ p.17 For now, suppose that
the level of each quality can take any non-negative real value: qi ∈ R+, ∀i = 1, ..., n
and vi 6= vi′ , ∀i 6= i′. There is one attribute xp that denotes the wealth of the decision
maker. W.l.o.g. we normalize initial wealth to zero such that a value xap ≤ 0 means
that alternative a is associated with a price of P = −xap. Before we turn to the optimal
design problem define a null good as an alternative with q0i = 0, ∀i ∈ I.
A monopolist seeks to design a product that maximizes profit subject to the cus-
tomer’s willingness to buy it. To ensure that the customer is willing to purchase the
good, the decision utility of the good (alternative a) must be weakly higher than the
decision utility of abstaining from the purchase (alternative b). Note that alternative b
is equivalent to a null good that is free of charge. Therefore, not buying is associated
with a decision utility (and experienced utility) of zero. Part (i) of Assumption II.1
then implies that the monopolist cannot extract a positive profit by selling a null good
at a positive price. Thus the product the monopolist designs must actually feature
some qualities at positive levels in order to be sold.
Let the costs of producing quality level qi be c(qi) =
1
2
ciq
2
i . The monopolist then
maximizes his profit subject to the decision utility of alternative a being non-negative:
max
P, qi
P − 1
2
n∑
i=1
ciq
2
i ,
subject to u˜(a) =
∑
i∈I
miviqi −mpvpP ≥ 0.
16As an illustration of Sims’ idea, think of a savings problem to which the optimal rule is to consume
half of the income: ct = 0.5yt. Suppose income is a random variable and takes on the value
10.458376 at some t. In Sims’ model the adaptation of ct to the optimal value (5.229188) is costly
as is requires the processing of the 8-digit input yt. Note however that in Sims (2003), finding the
optimal rule itself is not subject to cognition cost (though the anticipation of processing cost may
alter the optimal solution itself). In contrast, we focus on the impact of limited attention on the
derivation of the optimal solution.
17Note here that we differentiate between the n potential qualities of a product and the n+1 dimensions
of the purchase problem.
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Consider for a moment the case of unlimited attention u˜(a) = u(a). It is straight-
forward to show that the optimal design then features all n qualities at levels qi =
vi
vpci
respectively. The monopolist reaps a total profit of Π =
∑
i∈I pii from the sale of the
product, where pii =
v2i
2ci(vp)2
denotes the profit from producing each quality i at its
optimal level. We refer to pii as the profitability of quality i in the following.
The following proposition states that under limited attention the optimal design is
simpler in that it typically features only a subset I ⊆ I of all qualities. Denote by pi(t)
the t-th most profitable attribute (ties may be broken according to vi).
Proposition II.1.
If a monopolist intends to supply a single good to the market, the optimal design features
(i) only the most profitable quality (i : pii = pi
(1)) if and only if
@ m ∈ {2, ..., n} : ∑mt=2 (pi(t) − 1vpκt+1) ≥ 1vpκ2. In this case, the price extracts the
whole surplus: P = (viqi)/vp.
(ii) Otherwise, it features the m most profitable qualities for which∑m
t=1
(
pi(t) − 1
vp
κt+1
)
≥ 0, while pi(m+1) − 1
vp
κm+2 < 0. In this case, the price does not
extract the whole surplus: P = 1
vp
∑
i∈Imivixi <
1
vp
∑
i∈I vixi.
All qualities i ∈ I that the product features are produced at a level qi = vi/(vpci).
Intuitively, one can understand Proposition II.1 as showing how the limited attention
of the customers translates into an augmented cost function of the monopolist. The
limited attention reduces the willingness-to-pay for complex products, i.e. for products
featuring more than one quality. This is equivalent to a monopolist facing additional
costs when offering complex products. These costs include variable costs κt+1/vp asso-
ciated with introducing the t-th quality (t > 1), as well as fixed costs κ2/vp associated
with offering a complex product in the first place.
A couple of things are noteworthy. Given the product features a particular quality,
its optimal level is the same as the one under full attention. This is due to two effects
resulting from the endogeneity of limited attention. First, limited attention reduces a
firm’s incentives to invest in quality as the created value is not fully taken into account
by the customer. Second, the endogeneity of attention increases a firm’s incentives
to invest in quality as any additional unit of quality increases the attention paid to
that quality and thus the decision value of any unit of quality already invested.18
In our model, these two effects cancel out each other perfectly, so the maximization
problem of the monopolist yields the same level of product quality as in the case
with unlimited attention for those qualities that are considered. However, the product
18Note that the firm’s incentive to invest in quality in order to increase attention is conditional on
the attribute being considered. If the attribute is not considered, small changes in quality might
be insufficient in order to lift attention to a positive level.
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generally features less qualities than under full attention and the price is lower if the
product features more than a single quality. Note here that the exact canceling of the
above-mentioned effects hinges on our modeling of limited attention, in particular our
use of the range (maxa∈A xai −mina∈A xai ) as a measure of attribute dispersion. Yet, we
claim that the second effect prevails as long as one retains the assumption of a higher
attribute dispersion attracting attention. As this second effect compensates the first,
limited attention does not necessarily imply the production of lower quality levels.19
We want to highlight the prediction of the design of simpler products, i.e., the impact
of limited attention on the extensive margin of quality provision. It is a strong result
in that it predicts certain qualities not to be produced at all despite there being a
strictly positive marginal benefit and no marginal production cost at a quality level
of zero. Previous work predicting such underproduction in the extensive margin has
typically involved specific cost functions that resulted in the marginal production cost
at the quality level of zero to be larger than zero.20 In our framework, the tendency
towards simpler products is entirely driven by the demand side, namely the complete
neglect of certain qualities when customers derive their willingness-to-pay. This result
is interesting in the light of the development of devices, e.g. smart phones, that include
an ever-growing abundance of features. These devices certainly increase convenience
as they combine the functions of several previously distinct devices. Above proposition
questions whether this convenience will necessarily be rewarded with larger revenues
since the increased convenience comes at a cost of increased complexity. Our model
therefore suggests a way to conceptualize a value to simplicity in products. In addition,
Proposition II.1 suggests a reduced form for modeling such incentives to the firm.
To motivate our next section recall that the monopolist cannot extract the whole
value that the product yields to the customer as soon as the product features more
than one quality. We will analyze a way in which the monopolist can increase the
customer’s attention to quality and thus the willingness-to-pay for the product that is
sold to consumers without necessarily changing the product itself.
19In an earlier version to their 2013 article, Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2011) consider the implication of
focusing for product design. Similar to above intuition, they find that qualities may be over- or
underproduced depending on whether the attention function is concave or convex.
20Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2011) e.g. find an incentive to concentrate the value of a product into a single
dimension assuming a cost function that takes the sum of all quality levels
∑
i∈I qi as input. This
can best be interpreted as a setting in which the firm may costlessly reframe the product such that
different qualities are regarded as one cumulated quality or in which one quality may costlessly be
split into several different qualities. Technically, it ensures that for all but one quality marginal
production cost at a level of zero is strictly positive. The concentration result does not carry over
to other cost functions, as e.g. the one employed here. This is because their focusing model does
not feature neglect.
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4. Optimal Product Design with Introduction of a Bait
Good
Recall that the consumer attention is a function of both the valuation vj and the
dispersion within the choice set (maxxj −minxj). A firm might not be able to change
the valuation vj of a quality, but it can manipulate the dispersion. If the firm can
produce several goods, it might have an incentive to produce goods that have the sole
purpose of increasing the dispersion of quality, thereby making these dimensions of the
purchase problem more salient. Note that the quality levels are bounded below by the
option of not buying (min qi = 0). This implies that in order to increase dispersion,
products that are designed to manipulate attention must feature high quality levels.
Such products will increase dispersion by increasing max qi. Yet, if these products are
not intended for sale, they must be unattractive to consumers. This could, for example,
be achieved by a very high price. This may however increase attention paid to the price
dimension. Attracting attention to the price is not in the interest of the firm, as it makes
a purchase less desirable to consumers. It may thus not always be in the interest of the
firm to use such a manipulating device. In the following, we use the term bait good for
those goods that have the sole purpose of manipulating consumer attention. Because
these bait goods are designed to be unattractive, consumers still buy the main good
that we henceforth call primary good.21 We investigate under what circumstances firm
can profitably employ bait goods. We furthermore look at the characteristics of an
optimally designed bait good.
In the analysis we assume that the firm does not incur any costs for designing and
producing the bait good. We maintain this assumption to concentrate on the question
whether it is possible to increase the willingness-to-pay of consumers for the primary
good, and thus the profit made from its sale.
In addition, there are some arguments why the cost of the bait good might be
negligible. First, if the bait good is never actually sold to the customer, it only needs
a single item of the bait good that can be (unsuccessfully) offered to each of a large
number of customers. If, as we are about to show, the bait good increases profits, the
additional profits reaped from each customer may in sum be sufficient to cover the cost
of bait good production. A second avenue to accommodate the cost of producing the
bait good is to allow for customer heterogeneity in their intrinsic valuation of money.
As we argue in the discussion section, a product designed for a richer customer segment
is a prime candidate to serve as a bait good for a poorer customer segment. In this
21Obviously, the primary good still has to yield positive decision utility to the consumer in order to
be bought.
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way, the bait good is produced both for sale (to a rich customer segment) as well as
for the manipulation of attention (of a poorer customer segment).
As outlined before, bait goods are designed to have premium quality. In reality,
quality levels are typically bounded at some level. For example, there are technological
and physical limitations on the horsepower that a car can have. Therefore, we now
assume technical frontiers for each quality. Formally, all qi ∈ [0, q¯i] with q¯i ∈ R+.
Let us first look at the question under what circumstances a bait good actually
increases profits of the firm. Note e.g. that if the monopolist is confined to producing
a good with only a single quality, there is nothing to be gained from manipulating
attention. This is because the primary good is designed such that the single quality
employed ranks first in the attention hierarchy and thus receives full attention. This is
different if the primary good features several qualities where, as we have shown before,
the price gets full attention while the qualities do not get full attention. A bait good
then derives its value through increasing the attention paid to the qualities that are
not fully considered or are neglected altogether.
Proposition II.2. Suppose a monopolist’s profit-maximizing design of a single product
features at least two qualities: |I| ≥ 2. If at least one of these qualities is not produced
at the highest feasible level, the monopolist can strictly increase profits by using a bait
good.
Proof. See Appendix.
The bait good thus increases the profit that can be made from the sale of the primary
good while keeping the attention hierarchy among dimensions intact. This is done by
designing the bait good such that it determines the range of available quality together
with the outside option. The dual incentive to invest in quality that is present in
the design of the single product, first to increase the value of the product given some
attention by customers and second to increase attention of customers, is now split
between primary and bait good. The bait good is designed to attract attention while
the primary good is designed to provide value. To ensure this split, the bait good is
made unattractive to the consumer with a sufficiently high price. This does not come
at the danger of raising attention towards the price dimension if the optimal design of
the primary good features at least two qualities. In that case, the price is already fully
considered and people cannot pay more than full attention to the price.
Note here that we have only shown that a bait good can increase profits under fairly
general conditions. We have not yet looked at the profit maximizing design of the bait
good. One obvious venue to further increase profits is by increasing the qualities of the
bait good as much as is technologically feasible. Note, however, that attracting more
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attention to one quality may result in another quality receiving less attention since
qualities “compete” over attention ranks. When contemplating the optimal design of
the bait good the firm thus needs to make a decision as to whether it should exploit
technological boundaries of a quality thus raising attention for an individual quality,
but thereby potentially distracting attention from other qualities of the product.
We want to illustrate this trade-off inherent in the optimal design of the bait good in
a setting with two qualities {1, 2}. We assume w.l.o.g. that quality 1 is more profitable:
pi1 > pi2. We denote with νi = viq¯i the maximal utility that can be provided through
quality i that is technologically feasible. We want to derive the optimal design of
the bait good (qb1, q
b
2) which maximizes the profit from the sale of the primary good:
Π =
∑
im
2
ipii with mi =
{
0, 1− κr(i)/qbi
}
. We will assume throughout that qb1 ≥ q1,
qb2 ≥ q2 and P b >
∑
i=1,2 viq
b
i/vp ≥ P such that the bait good is undesirable as it comes
at an excessively high price. Note that this directly implies that r(p) = 1 for any
design of the bait good. From the profit formula it is obvious that it is always optimal
to maximize the level of the bait good in any quality as long as this does not change
the attention rank of the quality. The question that interests us is which quality will
feature a higher (lower) attention rank under the optimal attention manipulation. Let
miz denote the maximal attention that can be attracted to quality i given that it ranks
on position z in the attention hierarchy, assuming that attention is maximized for all
higher ranking attributes given their rank.
Proposition II.3. The optimal design of the bait good will attract more attention to
quality 1 than to quality 2 if and only if (m212 −m213)pi1 ≥ (m222 −m223)pi2.
The proposition is straightforward from the profit formula. Yet, since the attention
parameters are hardly observable we want to state sufficient conditions for quality 1 or
quality 2 attracting most attention in a couple of corollaries.22
Corollary II.1. If pi1 > pi2 and ν1 ≥ ν2, then the optimal bait good design will make
quality 1 receive more attention than quality 2 and (qb1, q
b
2) = (q¯1, q¯2).
The intuition is rather simple. More attention can be attracted to the more profitable
quality 1 at rank 2 than to the less profitable quality 2 at rank 2. In addition, placing
quality 1 at rank 3 would restrict the extent to which the bait good can attract attention
to quality 1. The bait good could not exploit the technological boundaries in quality 1.
In contrast, placing quality 2 at the lower rank 3 does not restrict the bait good’s level
of quality 2 to exploit technological boundaries and to set qb2 = q¯2. We conclude that,
if the more profitable quality is also the one with the larger technological boundaries,
22See the Appendix for all proofs.
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the bait good will be characterized by (qb1, q
b
2) = (q¯1, q¯2). The bait good will be a
state-of-the-art product featuring the highest possible quality in all dimensions.
Corollary II.2. If pi1 > pi2, and ν2 > ν1 > κ3, yet
pi1−pi2
pi2
≤ ν2−ν1
ν2
κ1
κ2−κ1 , then the
optimal bait good design will make quality 2 receive more attention than quality 1 and,
again, (qb1, q
b
2) = (q¯1, q¯2).
In this case, placing the more profitable quality 1 at the higher attention rank 2
restricts the extent to which attention can be attracted to quality 2. The bait good’s
level of quality 2 has to be restricted to a level below q¯2 for otherwise quality 1 could
not maintain its higher rank. This again reduces the profit that can be made from
quality 2. If differences in technological boundaries are strong enough and differences
in profitability are rather small, it becomes optimal to attract more attention to the less
profitable quality, and set (qb1, q
b
2) = (q¯1, q¯2). Again, the optimal bait good is a state-
of-the-art product. The crucial difference is that this premium product now attracts
attention to the less profitable quality and distracts attention from the more profitable
quality. The sufficient condition for this to happen relates the relative profit difference
to the relative technological difference scaled by a constant factor.
In both cases considered so far, the bait good was a state-of-the-art product such
that it featured the highest quality levels possible. This is not always the case.
Corollary II.3. If pi1 > pi2, and ν2 > ν1 > κ3, then for ν1 sufficiently close to ν2 the
optimal bait good design will make quality 1 receive more attention than quality 2 and
not exploit technological limits in all quality dimensions: (qb1, q
b
2) = (q¯1, ν1/v2).
If the difference in technological limits is small enough, it is worthwhile to keep the
more profitable quality at the higher attention rank. Yet, this implies that the extent
to which attention can be attracted to the other quality must be restricted. The last
corollary highlights how the trade-off underlying the optimal attention manipulation
may produce different designs of the manipulating device, that is, the bait good.23
5. Discussion
In this work we seek to highlight how a firm may employ specially designed products
to manipulate the attention allocation of its customers. There are a couple of issues
and potential extensions of the model that are worth further discussion.
23This trade-off is absent from models such as Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) that do not feature the
potential for attention distraction.
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Heterogeneous Consumers
Until now we have assumed that consumers are homogeneous in both their preferences
and their cognitive abilities. This assumption could be weakened in several ways.
One interesting possibility is to allow customers to have different levels of wealth.
For simplicity assume there are two groups of customers, very loosely labeled as poor
and rich. Let the first group assign higher importance to the money dimension (and
thus the price) of a product: vpoorp > v
rich
p . This results in a firm designing different
products to cater to both groups of customers. Recalling Proposition II.1, the rich
group’s ideal product may feature more qualities than the poor group’s product. More
interestingly, it features all the qualities the poor group’s product has on a higher level.
This makes the rich group’s product an ideal candidate to be a bait good for the poor
group. It increases the attention paid to all the qualities that the product for the
poor features and thereby increases the willingness-to-pay of the poor. In this way, a
firm may employ products designed for richer customer segments as a bait good for
poorer customer segments. This can explain one of the observations we discussed in the
introduction: the advertisement of expensive cars to an audience of which a majority
is not able to afford it. It can also explain why shops tend to put their most expensive
products, that can only be afforded by a small minority, on display.
If customers differ in the cognitive constraints they face, i.e. if they differ in their
cognition costs κr, a firm may cater to these different groups with products differing in
their degree of complexity. One reason for different cognitive constraints could be that
one group has to act under stronger time pressure. If this is the case, the firm could,
for example, offer products that differ in the number of qualities they feature. The
hurried customer segment is then offered a product with only a few essential features,
while customers with more time prefer more elaborate products.
Finally, customers may differ in their valuation for different qualities. As these valua-
tions influence both a quality’s profitability and the relative ease of attention attraction,
a firm may have strong incentives to segment the customer population and design an
appropriate product line for each segment separately. Still, analogous to the discussion
of differing wealth levels, a firm may have an incentive to offer a product designed
for one customer segment to a different segment despite that segment’s unwillingness
to purchase the product. Offering a sports car to a family father may increase his
willingness-to-pay for horse power despite his general focus on car safety.
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Negative “Qualities”
So far we have assumed that all qualities (save the price) are valued by the customer
(vi ≥ 0, ∀i). There are certainly some characteristics that a product may feature
which customers dislike, e.g. the level of exhaust fumes of cars, or the level of sugar
and trans fats in food. While the customer dislikes these characteristics and their pres-
ence reduces consumers’ willingness-to-pay, a reduction and/or replacement of these
attributes may be costly to the firm. Employing bait goods can thus have further ben-
eficial effects since, in addition to attracting attention to positive characteristics, the
firm could distract from negative characteristics. Also, a firm might have incentives
to focus on reducing few negative characteristics a lot instead of reducing all negative
characteristics a little bit. A label “sugar free” or “low carb” may effectively distract
from other negative characteristics, for example high levels of trans fats.
6. Conclusion
We have introduced a new approach to model limited attention and applied it to the
problem of optimal product design. The proposed attention heuristic fulfills several
desirable properties that we think are realistic in real world markets.
Using this framework, we have shown that limited attention has far-reaching impli-
cations for product design and in general also for product lines. In general, a firm
produces products that have fewer qualities than they would have if consumers were
fully attentive. The customers’ tendency to neglect creates an incentive for the firm
to offer simple products. Our model thus yields a way to formalize incentives to keep
things simple.
We find that a monopolist would actually prefer consumers to be fully attentive. This
is because the consumers’ willingness-to-pay is lower under limited attention since they
do not fully appreciate all the qualities inherent in a product. Since the monopolist
profits from an increase in attention, there is an incentive to introduce goods of premium
quality that are not intended for sale, but that increase the attention of the consumers.
These bait goods can be used to increase attention, but they can also distract consumer
attention from attributes that are less profitable to the monopolist.
Although we have focused on product design, future research may apply the model
of limited attention to a wide variety of settings. Given that we deem judgments of
commensurability to be at the core of complexity problems, and our discipline being
primarily concerned with the investigation of trade-offs across dissimilar dimensions,
we are confident that our model may yield interesting insights into choice frictions in
a lot of other contexts.
III. Limited Attention and the
Demand for Health Insurance
This chapter presents an analysis of how customers with limited
attention value and choose among health plans. We show how the
model can accommodate four observations regarding plan choice.
First, people tend to overweight the premium and thus underap-
preciate the value of health insurance. Second, insurance compa-
nies may have a strong incentive to reduce quality and to hide
these shortcomings in the fine print while attracting customers
with insufficiently lower premiums. Third, customers may choose
dominated alternatives. Finally, the willingness-to-pay for insur-
ance is subadditive creating an incentive for providers to unbundle
comprehensive plans. We discuss how these effects may result in
a fundamental dilemma for policy makers.
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1. Introduction
Health insurance plans are complex products. They may differ in premiums, which dis-
eases/treatments are covered, co-payment rates, deductibles, coverage of dependents,
health incentives, maximum benefits, and many more aspects. Choosing whether to
buy, and if so, which plan to buy, is thus seen as a difficult task. Accordingly, there
is a strong need for advice on health plan choice and frequent efforts to provide such.1
Advice on health plan choice and its many dimensions are also a frequent topic in the
media.2
The topic of complexity of choice has attained increasing attention among economists.
Specifically, the introduction of Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance in the
United States offers an opportunity to study how consumers choose from a wide array
of products differing on several dimensions. The question of whether consumers make
optimal choices in that context has been the subject of extensive research.3 Both the-
oretical and empirical work has concentrated on the abundance of available options,
thus highlighting the cognitive load associated with the number of options available.4
In consequence, discussion has focused on whether a restricted choice set would make
consumers better off. This discussion however neglects a dimension of choice complex-
ity. Choosing the right health plan is difficult not only because there are so many
options available, but in particular because these plans differ in so many attributes.5 It
is this aspect of choice complexity and its implications for choice among health plans
that is the focus of this work.
This work highlights the difficulty associated with evaluating the desirability of a
health plan given that each alternative may differ on several dimensions, in particular
the numerous diseases for which treatment/medication may or may not be covered. It
uses the model described in Chapter 2 to depict how consumers with limited atten-
tion choose among multi-dimensional options, by focusing on a limited number of the
attributes that are relevant for choice. We assume that attention is directed towards
those dimensions that incorporate the largest utility differences between the available
1As an example, the U.S. federal government offers information on health plans and advice to un-
derstand the different features of health plans on www.HealthCare.gov.
2See e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/health/16patient.html
3See Cubanski and Neuman (2007) and Neuman and Cubanski (2009) for reports on the program. See
e.g. Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2006) and Heiss, McFadden, and Winter (2010) for a discussion
of optimal choice among Medicare Part D plans. Kling, Mullainathan, Shafir, Vermeulen, and
Wrobel (2012) report evidence for a “comparison friction” in the choice of Medicare Part D plans.
4See e.g. Frank and Lamiraud (2008), Iyengar and Kamenica (2010), and Schram and Sonnemans
(2011).
5One might argue further that the difficulty of having so many options would not arise if it was not
for the possibility to vary health plans on so many dimensions.
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alternatives. Dimensions in which the alternatives vary less receive less attention or
no attention at all, i.e. they are neglected. The decision-maker thereby simplifies the
problem before solving it.
We derive possible implications of such limited attention of customers. Specifically,
we want to propose limited attention as a possible explanation for demand phenomena
that have been observed in this context, yet are difficult to reconcile within existing
models. First, we predict people to focus on the premium when deciding whether to
purchase health insurance. The premium incorporates the largest utility difference
across options for an average individual thereby attracting most attention in the in-
surance problem. This implies that people underappreciate or even neglect several of
the benefits associated with having health insurance, and, consequently, undervalue
health insurance. This is in line with empirical findings by Abaluck and Gruber (2011)
as well as Heiss, Leive, McFadden, and Winter (2012). Second, the tendency of cus-
tomers to focus on a limited number of diseases covered and to neglect the coverage
of others allows firms to decrease the quality of their health plans unnoticed. We de-
rive conditions under which customers choose health plans that exclude coverage for
certain conditions not because coverage is deemed undesirable, but because the lack of
coverage is ignored due to cognitive limitations. This topic has been mostly neglected
in the health economics literature to date. Yet, media coverage and an abundance of
Internet advice indicate that there is some popular interest in the topic of insurance
providers hiding limited coverage in the fine print. Accordingly, policy makers have
attempted to regulate information provision by insurance providers e.g. by restricting
the use of fine print. In this chapter we argue that that it is not insufficient font size
that results in customers making less-informed choices. We are thus skeptic about the
effectiveness of policies banning fine print. Third, customers may make dominated
choices if they happen to neglect exactly those plan attributes in which the domination
occurs. This can explain the observation of dominated choices in the context of health
insurance as documented by Sinaiko and Hirth (2011) that stands in sharp contrast
to any preference-based model of choice. Finally, the undervaluation of comprehensive
health plans creates an incentive for an insurance provider to unbundle and offer several
more specific insurance plans individually. Such an unbundling effect has been reported
in experiments by Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther (1993). We analyze
which insurance plans are offered in market equilibrium and conclude the chapter by
arguing that the effects we describe produce a serious dilemma for policymakers.
It has already been argued by Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) that behavioral fac-
tors could play a major role in the markets for health care and health insurance. We
seek to discuss one such factor, the complexity involved in the insurance purchase de-
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cision. Similar to other authors, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) stress education and
information provision as promising interventions to overcome behavioral biases. We
fear that such interventions may be less promising with regard to the bias we discuss
here. The complexity problems involved in the insurance decision are a result of the
necessity to absorb and process a large amount information. Providing additional in-
formation might then turn out to be less helpful or even counterproductive. Close to
our approach that assumes a necessity to focus on a subset of the available information
is Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013). We are confident that some of our results can be repli-
cated within the framework of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013). This assures us that these
predictions are not just an artifact of the model we employ here, but are robust to the
choice of different models of limited attention. Distinct elements of our approach are
the modeling of neglect and the assumption of a strict attention hierarchy.6 In par-
ticular, taking into account neglect enables us to accommodate evidence of dominated
choices. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer
(2012) model salience as a function of perceptual biases. We share the assumption of
the weighting of a problem’s dimensions being driven by an ordering of dimensions with
respect to utility differences although we differ on the motivation of this assumption. In
addition to our approach, they discuss the conflicting influence of such an ordering and
diminishing sensitivity in perception on the weighting process. Similar to Ko˝szegi and
Szeidl (2013) their model neither features a strict salience order among the dimensions
nor does it feature neglect. As discussed before, this makes their model incapable of
explaining dominated choices. Customers’ tendency to neglect and the resulting ability
of firms to exploit such inattention have already been investigated in industrial organi-
zation settings (see most prominently Gabaix and Laibson (2006)). In our framework,
inattention is endogenous. It has been shown that this endogeneity may lead to the
opposite result of a firm being unable to exploit inattentive customers in a monopoly
setting (see Chapter 2). Interestingly, we see the ability to exploit inattention reemerge
when we look at more competitive markets in sections 3 and 6.
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem of whether to purchase
health insurance and establishes the undervaluation of insurance if customers’ attention
is limited. Section 3 shows the great scope for profitably undercutting any incumbent
health plan by reducing quality unnoticed. Section 4 discusses customers’ propensity
to make dominated choices. Section 5 summarizes experimental evidence suggesting
6We deem both elements to be important in the modeling of complexity problems as discussed in
Chapter 2. Specifically, the assumption of a strict attention hierarchy ensures that more complex
problems are more difficult to solve, thereby leading to a larger tendency for decision errors. In
Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013)’s approach one can find arbitrarily complex problems which the decision-
maker may solve without problem.
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the profitability of unbundling comprehensive insurance plans and indicates how the
model of limited attention can accommodate that evidence. Section 6 investigates
which health plans are offered in market equilibrium. Section 7 concludes by shortly
discussing some implications of these results for policy.
2. The Problem of Buying Insurance
We model the problem of buying health insurance as a problem of choosing between
two multi-dimensional alternatives. Let the insurance contract be described by a pre-
mium P and a coverage rate α ∈ [0, 1], i.e. the share of treatment cost the insurance
pays. Each alternative in the choice set is associated with a vector of consequences
((x1, pi1), ..., (xm, pim)) where x describes the consequence, while pi describes its prob-
ability. For example, buying health insurance incorporates the (certain) payment of
a premium (−P, 1). Second, it comprises consequences contingent on developing a
disease. Let I, |I| = n denote the finite set of diseases and assume that the occur-
rence of different diseases are disjoint events. For expositional purposes, suppose here
that there are only two diseases I = {1, 2}. Buying insurance ensures the reception
of treatment if need be. Thus it is associated with the health-related consequences
(−Di + Ti, pii), i = 1, 2 where Di denotes the deterioration of health due to disease
i ∈ I, Ti ≤ Di the improvement of health due to medical treatment of disease i, and
pii the probability of developing disease i. Furthermore, dependent on α buying insur-
ance is associated with a monetary consequence of a copayment in case of a disease:
(−(1 − α)ci, pii) where ci denote the monetary cost of acquiring treatment for disease
i. In sum, the option insurance can be represented as7(
(−P, 1), [(−Di + Ti, pii), (−(1− α)ci, pii)]i∈I
)
. (III.1)
In contrast, the alternative remaining uninsured is represented by a different vector
of consequences. Suppose there are two types of diseases. First, there are diseases for
which the decision-maker is able to afford treatment even when having no insurance.
Denote this set by F ⊆ I and suppose here F = {1}. Then in case of disease 1,
having no insurance is associated with the health consequence (−D1 + T1, pi1) since
we assume the benefits of treatment to outweigh the cost. Second, contracting dis-
ease 1 is associated with the monetary consequence of having to pay the full cost of
treatment (−c1, pi1). On the other hand, there may be diseases, for which the decision-
maker is unable to afford treatment without insurance. Denote this set of diseases by
7For the moment, we assume that there are no diseases which are not covered by the insurance and no
diseases for which the decision-maker is unable to afford treatment when having health insurance.
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F¯ = I\F 8 and suppose here that F¯ = {2}. For all i ∈ F¯ , remaining uninsured incurs
the consequence of a deterioration of health (−Di, pii). On the other hand, since the
decision-maker is unable to afford treatment there is no monetary expenditure asso-
ciated with receiving treatment, thus there is no monetary consequence.9 Thus the
option of remaining uninsured is represented by a vector(
[(−Di + Ti, pii), (−ci, pii)]i∈F , [(−Di, pii)]i∈F¯
)
. (III.2)
The decision-maker is both willing and able to purchase treatment for diseases i ∈ F .
Yet, he is assumed to be willing but unable to do so for diseases i ∈ F¯ .
In order to solve the decision problem, the consequences of the available alternatives
have to be ordered into categories, to which we henceforth refer as problem dimensions
or aspects. One may think of this categorization process as a way of transforming the
choice problem into a list of pros and cons of choosing one alternative over another. To
arrive at such a representation, each consequence of an option is ordered into exactly
one dimension. Two options each have a consequence in the same dimension if these
two consequences are comparable.10 For example, the consequence of a co-payment
in case of disease 1 associated with insurance is ordered into the same dimension as
the full payment of treatment cost for disease 1 associated with remaining uninsured
as they are both payments required to get treatment for disease 1. Similarly, the
health consequence (−D2,+T2, pi2) associated with insuring is categorized into the
same dimension as health consequence (−D2, pi2) of a health deterioration associated
with remaining uninsured as they both denote health consequences in case of disease 2.
An option cannot have two consequences in one dimension. For example, the monetary
consequences associated with disease 1 cannot be ordered into the same dimension with
the monetary consequence associated with disease 2. Although both denote monetary
consequences, they are associated with different events. Finally, there are consequences
of one option that the other option lacks, such as the premium payment associated only
with insurance, or the monetary expenses for treating disease 2, also associated only
with insurance. This means that the option remaining uninsured lacks a comparable
consequence that we represent by associating a consequence (0, pi) with that alternative
8Formally, if B is the decision-maker’s budget, then F¯ = {i ∈ I : ci > B}.
9Throughout, we abstract from monetary consequences associated with becoming sick that are un-
related to receiving treatment or insurance.
10The question of what constitutes a dimension of a choice problem is highly relevant for our later
results since it is these dimensions among which attention is allocated. We assume a categorization
based on comparability that we deem sensible for the choice problem under investigation. This
is also consistent with our assumption discussed later that the difficulty associated with solving
multi-dimensional problems is based on the need to make commensurability judgments with regard
to different dimensions that are difficult to compare.
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in the respective dimension. The categorization process leads to a choice problem with
several dimensions. Denote by J the set of problem dimensions and note that the
categorization described above leads to |J | = 2n+ 1. The relevant aspects of choosing
whether to insure comprise the payment of a premium (or the lack of it), as well as the
monetary and health consequences associated with each disease i ∈ I.
The utility difference between two alternatives, here buying insurance versus not
buying insurance, is assumed to be the sum of the utility differences in all dimensions
of the choice problem. W.l.o.g. we assume the utility of an alternative in a dimension
in which the respective alternative has no consequence to be zero.
Further, we assume the utility of a consequence to be linear. The difference U in
utility between buying insurance and remaining uninsured is then
U =vp [−P − 0] +
∑
i∈F
piivh [(−Di + Ti)− (−Di + Ti)] +
∑
i∈F
vppii [(−(1− α)ci)− (−ci)]
+
∑
i∈F¯
piivh [(−Di + Ti)− (−Di)] +
∑
i∈F¯
piivp [(−(1− α)ci)− 0]
= −vpP +
∑
i∈F
piivpαci +
∑
i∈F¯
piivhTi −
∑
i∈F¯
vp(1− α)ci, (III.3)
where vp denotes the marginal utility of money, vh denotes the marginal utility of
health. In our simplified setting with only two diseases this gives us
U = −vpP + pi1vpαc1 + pi2vhT2 − vp(1− α)c2.
The net utility of buying insurance comprises the disutility of the premium payment,
the utility gain from receiving (partial) coverage of affordable treatment cost, the utility
gain from receiving (otherwise unaffordable) treatment in case of disease 2, and the
disutility from making a co-payment in case of disease 2.
The linearity assumptions on both the utility from consequences and the cumula-
tive utility function U imply risk neutral preferences. Accordingly, if the premium is
actuarially fair, i.e. P =
∑
i piiαci, the value of insurance U is given by
U =
∑
i∈F¯
pii(vhTi − vpci) > 0, (III.4)
or U = pi2(vhT2−vpc2) in our simplified setting. The utility of insurance is the net value
of access to otherwise unaffordable treatment provided by the insurance. Following
Nyman (2003) the value of insurance to a risk-neutral customer is created through
the access motive: the possibility to acquire treatment for diseases i ∈ F¯ for which
the decision-maker is willing (thus the nonnegativity of the value) but unable to pay
without insurance. We abstract from incentives due to risk preferences.11
11Our results do not hinge on the functional form of U since we an-
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We suppose the decision-maker has difficulties thinking through each of the (2n +
1) aspects in order to reach a decision. Specifically, incorporating every aspect of
the problem into the decision requires judgments concerning the commensurability
of different dimensions such as certain monetary consequences, uncertain monetary
consequences, or uncertain health consequences. A full consideration of every aspect
requires judgments as to how e.g. a disadvantage in the premium dimension compares
to an advantage in terms of better health in case of a disease for which treatment is
unaffordable. In addition, it requires a judgment as to how one advantage in e.g. a
better health in case of one disease, say lung cancer, adds up to an advantage in better
health in case of a different disease, say a flu. Appreciating each and every aspect of
the problem thus requires a tremendous amount of commensurability judgments that
all require cognitive effort. Thus, instead of fully evaluating the utility differences the
decision-maker focuses on a subset of the relevant dimensions when making his choice.
He thus bases his decision on the difference in decision utility U˜ :
U˜ :=−mpvpP +
∑
i∈F
mc(i)piivpαci +
∑
i∈F¯
mh(i)piivhTi −
∑
i∈F¯
mc(i)pii(1− α)ci (III.5)
where mj ∈ [0, 1] is the attention a dimension j ∈ J receives, c(i) denotes the dimension
comprising those consequences that refer to payments in case of disease i, and h(i)
denotes the dimension in which the health consequences of the options in case of disease
i are compared.
Limited Attention
We want to shortly discuss the attention allocation that is reflected in the attention
parameters mj.
12 An implicit assumption in models of multi-attribute decision-making
is commensurability, i.e. the possibility to measure and compare different concepts by
a common standard. A decision-maker has no problem to determine how much a better
treatment for disease i is worth compared to a worse (or no) treatment for disease j,
or whether a better treatment for i is worth $x to her or not. The attention allocation
we assume seeks to depict that the cognitive process of making different consequence
dimensions commensurable, which is necessary to attain an overall assessment of desir-
ability of one option over another, is difficult. It is this difficulty that makes complex
alyze a biased processing of the inputs of U . With U = (1 −∑
i pii) [u(−P,−0)− u(−0,−0)] +
∑
i∈F pii [u(−P − (1− α)ci,−Di + Ti)− u(−ci,−Di + Ti)] +∑
i∈F¯ pii [u(−P − (1− α)ci,−Di + Ti)− u(−0,−Di)] one may model the familiar expected
utility-representation of the problem. Assuming u to be concave over its first input (the sum of all
monetary consequences in a state), one can model risk aversion. As it greatly simplifies exposition
we opt for a risk neutral representation.
12A more extensive derivation and discussion can be found in Chapter 2.
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decisions such as insurance purchase hard. The best way to simplify such decisions is to
avoid the task of making dimensions commensurable by ignoring at least some dimen-
sions. This may lead to worse decisions, yet it reduces the cognitive effort.13 It remains
to ask which dimensions it is sensible to focus on. We assume that the decision-maker
focuses on those dimensions in which the utility differences are largest. The decision-
maker takes those dimensions into account in which the available alternatives differ
the most, and, given these differences, the decision-maker cares most about. The at-
tention allocation thus models neglect as the result of a process of simplification and
prioritization. It endogenizes neglect by making assumptions about the characteristics
of the dimensions that are ignored, instead of directly assuming ignorance with regard
to specific dimensions. Finally, we assume this attention allocation to be “hard-wired”,
thereby avoiding questions of strategic ignorance and infinite-regress problems.
We assume a particular framing of the choice problem. In this frame, the premium,
the monetary consequences, and the health consequences of each individual disease
form a distinct problem dimension. Why do we deviate from the familiar lottery
representation, i.e. a problem representation based on states of nature? Our choice of
a frame is necessary since we argue that the difficulty in complex problems is due to the
necessity of making different dimensions commensurable. A frame different from the
one we assume, in particular the lottery representation, already prerequisites this act
of making different consequences commensurable. For one cannot compare the utility
in a particular state (say disease i) between two alternatives without assigning a utility
for this state to each of the two alternatives. Yet, this assignment already requires to
integrate judgments concerning the relative desirability of different consequences such
as a premium payment (or the lack of it), the health consequence, and a copayment (or
the lack of one) into an overall assessment of the desirability of a particular alternative
given that i occurs. Assigning the attention weights to different states instead of
different consequences would thus assume that it is a comparison across states that is
difficult and not the comparison of different consequences. That would contradict our
very idea of what makes multi-dimensional problems complex.
We now want to formulate the attention weights mj that reflect the above consid-
erations. Let µj = maxg∈Γ u(g, j) −ming∈Γ u(g, j) where u(g, j) denotes the utility of
that consequence of alternative g which is ordered into dimension j, and Γ denotes the
set of all available alternatives g.14 For example, the utility of insuring associated with
13Note that considering not all of the alternatives, referred to as forming a “consideration set”, will
not do the trick, since even as little as only two alternatives may differ on a large number of
dimensions.
14Recall that we assume u(g, j) = 0 for those alternatives g with no consequence associated with
dimension j.
On Barriers to Informed Decision-Making 66
the health consequence of disease 2 is u(insuring, h(2)) = pi2vh(−D2 + T2) while the
respective utility for remaining uninsured is given by u(uninsured, h(2)) = pi2vh(−D2).
µj denotes the maximum utility difference in dimension j from any binary comparison
of alternatives in the choice set. Since in the case we consider here there are only the
two options of insuring and remaining uninsured, µh(2) = pi2vhT2.
We assume a strict hierarchy r : J → {1, ..., |J |}, among the problem dimensions
j ∈ J to which we henceforth refer as the attention hierarchy. This hierarchy obeys
µj > µj′ ⇒ r(j) < r(j′), (III.6)
i.e., dimensions with larger utility differences attain a higher attention rank. In case
that (III.6) does not produce a strict order we assume a particular tie-breaking rule.15
Given a dimension’s rank in the hierarchy, the attention mj it receives is given by
mj = max
{
0, 1− κr(j)
µj
}
(III.7)
where κr(j) may be interpreted as the cognitive cost associated with considering the rth
dimension of the problem. As we seek to model a decision-maker who has difficulties
with solving complex problems we assume
(i)κ1 = 0 (III.8)
(ii)κr < κr+1, ∀r. (III.9)
This assumption reflects the rising difficulty of considering more and more dimensions
of the problem. Eventually, if there are dimensions j, such that µj ≤ κr(j), then
mj = 0. This means that any differences between the alternatives in these dimensions
are completely neglected. The attention allocation thus reflects a need to simplify the
complex choice problem in order to reach a decision. This simplification is achieved
by ignoring some of the differences between the options. Due to limited attention the
decision-maker may not (fully) appreciate differences between the two alternatives.
Undervaluation of Insurance
Returning to our problem of insurance purchase we consider the following assumption:
Assumption III.1.
vpP >
{
[piivpαci]i∈F , [piivhTi]i∈F¯
}
. (III.10)
15If not stated otherwise we assume ties to be broken randomly.
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The assumption states that (a) the premium exceeds the expected coverage of treat-
ment cost of each individual disease, (b) for the diseases it provides access to treatment
the value of the premium exceeds the expected value of this treatment for each indi-
vidual disease. It turns out that this assumption is sufficient for the value of insurance
to be underappreciated.
Proposition III.1. Undervaluation of Insurance
If Assumption III.1 is satisfied, then the decision-maker underappreciates the value of
health insurance (U˜ < U) that provides close to full coverage16 and may select not to
insure despite it being individually optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
We argue that this implies that a majority of people underappreciates the value of
health insurance. Consider the setting for which Assumption III.1 is satisfied. Part (a)
of the assumption is always satisfied if the premium is greater or equal the actuarially
fair premium, i.e. if the insurer breaks even. Part (b) is satisfied if insurance covers suf-
ficiently many diseases that are unlikely individually. We regard this assumption to be
satisfied in the case of health insurance for the average customer, i.e. an individual with
no severe pre-existing condition. This is based on the observation that the distribu-
tion of medical expenditures is highly skewed. The most common diseases have rather
minor health consequences and available treatments tend to be cheap. These should
constitute the diseases in F . On the other hand, the largest chunk of medical expendi-
tures is created by rare diseases with highly expensive treatments. These should be the
ones we would expect to form the set F¯ . Hence, we regard it as a valid approximation
to assume that the probability to contract any particular disease i ∈ F¯ is small. If (and
only if) Assumption III.1 is satisfied, the premium dimension receives full attention,
mp = 1, while all further dimensions j 6= p are not fully considered, 0 < mj < 1, or even
neglected, mj = 0. Note that this implies that the cost of insurance (the premium)
is fully considered while its benefits are not fully appreciated.17 Consistent with this,
Abaluck and Gruber (2011) find that elders place too much weight on the premium
relative to expected out-of-pocket costs when choosing a Medicare Plan D prescription
drug plan.18
16Precisely, if the premium P is nondecreasing in the level of coverage α, and the premium for full
coverage α = 1 is affordable, then there exists a level of coverage 0 < α < 1 such that the
decision-maker underappreciates the value of insurance for any health plan (α, P ) with α > α.
17The necessary and sufficient condition for full insurance to be underappreciated is mp > m¯, where
m¯ is the weighted average of the attention parameters associated with the dimensions j 6= p.
18In addition, they find elders not to value variance-reducing aspects of health plans. This last finding
is particularly striking as variance reduction is the classic argument for insurance purchase. We
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The value of insurance U offering (close to) full coverage is not fully appreciated.19
First, people tend to underappreciate all the out-of-pocket cost of attaining treatment
that health insurance takes over. Intuitively, as the number of potential diseases is
large people are unable to take into account all the expected cost they have to cover
privately if they remain uninsured. Second, people tend to underappreciate the access
value provided by health insurance. Again, as the number of potential diseases is large,
the decision-maker is unable to consider each disease for which he will not be able to
afford treatment if remaining uninsured.
Next to insufficient income to afford premiums or alternative ways to access medical
care (e.g. charity or Medicaid in the U.S.) this underappreciation of the value of health
insurance can explain the prevalence of a significant number of voluntarily uninsured
where health insurance is not mandatory. Consistent with the model’s predictions,
Heiss, Leive, McFadden, and Winter (2012) report an undersubscription to the gen-
erous Gold plans compared to the Silver plans with less benefits and lower premium.
Although being primarily concerned with the sources of advantageous selection, Fang,
Keane, and Silverman (2006) find cognitive ability to be positively correlated with in-
surance purchase. We predict this under the natural assumption that the cognitive
cost parameters κr are negatively correlated with cognitive ability.
Our result of an undervaluation of insurance may be contrasted with evidence sug-
gesting a preference for excessively low or no deductibles.20 More generally, economists
have consistently argued that people tend to overinsure against health risks.21 First, we
want to emphasize that the characterization of a preference for low or no deductible or a
strong preference for full insurance as overinsurance is based on the common approach
to restrict the value of insurance to the balancing of consumption across states, i.e. its
risk-reducing function. If one assumes the value of health insurance to be primarily
driven by access motives, as we do here, a preference for a low deductible or even for full
insurance cannot be understood as overinsurance. A deductible as high as $1,000 may
already restrict access to medical care if a household falls on hard times. Choosing a
conclude that our approach to disregard incentives based on risk aversion can be viewed as a
reasonable approximation.
19We conjecture that underappreciation holds much more generally. For example, if α is close to zero,
the set of diseases for which insurance provides access to treatment (call it A) is empty, i.e. the
health insurance provides no access value, and U − U˜ < 0. We cannot completely rule out the
possibility that U−U˜ ≥ 0 for intermediate α for all possible (vpαci)i∈F , (vhTi)i∈A, (−vp(1−α)ci)i∈A
with A = {i ∈ I : B < ci ≤ (B − P )/(1− α)}. Yet, we conjecture that the underappreciation of
coverage and access value usually dominates the underappreciation of copayment.
20See e.g. Sydnor (2010).
21See e.g. Feldstein (1973) and Feldman and Dowd (1991).
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low deductible or no deductible at all ensures this access.22 We want to underline that
we do not seek to negate the role of risk preferences for the demand of health insurance.
Yet, given decades of finding evidence that economists interpret as “overinsurance” we
think that we should at least consider the possibility that it is not the customers who
consistently buy too much insurance, but it is us economists neglecting an important
part of the value of insurance when deriving the optimal amount of insurance.
The underappreciation of the value of insurance is a result of the complexity of the
insurance-purchase problem. Such underappreciation does not only make the option
of remaining uninsured more attractive as it actually is, it also makes insurance plans
with lower coverage more attractive as they are. This gives rise to a strong potential
for undercutting.
3. Profitable Undercutting in an Insurance Market
In this section we want to show that an insurance provider entering the market may
profitably attract customers from an incumbent insurance plan by undercutting the
premium and lowering coverage. We do not yet consider a full characterization of firm
behavior in the insurance market. This will be addressed in a later section. Here
we seek to establish that customers with limited attention are attracted towards low-
premium, low-quality plans to a suboptimally strong degree and that firms may exploit
this attraction. We argue that it is this exploitation of limited attention that underlies
the frequently-voiced suspicion that firms “hide” shortcomings of the products in the
fine-print of the contracts.
Let us consider more generally the undercutting strategy described above. First,
assume that there is an incumbent insurance plan, e.g. a public insurance program. Let
it be characterized by some premium P and some degree of coverage of health costs α ∈
(0, 1]. Define A(α) ⊆ F¯ as the set of diseases for which an insurance plan with coverage
rate α provides access to treatment.23 To save on notation, let A = A(α) denote the
22A different explanation for a preference for low deductibles would need a modification of the model
we apply here. Suppose the explicit mention of a deductible increases the salience of exactly
those instances in which the insurance does not pay. Further suppose, that the attention rank of
a consequence does not only depend on the utility difference across alternatives but also on the
salience of the consequence. In this case, the decision-maker will focus on the events in which a high-
deductible insurance does not pay off while neglecting the ones in which it does. A high-deductible
insurance may then be regarded as receiving (close to) no insurance yet with the obligation to pay
a premium.
23Formally, A(α) = {i ∈ I : B < ci ≤ (B − P )/(1− α)}. We assume throughout that A is nondecreas-
ing in α in the sense that i ∈ A(α′)⇒ i ∈ A(α), ∀α′ ≤ α. This will hold as long as (B−P )/(1−α)
is nondecreasing in α.
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set associated with the incumbent plan. Furthermore, assume that the premium is at
least actuarially fair, i.e. P ≥ ∑i∈F∪A piiαci. Now, consider a second insurance plan
with 0 < α′ < α and denote by A′ = A(α′) ⊆ A the set of diseases for which this second
health plan provides access to treatment. Assume that this second plan is priced such
that the premium difference reflects the difference in expected cost of coverage, i.e. P ′ =
P−∑i∈F∪A′(α−α′)piici−∑i∈A\A′ piiαci. The lower premium P ′ incorporates the saving
of expected coverage cost for all treatments that will be demanded by customers under
both plans i ∈ F ∪A′. In addition, there may be additional cost savings as a reduction
in coverage may make some treatments unaffordable as copayments (1−α)ci increase.
For these diseases i ∈ A\A′, the insurance does not have to cover any treatment costs.
We now want to investigate the difference in decision utility between health plan 1
and health plan 2. If this difference is negative the second, low-coverage health plan
is preferred to the first, high-coverage health plan. The difference in decision utility is
given by
U˜1 − U˜2 = mpvp(P ′ − P ) +
∑
i∈A\A′
pii
[
mh(i)vhTi −mc(i)vp(1− α)ci
]
+
∑
i∈F∪A′
piimc(i)vp(α− α′)ci
= mpvp
 ∑
i∈F∪A′
pii(α
′ − α)ci −
∑
i∈A\A′
αpiici

+
∑
i∈A\A′
pii
[
mh(i)vhTi −mc(i)vp(1− α)ci
]
+
∑
i∈F∪A′
piimc(i)vp(α− α′)ci
=
∑
i∈F∪A′
piivp(mc(i) −mp)(α− α′)ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attention-weighted net value of higher coverage
+
∑
i∈A\A′
pii
[
mh(i)vhTi −mc(i)vp(1− α)ci −mpvpαci
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attention-weighted net value of higher access
. (III.11)
Consider the last equality in (III.11). The first part compares the larger coverage of
treatment costs for diseases i ∈ F ∪ A′ under health plan 1 to the premium increase
necessary to finance this larger coverage. If these differences between the two plans
receive full attention mc(i) = mp = 1, they cancel out each other under risk neutrality.
If the premium dimension p receives more attention than the co-payment dimensions
c(i), this first part of (III.11) is strictly negative. The second part arises if the lower
coverage by plan 2 entails a loss in access to treatment. In that case, plan 2 is associated
with worse health outcomes in case of sickness as the decision-maker is unable to afford
treatment for diseases i ∈ A\A′ when insured under plan 2: a clear disadvantage of the
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second plan. Yet, given that there is no treatment, there cannot be any co-payment
for these treatments under health plan 2 either: an advantage of plan 2 over plan
1. Finally, as no treatment for diseases i ∈ A\A′ is sought under plan 2, this allows
a premium reduction of the entire expected coverage cost piiαci compared to plan 1:
again an advantage of plan 2. Note that, if α′ and α are such that A = A′, i.e. if the
reduction in coverage does not entail a reduction in access, the second part of (III.11)
vanishes since A\A′ = ∅.
Consider the following assumption reminiscent of Assumption III.1:
Assumption III.2.
vpP >
{
[piivpαci]i∈F , [piivhTi]i∈A
}
. (III.12)
Assumption III.2 states that the disutility from the premium payment for the in-
cumbent plan is larger than each individual expected benefit from having (partial) cost
coverage and access to treatment. Now we can state the following proposition regarding
the possibility for undercutting.
Proposition III.2. Profitable Undercutting
Suppose insurance is voluntary and a single incumbent plan with coverage rate α with
A 6= ∅ is demanded in the absence of any other plan.
(i) If there exists an α′ < α such that A = A′, and if Assumption III.2 holds for the
incumbent plan, a strictly more profitable plan with lower coverage can be constructed
that customers will mistakenly choose over the incumbent plan.
(ii) If the incumbent plan features a coverage rate α such that A′ ⊂ A for all α′ < α,
and if Assumption III.2 holds for the incumbent plan, profitable undercutting is possible
if mh(i) = 0 for the disease(s) i ∈ A\A′.
Proof. See Appendix.
We call customers’ choices described in Proposition III.2 mistaken since they would
be better off choosing the high-quality incumbent plan instead of the low-quality plan.
The reason for the described undercutting strategy to work is the decision-maker’s
focus on the premium dimension when making his choice. While the advantage of
the new plan over the incumbent plan is concentrated in the premium dimension its
disadvantages are distributed across many dimensions. An insurer may thus “hide” the
shortcomings of a (qualitatively) disadvantageous insurance plan by reducing coverage
rates (or services covered) only slightly for each disease. These service deteriorations
in cumulation allow the insurance provider to offer a significant premium reduction.
As each single service deterioration is small, customers will not recognize each of them.
This allows the firm to retain some of the cost savings from the decrease in quality.
On Barriers to Informed Decision-Making 72
If insurance is voluntary, the attention paid to the health consequences h(i) of in-
surance choice is independent of the undercutting plan. Thus, when comparing the
two plans a customer may pay attention to health consequences of diseases i ∈ F ∪A′
in which the two insurance plans do not differ.24 At the same time, a customer may
neglect health consequences h(i), i ∈ A\A of diseases in which the two options do ac-
tually differ. If access is lost for one of these diseases under the low-quality plan, it
will remain unrecognized by the customer. To give an example: if a customer worries
particularly about being insured against costs of treatment of common diseases, such
as pneumonia, he will particularly look for these features in an insurance plan. The
cheaper plan may then be chosen if it covers these common diseases even if it lacks
coverage for treatment of some rare types of cancer, and coverage of cancer would, in
isolation, be preferred by the customer. Yet, as the customer is so much preoccupied
about receiving coverage for the common diseases he neglects to recognize the limited
coverage for rare diseases of the cheaper plan.25
Proposition III.2 shows that limited attention may result in a quality deterioration in
health insurance markets. Absent of switching costs, a qualitative race to the bottom
may arise in markets for complex insurance products. There is a discussion about
whether insurance companies “hide” limited coverage in the fine print. This section
suggests that it is not font size that makes insurance contracts hard to evaluate, but
the sheer size of the contracts. And it is this degree of complexity that allows firms to
hide quality reductions in the “fine print”.
Is such undercutting a real danger? After all, the existing literature predominantly
finds considerable reluctance to switch between health plans.26 The possibility of un-
dercutting might then not be too serious. Yet, given that this very literature usually
calls for interventions to reduce switching costs in order to spur efficiency, the danger of
inefficient undercutting absent switching costs should at least be considered. Studies
that investigate the reasons of those customers who actually do switch health plans
find that the premium plays a suboptimally large role.27 This is striking as there is a
considerable number of dimensions in which plans can provide better quality given a
premium yet there is only one way to make a health plan cheaper given a level of quality
24This does not mean that attention is “wasted”. The consideration of access is important for the
decision-maker to evaluate the desirability of any one of the insurance options against the outside
option. If the decision-maker neglected the health consequences of being insured, he would always
opt out of insurance as he would disregard all the advantages of being insured.
25Similarly, people may exhibit a tendency to focus on whether their current medication (pii = 1) is
covered when selecting a Medicare Part D plan. This may result in a failure to consider in addition
whether a plan covers those medications these people most likely need in the future (pii < 1).
26See e.g. Heiss, Leive, McFadden, and Winter (2012) and Frank and Lamiraud (2008).
27See e.g. Abaluck and Gruber (2011) or Heiss, Leive, McFadden, and Winter (2012).
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(i.e. coverage). Thus, calls to decrease switching costs based on efficiency arguments
should ascertain that health plan choice absent switching cost indeed optimally weighs
price differences against quality differences.28
Both the result of undervaluation of insurance and of the possibility to undercut
are the result of an unequal distribution of advantages and disadvantages of one al-
ternative over another across dimensions. As the benefits of insurance are scattered
across dimensions, while costs are concentrated in one dimension, the first tend to be
underappreciated. Similarly, the undercutting strategy is successful as it concentrates
the advantage over a different insurance plan in one dimension (the premium) while
spreading the disadvantages across several dimensions. While this section discusses
the suboptimal attraction of customers to plans with lower quality and lower premium,
we next want to establish that customers with limited attention may even end up
buying plans for which lower quality is not even partially compensated by a premium
reduction.
4. Dominated Choices
While most behavioral patterns can be rationalized by some sort of preference, one
type of behavior is rather difficult to reconcile with preference-based explanations. If
we observe people actively choosing an alternative that fares at most equally well on
all dimensions, but is inferior in at least one dimension compared to another available
alternative, we remain with two possibilities: the decision-maker does not care at all
about the dimension in which the chosen alternative is inferior, or the decision-maker
has made a mistake. More precisely, the decision-maker chose a dominated option.
Such dominated choices have been observed in markets for health insurance.29 The
model of limited attention proposed here can explain such behavior. For this, assume
that plans are described by their premium P and, for each disease i ∈ I, by the degree
of coverage αi ∈ [0, 1] they offer. The choice set Γ thus comprises different plans g as
elements, where each plan g is described by a premium and a vector of coverage rates:
(P, (αi)i∈I). If the decision-maker has the option not to insure this can be represented
by a “plan” g0 ∈ Γ with P = αi = 0, ∀i ∈ I. The following proposition establishes
the possibility that a decision-maker may be indifferent between two options, for which
one dominates the other.
28Handel (2013) warns against nudging consumers to overcome choice inertia as the improvement in
individual choice quality may come at the expense of more severe adverse selection. We complement
this by arguing that there might not even be a large benefit of improved individual decision-making
to compensate for the exacerbated adverse selection.
29See Sinaiko and Hirth (2011).
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Proposition III.3. Indifference despite Dominance.
Suppose there exists a choice set Γ of health plans with at least two distinct elements. If
there exists a dimension j ∈ {p, c(i) : i ∈ F, h(i) : i ∈ F¯} such that µj > 0 yet mj = 0.
Then there exists a plan that is dominated by one of the available plans, but the decision-
maker will be indifferent between these two plan if the dominated plan is added to the
choice set.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let g∗ ∈ Γ denote a plan the decision-maker would choose from Γ. Using the idea of
Proposition III.3, we can establish the possibility that there exists an option g′ that is
dominated by g∗, yet would be chosen from the set Γ ∪ g′.
Corollary III.1. Choice of a Dominated Alternative.
Suppose there exists a choice set Γ of health plans with at least two distinct ele-
ments. If there exists a dimension j ∈ {p, c(i) : i ∈ F, h(i) : i ∈ F¯} such that u(g∗, j) >
ming∈Γ u(g, j) yet mj = 0. Then there exists a dominated alternative that the decision-
maker would choose if it was included in the choice set.
Proof. See Appendix.
As an illustration, suppose only a single plan is offered that fully covers some set
S ⊆ F¯ with |S| ≥ 2, i.e. αi = 1,∀i ∈ S, αi = 0,∀i ∈ I\S. Further suppose that the
premium is actuarially fair, P =
∑
S piici and the decision-maker is willing to purchase
that plan mpvpP ≤
∑
i∈Smh(i)vhTi despite that fact that the decision-maker neglects
one of the benefits of coverage: mh(i) = 0 for some i ∈ S, say ι. Now, imagine a second
plan that is identical to the first plan except for the coverage of disease ι was offered
in addition to the first plan, at the same premium P . The introduction of this second
plan will not change the attention allocation. Further, the new plan will be considered
equally good as the first plan. Since the decision-maker would have chosen the first
plan absent the second plan he will now choose either the first or the second plan. He
may thus end up choosing the second plan despite it being dominated by the first plan
for the simple reason that he happens to neglect exactly the dimension in which the
domination occurs.
The corollary and the simple example highlight how the model can naturally explain
the observation of dominated choices through modeling neglect. A sufficient condition
for dominated choices is stated here since it is obvious, and stated here without proof,
that a necessary condition for dominated choices is neglect. For a utility-maximizing
decision-maker will only choose a dominated option if he happens to neglect those
dimensions that produce the domination. It is important to note the necessity of
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neglect for the explanation of dominated choices. Other approaches that also feature
biases in the weighting process of different problem dimensions such as Ko˝szegi and
Szeidl (2013) or Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) are not capable of explaining
such behavior. Though parameter values can be found such that decision weights
in these models are approximately zero, they can never be exactly zero. Yet, this is
necessary to model neglect and dominated choices as one of its behavioral consequence.
Note that the model allows for stronger predictions than stating the mere possibility
of dominated choices. The requirement that some benefits of the dominating insurance
plan are neglected allows to make further predictions. First, the model predicts at most
indifference between a dominating and a dominated alternative. It cannot happen that
the decision-maker strictly prefers the dominated over the dominating alternative. This
seems plausible: limited attention may attenuate to which extent an advantage is ap-
preciated. It should not lead to an advantage being misperceived as a disadvantage.
Second, the model predicts dominated choices never to occur in binary choices. In bi-
nary choices, at least one dimension in which the dominated alternative is inferior must
be considered. This suffices for a dominated alternative never to be chosen. Finally,
if a dominated alternative is chosen, this alternative and the dominating alternative
must share advantages over a third alternative that distract attention from the dimen-
sions in which the domination occurs. This again implies that a dominated alternative
that is weakly worse than all available alternatives, i.e. an alternative dominated by
all other alternatives, will never be chosen. It also means that the shared advantages
over the third alternative must be large enough compared to the disadvantage(s) of the
dominated alternative, for otherwise the first could not distract from the latter. In this
sense, the disadvantages of the dominated alternative that is chosen have to be minor.
5. Specific vs. Comprehensive Insurance: The Benefits of
Isolating Risks
It has been observed that people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for various specific insur-
ances exceeds their willingness-to-pay for a comprehensive insurance that covers all of
the incidences the specific insurances are addressing. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and
Kunreuther (1993) provide several examples of such an unbundling effect.30 They ar-
30In a series of experiments they ask their subjects for their willingness-to-pay for health insurance
that covers hospitalization either for any disease, for any accident, for any reason, or for any
disease or accident. They find that if subjects are asked their WTP for any disease (followed by
any accident), or asked their WTP for any accident (followed by any disease), the sum of these two
WTP ($89.10 and $69.55 on average) significantly exceeds the WTP expressed for the insurance
covering any reason ($41.53 on average) or the insurance covering any disease or accident ($47.12
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gue that this effect is due to a greater availability of the more specific events compared
to the unspecific “any reason”. Our model may complement the availability hypothesis
with an explanation based on complexity-reduction.
Suppose that people tend to think of three categories of consequences in which the
alternatives differ when considering this decision problem: premium, coverage in case
of accident, and coverage in case of disease.31 Denote by P the premium, ca the cost
treatment in case of an accident, pia the probability the DM associates with having an
accident, cd the cost of treatment in case of a disease, and pid the probability to be
hospitalized for a disease.
First, consider the case of an insurance that only covers one of the incidences (either
accident or disease). The decision problem of whether to buy such an insurance com-
prises two dimensions: the premium dimension and the dimension associated with the
payment in case of disease. Each option has an advantage in exactly one dimension. If
the decisions are made sequentially without prior anticipation of the second decision32,
the decision-maker solves two two-dimensional problems with advantages and disadvan-
tages being condensed in one dimension each. Yet, if the decision-maker has to choose
between insuring against any disease or accident, he solves one three-dimensional prob-
lem. The advantages of being insured are spread across two dimension: payment in
case of an accident and payment in case of a disease. The disadvantage is condensed in
only one dimension: the premium. The attention process then favors remaining unin-
sured. The reason for this effect is that the integration of several incidences into one
comprehensive insurance makes the insurance decision more complex. In particular, it
adds a benefit dimension while integrating the cost into an already existing dimension
(the premium). As a decision-maker cannot fully take into account all dimensions he
concentrates on those with the largest utility differences. This tends to be the pre-
mium dimension as it integrates the costs of covering several incidences. As a result
the benefit dimensions are not fully considered.
This unbundling effect is not only present when the two more specialized insurances
incorporate only a single benefit dimension. We can show that any “split” of a com-
prehensive insurance into an arbitrary number of more specialized insurance plans will
result in an increased willingness-to-pay.
on average).
31For simplicity, we assume treatment cost to be affordable for both incidences. The argument can
easily be replicated for the cases in which treatment for one or both incidents is unaffordable
without insurance.
32Alternatively, one may assume that the decision-maker narrowly brackets such that he solves the
two choice problems in isolation.
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Proposition III.4. Unbundling of Insurance Plans
Let S ⊆ I, |S| ≥ 2 be the set of diseases for which a comprehensive insurance plan
offers full coverage of treatment cost. Let (S1, ..., Sz) be a partition of S and let W (S)
be the maximum willingness-to-pay for an insurance plan covering the treatment costs
for all diseases i ∈ S. Then W (S) <∑zl=1 W (Sl).
Proof. See Appendix.
Unbundling a comprehensive insurance mitigates the extent of underappreciation of
value. This underappreciation of comprehensive insurance might pose a dilemma to
insurance providers. On the one hand, there is an incentive to split insurance plans into
more specific plans in order to mitigate the underappreciation of the value of insurance.
On the other hand, customers may be reluctant to consider a large number of specific
plans individually.
6. Insurance Provision in Market Equilibrium
We want to investigate which insurance plans are offered in equilibrium in a regulated
market. Due to the discontinuities in the attention function mj, that result in discon-
tinuities in the payoff functions of firms, we cannot be certain that equilibria always
exist. We therefore look at a particular setting. Each firm can offer only a single plan.
We confine attention to the case in which firms choose the diseases for which they
provide coverage. Yet, if they choose to cover a particular disease, they are bound to
cover the full treatment cost.33 A firm’s plan choice is then a set S ⊆ I of diseases
covered and a premium P . This simplification allows the convenience to define the
benefit bi of having insurance for disease i ∈ I by
bi =
piivpci if i ∈ F,piivhTi if i ∈ F¯ .
Since there are no differences between having or not having insurance in the monetary
consequences for diseases i ∈ F¯ and no differences between having and not having
insurance in the health consequences for diseases i ∈ F , we will write mi to denote the
attention paid to the benefit of having insurance for disease i, i.e. mi = mc(i), ∀i ∈ F
and mi = mh(i), ∀i ∈ F¯ .34
33One could think of this as a regulatory requirement to eliminate the undercutting incentives we
discussed in Proposition III.2.
34We assume throughout the section that the premium payments do not result in an inability to afford
treatments that would be affordable without insurance. Formally, with the decision-maker’s budget
being B we assume B − P (S) > ci, ∀F\S. Since we will consider actuarially fair premia in this
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We assume that customers are equal with regard to their preferences, their risk, and
their cognitive abilities. These customers choose the plan that maximizes their decision
utility given the choice set they face. If more than one plan maximizes decision utility,
demand is split equally among the maximizing plans unless noted otherwise.
Suppose insurance is voluntary, i.e. there exists the outside option not to insure at all
(S, P ) = (∅, 0). Consider the following equilibrium candidate. For each subset S ⊆ I
a plan covering this very subset is offered by more than one firm at an actuarially
fair premium, i.e. P =
∑
i∈S piici. Then, if
∑
i∈I piici > bi ∀i ∈ F¯ is satisfied, this
constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition III.5. If
∑
i∈I piici > bi ∀i ∈ F¯ , then there always exists an asymmetric
equilibrium in which each possible plan with an actuarially fair premium (S, P ) : S ⊆
I, P =
∑
i∈S piici is offered by at least two firms.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is interesting to investigate which plans are purchased by customers in the above
equilibrium. It turns out that equilibrium insurance, and thus the welfare properties
of the equilibrium, strongly depend on the structure of insurance benefits bi. We will
assume that bi 6= bi′ ∀i, i′ ∈ I : i 6= i′.
The following proposition characterizes the insurance plan that is purchased in equi-
librium.35
Proposition III.6. In the equilibrium described in Proposition III.5 the customers
purchase the plan (S∗, P ∗) with
S∗
{
i ∈ F¯ : bi − vppiici ≥ κr(i)
}
with r(i) = | {i′ ∈ I : bi′ > bi} |+ 1,
P ∗ =
∑
i∈S∗
piici
Proof. See Appendix.
Note the following properties of insurance purchase in equilibrium. First, in equilib-
rium no diseases are insured for which customers do not need insurance: S∗ ⊆ F¯ . This
section this translates into B−∑S piici > ci, ∀F\S. Again, this abstracts from any issues related
to the affordability of premia. We note that this is not without loss of generality for a treatment
may become unaffordable because insurance for other diseases cuts deep into the decision-maker’s
budget. We maintain this assumption in order to focus on the implications of limited attention on
equilibrium insurance.
35We assume that if a customer is indifferent between a plan (S,
∑
S piici) and a plan (S
′,
∑
S′ piici)
with S′ ⊂ S, then the customer purchases the more comprehensive plan covering S.
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is true because bi − vppiici − κr(i) = −κr(i) < 0 holds for all i ∈ F . However, S∗ might
be the empty set, i.e. customers may not insure at all in equilibrium. This means it is
possible that none of the gains from trade are realized in equilibrium. This happens if
there does not exist i ∈ F¯ satisfying the condition for inclusion in S∗. Such a situation
occurs if the largest insurance benefits are produced by diseases with affordable treat-
ments. In that case, diseases for which insurance is necessary, i ∈ F¯ , receive very low
attention ranks and therefore very high attention thresholds κr(i) that may preclude
them from being appreciated in the decision process.36
The comprehensive plan plays an important role in the equilibrium as it fixes the
attention allocation and makes it distraction-proof. This stabilization of attention
comes at a cost however. Limited customer attention may be wasted on diseases for
which customers do not need (and do not buy) insurance. Formally, there may be
diseases i ∈ F with mi > 0, while we know that S∗∩F = ∅. A straightforward question
would be whether there always exist equilibria in which the market offers coverage
only for diseases i ∈ F¯ . Such a setting would be desirable as attention would only be
allocated to diseases for which insurance is beneficial. Second, under such an attention
allocation the extent of coverage S∗ ⊆ F¯ that customers eventually choose could be
larger since they do not waste attention considering coverage for unnecessary insurance.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. It can be shown that in such an environment
profitable deviations may occur in which firms distract attention by offering and selling
plans that include unnecessary coverage while excluding necessary coverage.37 In that
sense, by stabilizing attention the comprehensive option ensures quality in the market.
Ironically, it does so by offering the highest extent of unnecessary coverage, i.e. it
includes coverage for all i ∈ F . We want to underline that the comprehensive plan
may ensure quality in the market without ever being chosen itself.
Let us consider the welfare properties of the equilibrium. To do so, let us first note
that welfare is maximized by any set S ∈ I that maximizes∑i∈S(bi−piici). This means
that the first-best is characterized by
Sfb ⊇ F¯ . (III.13)
That means, customers would purchase insurance for all diseases for which they need
insurance, i ∈ F¯ . Comparing this to the insurance plan purchased in the equilibrium
36It is interesting to note that the three plans that support this equilibrium are the outside option
(∅, 0), the comprehensive plan (I,∑i piici), and the chosen plan (S∗, P ∗). The former two fix the
attention allocation and ensure that attention cannot be distracted. The latter is the one to which
customers assign highest decision utility given that attention allocation and it may happen that it
coincides with one of the former.
37A proof can be found in the Appendix.
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with limited attention shows that S∗ ⊆ F¯ ⊆ Sfb. While competition drives premia
to actuarially fair levels, customers tend to underinsure under limited attention. In
the most extreme case, customers may choose not to insure at all, S∗ = ∅, thereby
foregoing all the benefits from trade prevalent in this market:
∑
F¯ (bi − piici).
We may wonder whether the equilibrium is at least constrained-efficient in the sense
that it maximizes welfare given the cognitive limitations of the market participants.
Such a constrained-efficient outcome would result in an insurance of a set S ⊆ I that
maximizes
∑
i∈S(bi−piici) under the constraint that insurance is purchased voluntarily:
U˜ ≥ 0. Unfortunately, the equilibrium set S∗ generally does not coincide with the
constrained-efficient set SC either.38 One reason for this is that in the competitive
equilibrium attention is wasted towards considering diseases i for which insurance is
not necessary. In addition, among the diseases i ∈ F¯ , attention is attracted towards
diseases with large benefits bi. These do not necessarily coincide with the diseases
that deliver the largest welfare gains of insurance bi − piici. Finally, S∗ maximizes
decision-utility, while Sc maximizes experienced utility (while keeping decision utility
nonnegative). Thus Sc may include treatments that result in an increase in experienced
utility, yet a decline in decision-utility, as long as this decline does not make the whole
insurance purchase undesirable.
7. Conclusion
This chapter seeks to illustrate how four phenomena that have been observed in the
choice of health insurance may be the result of the complexity inherent in this choice
problem. First, we have shown that people with a tendency to simplify complex deci-
sions tend to underappreciate the value of health insurance. Second, this tendency to
simplify allows firms to “hide” quality reductions by scattering them across many at-
tributes of the health plan. Third, their propensity to neglect may lead people to make
dominated choices. Finally, we have indicated an incentive to unbundle comprehensive
health plans in order to mitigate the extent of underappreciation of value.
These results may give rise to a dilemma faced by policy makers who seek to increase
insurance coverage. If one acknowledges an underappreciation of value one may support
calls for an individual mandate for health insurance incorporating a couple of minimum
quality standards. However, to ensure a first-best allocation an individual mandate
would have to be coupled with mandated benefits for all diseases for which individuals
cannot self-insure. Insurance providers would only be able to compete on the premium
38To show this consider that S∗ can be empty, while the constrained-efficient set cannot. For any
i ∈ F¯ , the insurance plan (i, piici) results in strictly positive decision utility absent any alternative
insurance plan (safe the outside option).
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dimension. Such a policy has its own drawbacks though. Such a restrictive policy would
forgo the benefits of product differentiation for different tastes/risks. In addition, it
would create a strong incentive for health providers to lobby for their products to
be covered by mandated benefits. Finally, the model of limited attention identifies
the underappreciation of the value of such a mandated comprehensive insurance as a
particular obstacle. If people underappreciate the benefits while focusing on the cost,
such a policy will be highly unpopular.
In sum, acknowledging the existence of the described biases in choice behavior may
support calls for policy interventions mandating insurance with extensive benefits. Yet,
the very existence of these biases will make such policies quite unpopular. Limited
attention as modeled here may thus not only drive a wedge between the need for and
the acceptance of policy interventions but even make them reciprocal.
This work is an attempt to model the complexity involved in choosing a health plan
that goes beyond modeling the number of choices as the main source of complexity. We
argue that a major part of the complexity involved is due to the many aspects this choice
problem has. Given that we only consider the large number of diseases a health plan
may or may not cover, and that health plans may vary on many more attributes, we are
confident that further research into this aspect of complexity will be instructive. Finally,
we think that research on limited attention may add nicely to the well-researched topic
of adverse selection in insurance markets. If people underappreciate insurance they
may select out of a market to a degree that is suboptimal both from a social and an
individual point of view. In addition, selection may occur both due to a heterogeneity
in underlying risks and a heterogeneity in cognitive capabilities. We conclude that
further research into the issue of complexity in the market for health insurance can
take several promising directions.
A. Appendices
1. Appendix to Chapter I
Equivalence of Two Approaches to Calculate Gain-Loss Utility
KR derive a percentile-wise comparison of material outcomes for some belief F (m) over
outcomes. Formally, they define the material outcome at percentile pi:
For any distribution F over R and any pi ∈ (0, 1) let mF (pi) be the material utility level
at percentile pi, defined implicitly by
(i)F (mF (pi)) ≥ pi,
(ii)F (m) < pi for all m < mF (pi).
This definition yields a unique function mF (pi) : (0, 1)→ R with
mF =

m1 ∀pi ∈ (0, F (m1)]
m2 ∀pi ∈ (F (m1), F (m2)]
...
mk ∀pi ∈ (F (mk−1), 1)
(A.1)
where (m1, ...,mk) constitutes the support of F (m) with m1 < m2 < ... < mk.
Proof. First, mF = m1 ,∀pi ∈ (0, F (m1)]. Suppose not. In this case, there exists a
pi ∈ (0, F (m1)] for which either mF (pi) < m1 or mF (pi) > m1. If mF (pi) < m1 there is
a contradiction to (i), since F (mF (pi)) = 0 < pi , ∀pi ∈ (0, F (m1)]. If mF (pi) > m1
there is a contradiction to (ii), since there exists a level of m < mF (pi), namely m1, for
which F (m) ≥ pi.
Similarly, for all mi, i = 2..k − 1, mF = mi ,∀pi ∈ (F (mi−1, F (mi)]. Suppose not.
Then there exists a pi ∈ (F (mi−1, F (mi)] such that either mF (pi) < mi or mF (pi) > mi.
If mF (pi) < mi there is a contradiction to (i) as F (mF (pi)) < pi. If mF (pi) > mi
there is a contradiction to (ii), since there exists an m < mF (pi), namely mi such that
F (m) ≥ pi.
Finally, mF (pi) = mk ,∀pi ∈ (F (mk−1), 1). Suppose not. Then there exists a pi ∈
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(F (mk−1, 1) such that either mF (pi) < mk or mF (pi) > mk. The first case contradicts (i)
since F (mF (pi)) < pi. The second case contradicts (ii) since there exists an m < mF (pi),
namely mk such that F (m) ≥ pi.
It can thus be shown that the function mF , implicitly defined by KR, can explicitly
be defined as the quantile function of the cumulative distribution function F .
KR define gain-loss utility in the following way: at each percentile the material
outcome of the new belief is compared to the material outcome of the old belief. If
the former is higher than the latter the individual experiences a gain at this percentile,
otherwise it experiences a loss at this percentile. Formally, define psychological utility
from a change in belief by
v˜(Ft, Ft−1) = η
∫ 1
0
µ
[
mFt(pi)−mFt−1(pi)
]
dpi
with:
µ(z) = z if z ≥ 0,
µ(z) = λz if z < 0.
Take as an illustration Figure A.1 and suppose F represents a posterior (Ft) and G the
prior belief (Ft−1). Then v˜(F,G) = −λA+B − λC +D.
It is straightforward that the same result can be obtained by comparing the old and
new belief directly without deriving the quantile functions as long as µ is two-piece
linear as assumed. One can calculate gain-loss utility instead by assigning a gain to
any level of material outcome to which the new belief, say F , assigns lower density
than the old belief (G), i.e. when F (m) < G(m). A loss is assigned to any level of
material outcome to which the new belief (F ) assigns higher density than the old belief
(G), i.e. when F (m) > G(m). Thus, one can calculate the gain-loss utility directly by
comparing the beliefs at each level of material outcome.
v(Ft, Ft−1) = η
∫ ∞
−∞
µ [Ft−1(m)− Ft(m)] dm.
With above definition, v(F,G) = −λA + B − λC + D. Thus, both approaches yield
the same result as they both calculate equally-sized losses for the areas A and C and
equally-sized gains for the areas B and D. The second approach, however, spares the
detour over deriving the quantile functions mF (pi), mG(pi) first. Note, however, that
this simplification is only valid when assuming the two-piece linear representation of
gain-loss utility µ.
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m, mF(p), mG(p)
1
F(m),
G(m)
p
F(m) mF(p)
A
B
C
D
G(m) mG(p)
Figure A.1.: Comparing F and G versus comparing mF and mG.
Proof of Lemma I.1
Proof. To prove Lemma 1, one needs to show that (i) there exist beliefs p1 for which
E1U1(NT |NT )−E1U1(T |NT ), VNT = E1U1(NT |NT )−E1U1(T |T ), and E1U1(T |T )−
E1U1(NT |T ) equal zero respectively, (ii) these beliefs are unique, and (iii) have the
order described by Lemma 1. Define
ΓNT ≡ E1U1(NT |NT )− E1U1(T |NT ), (A.2)
ΓT ≡ E1U1(T |T )− E1U1(NT |T ). (A.3)
Furthermore, recall the definition VNT ≡ E1U1(NT | NT )− E1U1(T | T ).
(i) Existence
The proof is simple. Note that ΓNT > 0, VNT > 0 and ΓT < 0 for p1 = 0 while
ΓNT < 0, VNT < 0, and ΓT > 0 for p1 = 1. By continuity of ΓNT , VNT and ΓT , the
functions have at least one root on the interval (0, 1). Denote by p∗NT , p
∗, p∗T a root of
ΓNT , VNT ,ΓT respectively.
(ii) Uniqueness
It can be shown that the first derivatives of ΓNT and VNT with respect to p1 are strictly
negative at their respective root while the first derivative of ΓT with respect to p1 is
strictly positive at its root. This, coupled with continuity, implies the uniqueness of
the roots.
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(ii,a) ΓNT is strictly decreasing in p1 at ΓNT = 0.
At p1 = p
∗
NT , ΓNT = E1U1(NT |NT )− E1U1(T |NT ) = 0. This implies
(1− p∗NT )∆h − p∗NT∆s − p∗NT (1− p∗NT )η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s)
+ γ1η [λ(1− p∗NT )∆h − p∗NT∆s] = 0
⇒ χ1 ≡ (∆h + ∆s)− p∗NTη(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) + γ1η(λ∆h + ∆s)
=
1
1− p∗NT
∆s(1 + γ1η) > 0.
Differentiating ΓNT w.r.t. p1 yields
∂ΓNT
∂p1
= (∆h + ∆s)− (1− 2p1)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) + γ1η(λ∆h + ∆s).
At p1 = p
∗
NT this differential is negative as
∂ΓNT (p
∗
NT )
∂p1
=− (∆h + ∆s)− (1− 2p∗NT )η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s)− γ1η(λ∆h + ∆s)
=− χ1 − (1− p∗NT )η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) < 0.
(ii,b) VNT is decreasing in p1 at p
∗.
At p∗, VNT = 0. This implies
VNT = −∆s + (1− p∗) [(∆h + ∆s)− p∗η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s)] = 0
⇒ χ2 ≡ (∆h + ∆s)− p∗η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) = ∆s
1− p∗ > 0.
Differentiating VNT w.r.t. p1 yields
∂VNT
∂p1
= −(∆h + ∆s)− (1− 2p1)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s).
At p1 = p
∗ this differential is negative as
∂VNT (p
∗)
∂p1
=− (∆h + ∆s)− (1− 2p∗)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s)
=− χ2 − (1− p∗)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) < 0.
(ii,c) ΓT is increasing in p1 at p
∗
T .
At p∗T , ΓT = 0. This implies
ΓT = p
∗
T∆s − (1− p∗T )∆h + p∗T (1− p∗T )η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s)
+ γ1η [−(1− p∗T )∆h + λp∗T∆2] = 0
⇒ χ3 ≡ (∆h + ∆s)− p∗Tη(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) + γ1η(∆h + λ∆s)
=
1
1− p∗T
∆s(1 + γ1ηλ) > 0.
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Differentiating ΓT w.r.t. p1 yields
∂ΓT
∂p1
= (∆h + ∆s) + (1− 2p1)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) + γ1η(∆h + λ∆s).
At p1 = p
∗
T this differential is positive as
∂ΓT (p
∗
T )
∂p1
=(∆1 + ∆2) + (1− 2p∗T )η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) + γ1η(λ∆h + ∆s)
=χ3 + (1− p∗T )η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) > 0.
(iii) Order: 0 < p∗T < p
∗ < p∗NT < 1.
To complete the proof of the Lemma, it needs to be shown that the roots have the
stated order. Note that ΓNT > 0 and ΓT < 0 for p1 = 0 and ΓNT < 0 and ΓT > 0 for
p1 = 1. This implies that the roots are bounded away from zero and one. Furthermore,
it can be shown that both ΓNT > 0 and ΓT > 0 at p1 = p
∗. These observations, in
addition to the existence of unique roots and continuity of the functions, imply that
p∗T < p
∗ and p∗NT > p
∗.
(iii,a) ΓNT (p
∗) > 0.
ΓNT (p
∗) =VNT (p∗)− γ1η [−λ(1− p∗)∆h + p∗∆s]
=0 + γ1η [λ(1− p∗)∆h − p∗∆s]
Note that rNT − rT = ∆h + ∆s > 0. This means that at p∗, VNT = 0 implies
VNT = (1− p∗)∆h − p∗∆s − p∗(1− p∗)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) = 0
⇔ (1− p∗)∆h − p∗∆s > 0
⇒ λ(1− p∗)∆h − p∗∆s) > 0.
Thus ΓNT is positive at p
∗.
(iii,b) ΓT (p
∗) > 0
At p1 = p
∗, ΓT (p∗) = γ1η [−(1− p∗)∆h + λp∗∆s]. For this to hold it is necessary
that (1− p∗)∆h < λp∗∆s. Note that, by definition of p∗, (1− p∗)∆h = p∗∆s + p∗(1−
p∗)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s). Using this equation and solving for λ gives
(1− p∗)∆h < λp∗∆s
⇔ p∗∆s + p∗(1− p∗)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) < λp∗∆s
⇔ p∗∆s − p∗(1− p∗)η(∆h + ∆s) < λ [p∗∆s − p∗(1− p∗)η(∆h + ∆s)]
⇔ 1 < λ
which is true by assumption.
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Derivation of the value of information W
We derive the value W ≡ E0U0(i|i) − E0U0(n|n) assuming a prior p0 < p∗ such that
NT is the default action. The derivation for the alternative default action proceeds
analogously.
W (NT d) =E0 [u2|i]
− E0 [u2|n]
+ E0 [u1|i]
W (NT d) =q−
[
(1− p−)A+ p−B − p−(1− p−)η(λ− 1)rNT
]
+ q+
[
(1− p+)C + p+D − p+(1− p+)η(λ− 1)rT
]
− [(1− p0)A+ p0B − p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1)rNT ]
− q−q+γ1η(λ− 1)
[
(1− p+)(∆h + ∆s) + (2p− − 1)∆s + (p+ − p−)rNT
]
Noting that, under Bayesian updating, the prior is a convex combination of the poten-
tial posteriors, one can replace the third line with
[(1− p0)A+ p0B − p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1)rNT ] =[
q−(1− p−) + q+(1− p+)]A+ [q−p− + q+p+]B
− [q−p−(1− p−) + q+p+(1− p+) + q−q+(p+ − p−)2] η(λ− 1)rNT
This yields
W (NT d) =q+
[
p+∆s − (1− p+)∆h + p+(1− p+)η(λ− 1) (rNT − rT )
]
+ q−q+η(λ− 1)rNT (p+ − p−)2
− q−q+γ1η(λ− 1)
[
(1− p+)(∆h + ∆s) + (2p− − 1)∆s + (p+ − p−)rNT
]
.
Using the notation we introduced earlier, we can rewrite this as
W (NT d) = q+VT (p
+) + V oNI(NT d) + ED(NT d).
Proof of Proposition I.2
Proof. First, by Corollary I.1, perfect information must be instrumental. Second, by
Lemma I.2, the default action is NT if p0 < p
∗ and T if p0 > p∗. For ignorance to be a
PPE, (a) the value of perfect information must be negative given that the plan is not
to test: V oII(·, n) < 0, and (b) the plan prescribing not to test must be preferred to
the plan to test: W < 0.
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If p0 < p
∗, the default action is not to treat (NT). The value of perfect information
is then
V oPI(NT d, n) = p0∆s [1 + (1− p0)γ1η(λ− 1) + γ0η] + p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1)(1− γ1)rNT
which is strictly positive. Thus ignorance cannot be a PPE for someone with default
NT as condition (a) is never satisfied.
Now suppose p0 > p
∗, the default action is to treat (T). It is easy to see from
equations (I.13) and (I.15) that for perfect information W < V oII(·, n), thus condition
(a) implies condition (b). In other words, if rejection of perfect information is a PE
then it must be the PPE. The value of perfect information for someone with default T
is given by
V oPI(T d, n) = (1− p0)∆h(1− γ0η) + p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1) [rT − γ1(rT + ∆h)] .
This value is negative if and only if γ1 >
rT
rT+∆h
and the degree of loss aversion exceeds
a critical value λ∗ given by
λ∗ ≡ ∆h(1 + γ0η)
ηp0 [γ1(rT + ∆h)− rT ] + 1. (A.4)
Proof of Proposition I.3
Proof. We look at the value of a particular test: a test with − = 0 as assumed and
+ = p0
1−p0
∆s
∆h
. Such a test produces the posterior p+ = ∆h/(∆h+∆s). It is of particular
interest as it is the worst test in terms of + (among those with − = 0) that is still
instrumental from the point of view of the physician. Any test with a smaller false
positive rate would be recommended by the physician as it yields a strictly positive
value of information from his point of view. We derive a condition under which this
particular test is rejected by a patient with reference-dependent preferences. If the value
of information for the patient turns out to be negative for such a test, by continuity of
V oII it will still be negative for a test with slightly smaller + to which the physician
attributes a strictly positive value. Then there exists a range of tests in terms of + to
which the physician assigns positive value but the patient assigns negative value.
To derive whether the patient agrees to being tested or refuses to being tested we
first need to find out whether the patient would regard the test as instrumental or
noninstrumental. The patient will regard the test as instrumental if
W (NT d)− V oNI(NT d) ≥ 0
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It can easily be verified that this is the case with p− = 0 and p+ = ∆h
∆h+∆s
. In order
for ignorance to be a PPE, it suffices to check whether W (NT d) < 0 as for above
posteriors V oII(NT d, n) < W (NT d). This means that if W (NT d) < 0 ignorance is
both a personal equilibrium and, in addition, the preferred personal equilibrium.
With p− = 0 and p+ = ∆h
∆h+∆s
, W (NT d) equals
q+p+(1− p+)η(λ− 1)(∆h + ∆s) + V oNI(NT d)
Thus if V oNI(NT d) is sufficiently negative ignorance is optimal. This is the case if
∆s < q
−rNT
(
γ1 − ∆h
∆h + ∆s
)
. (A.5)
If condition A.5 is satisfied a patient with default NT refuses a test that results in
posterior probabilities of being sick of 0 or ∆h/(∆h + ∆s). Together with the fact
that this patient would not refuse a perfect test yields the result that there exists a
threshold p+ > ∆h/(∆h + ∆s) below which the patient refuses to being tested. Thus
for any prior p0 ∈
(
0, ∆h
∆h+∆s
)
for which above condition is satisfied, there exists an
interval of false-positive rates + for which the physician recommends the test but the
patient refuses.
Derivation of Observation 2
An increase in the effectiveness of treatment (a) increases ∆s, the net benefit of treat-
ment, and (b) decreases rT , which is the smaller the more effective the treatment. It
is possible to capture this effect by differentiating with respect to rT while assuming
∂∆s/∂rT = −1.
Proof.
∂V oNI(NT d)
∂rT
= 0. (A.6)
∂V oNI(T d)
∂rT
= q−q+η(λ− 1)(p+ − p−) [(p+ − p−)− γ1] . (A.7)(
∂W (NT d)
∂rT
)
+=−=0
= −p0(1 + (1− p0)γ1) < 0. (A.8)(
∂W (T d)
∂rT
)
+=−=0
= p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1)(1− γ1) > 0. (A.9)
Derivation of Observation 3
A rise in the costs of treatment increases ∆h, but decreases ∆s, the net benefit of
treatment to a sick, when treatment costs are identical across states as is assumed. We
thus differentiate with respect to ∆h assuming ∂∆s/∆h = −1.
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Proof.
∂V oNI(NT d)
∂∆h
= 0. (A.10)
∂V oNI(T d)
∂∆h
= 0. (A.11)(
∂W (NT d)
∂∆h
)
+=−=0
= −p0 − p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1)γ1. (A.12)(
∂W (T d)
∂∆h
)
+=−=0
= (1− p0)− p0(1− p0)η(λ− 1)γ1. (A.13)
Derivation of Observation 4
Proof. To distinguish the effects of an increase in disease severity from changes in the
characteristics of treatment we will assume
∆s = αrNT ,
rT = βrNT ,
∆h = (1− α− β)rNT ,
for some α > 0, β > 0 and α + β < 1. These assumptions ensure that (a) the benefit-
cost ratio of treatment, and (b) the relative effectiveness of treatment remain constant.
Using these assumptions it is easy to see that the value of information, be it non-
instrumental, instrumental, perfect, or imperfect, is simply a linear function of rNT of
the form ψ ·rNT where ψ denotes some constant. The change in the value of information
will thus be equal to ψ. More importantly, it means that the change in value is positive
(negative) if and only if the value itself is positive (negative).
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Derivation of Observation 5
Proof. (i) Speed of testing: variation in τ1.
d V oNI(NT d)
d τ1
= −q−q+(p+ − p−)η(λ− 1)rNT ∂γ1
∂τ1
> 0. (A.14)
d V oNI(T d)
d τ1
= −q−q+(p+ − p−)η(λ− 1)rT ∂γ1
∂τ1
> 0. (A.15)
d V oII(NT d, i)
d τ1
=
d V oII(NT d, n)
d τ1
=− q−q+η(λ− 1) [(1− p−)∆h + (p+ − p−)rT + p−∆s] ∂γ1
∂τ1
> 0.
(A.16)
d V oII(T d, i)
d τ1
=
d V oII(T d, n)
d τ1
=− q−q+η(λ− 1) [(1− p−)∆h + (p+ − p−)rT + p−∆s] ∂γ1
∂τ1
> 0.
(A.17)
(ii) Time of testing: variation of τ1, τ0 by an equal amount τ , thus
∂τ1
∂τ
= ∂τ0
∂τ
= 1.
d V oNI(NT d)
d τ
= −q−q+(p+ − p−)η(λ− 1)rNT ∂γ1
∂τ1
> 0. (A.18)
d V oNI(T d)
d τ
= −q−q+(p+ − p−)η(λ− 1)rT ∂γ1
∂τ1
> 0. (A.19)
d V oII(NT d, i)
d τ
= −q−q+η(λ− 1) [(1− p−)∆h + (p+ − p−)rT + p−∆s] ∂γ1
∂τ1
+ ηq+
[
λp+∆s − (1− p+)∆h
] ∂γ0
∂τ0
. (A.20)
d V oII(T d, i)
d τ
= −q−q+η(λ− 1) [(1− p−)∆h + (p+ − p−)rT + p−∆s] ∂γ1
∂τ1
+ ηq−
[
λ(1− p−)∆h − p−∆s
] ∂γ0
∂τ0
. (A.21)
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2. Appendix to Chapter II
Derivation of mj as an Optimal Attention Allocation under Cognitive
Constraints
Suppose a decision maker (DM) faces the problem of choosing between a finite number
of alternatives from the set A. Each alternative is described by a finite vector of
attributes j ∈ J . Let xaj denote the extent to which alternative a features attribute j.
The experienced utility of each alternative a ∈ A is expressed by
u(a) =
∑
j
vjx
a
j , (A.22)
where vj denotes the value the DM ascribes to an additional unit xj of attribute
j ∈ J . Thus the choice problem can be expressed by (A, v) where A = (xaj )a∈A,j∈J and
v = (vj)j∈J . Suppose a decision-maker (DM) faces cognitive constraints such that he
incurs cognitive costs whenever he faces a choice between multi-attribute alternatives.
i.e. |J | ≥ 2. The DM faces no information problem, he perfectly knows the values A
and v. He, however, faces problems whenever he needs to integrate this information
in order to make a choice. He thus imperfectly considers or takes into account the
information, and thus evaluates each alternative by its decision utility given by
u˜(a) =
∑
j
[
mjvjx
a
j + (1−mj)vjxdj
]
, (A.23)
where mj ∈ [0, 1] can be thought of as an attention parameter. mj = 1 denotes full
attention, while mj = 0 denotes complete neglect. When neglecting the information in
one dimension/attribute, the DM ascribes some value xdj to each alternative. Depending
on the assumptions one wants to make, this default value may differ. If the DM is “on
average right”, one may choose xdj = x¯j where x¯j is the average value of xj across
the available alternatives. If the DM is pessimistic, xdj = mina∈A x
a
j might be a good
assumption. If the DM has some default alternative, xdj = x
default
j could be reasonable.
Regardless of these assumptions, if the DM neglects a dimension, i.e. if mj = 0, he is
not able to discriminate between alternatives along this dimension.1
1The exact assumptions about xdj are irrelevant for the behavior of the DM. For any value of mj ∈
[0, 1] and for any modeler’s choice of (xdj )i=1,...,n, a constant
∑
j(1 − mj)vjxdj is added to the
decision utility of each alternative. For a given vector (mj)j=1,...,n, this constant is identical across
alternatives. It may differ across sets of alternatives because mj is a function of this set, as we are
about to derive. Yet, it does not differ across alternatives for a given set of alternatives. It has
thus no impact on the desirability of one alternative over another. With no behavioral impact, we
drop it in the main section without loss of generality.
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Now, let us look at the error from imperfectly considering the dimension j when
comparing two alternatives a, b from the set A:
vj|xaj − xbj| −mjvj|xaj − xbj| = (1−mj)vj(max{a,b} xj −min{a,b} xj)
= (1−mj)vjαj(a, b)∆j,
where ∆j = maxa∈A xaj −mina∈A xaj is the maximal difference in dimension j between
any two alternatives in the set A, and αj(a, b) = (max{a,b} xj − min{a,b} xj)/∆j is the
extent to which the actual difference between two alternatives a and b reflects the
maximal difference in j in the choice set A. Note that αj(a, b) ∈ [0, 1].
An optimal attention allocation will weigh losses from an erroneous representation
against losses from incurred cognition costs.2 The exact loss function L is, again, a
modeling choice. It should include losses from an imperfect problem representation
and a loss from exerting cognitive effort. Let us consider the following maximization
problem:
max
mj∈[0,1]
(−L) = −1
2
∑
j
(1−mj)Ej −
∑
j
κr(j)mj, (A.24)
where Ej represents the loss in dimension j from an imperfect representation of the
problem (A, v). The loss function L is a weighted average of the loss from inattention
Ej and of the cost of considering dimension j, κr(j), where the weight on the former is
decreasing and the weight of the latter is increasing in mj. E could have several forms
depending on the modeling choice. Consider e.g. the following:
Ej =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈A\a
(1−mj)vjαj(a, b)∆jωj(a, b) = (1−mj)vj∆jΩj (A.25)
with
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈A\a ωj(a, b) = 1, and Ωj =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈A\a αj(a, b)ωj(a, b). Then Ej
represents the weighted average of all errors from imperfectly considering dimension j
in the choice problem (A, v). For simplicity, we opt for a weighting (ωj(a, b))a∈A,b∈A
that puts all weight on the largest errors, i.e. ωj(a, b) > 0⇔ αj(a, b) = 1. This implies
that Ωj = 1, ∀j ∈ J .
The optimal solution of problem (A.24) is then given by
mj = max
{
0, 1− κr(j)
µj
}
, (A.26)
2One may argue that the DM’s objective is to make the right decision, not to form a correct repre-
sentation of the world. So, one might want to insert the loss from taking the wrong action into the
objective function. Yet, to determine that loss, one needs to know the right action. The problem
would amount to choosing the optimal attention with hindsight. Without the information about
the correct action, the best thing one can do is to optimize the representation of the world one
bases decisions on.
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where µj = vj∆j. Hence, whenever µj < κr(j), dimension j is neglected. One could thus
interpret µj as a measure of importance of dimension j to the DM. If the dimension is
important enough compared to the cognitive costs associated with its consideration, it
will be taken into account. And, given that it is taken into account (mj > 0), the extent
to which a dimension is taken into account rises in the importance of the dimension.
Note that the attention mj that dimension j receives is crucially determined by the
cognitive costs κr(j) associated with its consideration. We want these costs to reflect the
rising difficulty of solving increasingly complex problems. It is hence straightforward
to assume that considering a single dimension is costless, as there is no complexity
involved. Considering a second dimension involves the need to make a first commensu-
rability consideration and is thus associated with some positive cognition costs. Taking
into account additional dimensions should become increasingly costly. It thus matters
which dimensions are considered“first”. Denote by r : J → {1, ..., n} the order in which
the attributes are considered. We will henceforth refer to it as the attention hierarchy.
Given some place in the hierarchy, each dimension is associated with some cognitive
effort cost κr(j).
Given our ideas of rising consideration costs we assume
κ1 = 0, (A.27)
κr+1 > κr, ∀r ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} .
The dimension that is considered first, i.e. the dimension that receives rank 1 in the
attention hierarchy, is considered without cognitive effort. Taking into account addi-
tional dimensions is increasingly costly. The attention hierarchy r(j) is thus crucial for
the eventual attention allocation. Consider the following two-step procedure. First,
the DM needs to select an attention hierarchy r : J → {1, ..., n} that associates each
dimension with some consideration costs κr(j). One can think of this as the problem to
determine which dimension to consider first, which second, and so on. After assigning
a rank to each dimension, the DM solves the above described problem of optimal atten-
tion allocation (A.24) given some assignment of consideration costs. The problem can
then be solved backwards. Given any assignment r(j), the optimal attention allocation
is given by (A.26). Plugging this back into the objective function (A.24) yields
(−L) =
∑
j:mj>0
[
−1
2
(
κ2r(j)
µ2j
)
µj − κr(j) +
κ2r(j)
µj
]
− 1
2
∑
j:mj=0
µj
=
∑
j:mj>0
[
1
2
κ2r(j)
µj
− κr(j)
]
− 1
2
∑
j:mj=0
µj.
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The objective at the first stage, anticipating the result of the second stage, is thus
max
r(j)
∑
j:mj>0
[
1
2
κ2r(j)
µj
− κr(j)
]
− 1
2
∑
j:mj=0
µj. (A.28)
Now we can state the following result:
Proposition A.1. The optimal assignment r∗(j) satisfies
µj > µj′ ⇒ r(j) < r(j′). (A.29)
The optimal assignment assigns higher attention ranks to more important dimensions.
Proof. Under an optimal assignment r∗(j) interchanging the ranks of any two attributes
j, j′ ∈ J may not lead to an increase in (−L). Note that the objective function (−L)
is additively-separable across dimensions. We may thus confine attention to the parts
of the objective function that depend on the two dimensions j and j′.
Suppose µj = µj′ . It is easy to see that interchanging their ranks has no effect on
the objective function. We thus only look at cases in which µj > µj′ . Take any ranking
r. Under this ranking dimensions j and j′ are associated with some cognitive costs
κr(j), κr(j′). Denote by κh = max
{
κr(j), κr(j′)
}
and κl = min
{
κr(j), κr(j′)
}
. Whichever
dimension is assigned κl has a higher rank under r. We now show that if r does
not assign κl to attribute j (the one with strictly higher importance), r cannot be a
maximizer for (−L) for some set of cognitive costs (κ1, κ2, ...) satisfying our assumption
(A.27).
Let us distinguish four cases:
(i) κh > κl > µj > µj′ . Both attributes are neglected before and after interchanging
the rank. The objective function (−L) is thus invariant to such a change in
ranking.
(ii) µj > µj′ > κh > κl. Both attributes are taken into account at the lower rank.
However, it is better to assign attribute j the higher rank (and thus κl) if
1
2
κ2l
µj
− κl + 1
2
κ2h
µj′
− κh > 1
2
κ2l
µj′
− κl + 1
2
κ2h
µj
− κh
⇔ κ
2
l
µj
+
κ2h
µj′
>
κ2l
µj′
+
κ2h
µj
⇔ (κ2h − κ2l )µj > (κ2h − κ2l )µj′
⇔ µj > µj′ ,
which is true by assumption.
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(iii) κh > µj > µj′ > κl. Both attributes are considered at the higher rank but
neglected at the lower rank. It is better to assign attribute j the higher rank
(and thus κl) if
1
2
κ2l
µj
− κl − 1
2
µj′ >
1
2
κ2l
µj′
− κl − 1
2
µj
⇔ κ2l µj′ − µ2j′µj > κ2l µj − µ2jµj′
⇔ µjµj′(µj − µj′) > κ2l (µj − µj′)
⇔ µjµj′ > κ2l , which is true since µj > µj′ > κl.
(iv) µj > κh > µj′ > κl. Attribute j is considered both at the higher and lower rank.
Attribute j′ is only considered at the higher rank but neglected at the lower rank.
Still, it is better to assign attribute j to the higher rank if
1
2
κ2l
µj
− κl − 1
2
µj′ >
1
2
κ2l
µj′
− κl + 1
2
κ2h
µj
− κh.
This indeed holds true, since
1
2
κ2l
(
1
µj
− 1
µj′
)
− 1
2
µj′ − 1
2
κ2h
1
µj
+ κh =
1
µjµj′
[
1
2
κ2l (µj′ − µj)−
1
2
µjµ
2
j′ −
1
2
κ2hµj′ + κhµjµj′
]
=
1
2µjµj′
[
κ2l (µj′ − µj) +
(
κhµjµj′ − µjµ2j′
)
+
(
κhµjµj′ − κ2hµj′
)]
=
1
2µjµj′
[
κ2l (µj′ − µj) + µjµj′(κh − µj′) + κhµj′(µj − κh)
]
>
1
2µjµj′
[
κ2l (µj′ − µj) + κhµj′(κh − µj′) + κhµj′(µj − κh)
]
=
1
2µjµj′
[
(µj′κh − κ2l )(µj − µj′)
]
>0,
in which the first inequality (line 4) holds since µj > κh > κl, and hence the
second term in the bracket is replaced by strictly lower term. The final inequality
holds since µj > κh > µj′ > κl.
We have now shown that an optimal solution is to set r(j) according to (A.29). One
may argue that this rule may be violated for dimensions for which case (i) holds. While
this is true, one can counter that (A.29) is optimal for a choice problem (A, v), and
thus for a given vector of (µj)j=1..n, for all cognitive cost vectors (κ1, ..., κn) for which
κr+1 > κr, ∀r = 1, ..., n. The optimal assignment (A.29) is thus invariant to changes in
the cost vector (e.g. due to changes in cognitive resources for some given choice task).
In addition, even if case (i) holds for some dimensions for a given cost vector, it cannot
hold for all dimensions as long as κ1 = 0.
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Characteristics of the Attention Function
This section seeks to discuss some characteristics of the attention function, that we
derived.
First, more important dimensions receive (weakly) more attention than less impor-
tant attributes, ∂mj/∂µj ≥ 0. The attention each dimension receives thus depends
positively on its value to the decision-maker. In addition to this internal factor, the
dimensions’ dispersion within the choice set A increases attention. The attention an
attribute receives thus depends on the choice environment. It is possible to attract
attention to a dimension by varying the choice set appropriately.
Second, as one dimension gains importance it may eventually gain rank in the at-
tention hierarchy. As the attention order is strict another dimension must receive a
lower rank and thereby loose attention, ∂mj/∂µj′ ≤ 0, with strict inequality only if
∂mj′/∂µj′ > 0. It is hence possible to distract attention from a dimension. It is
noteworthy that this distraction effect only works through the attention hierarchy and
is thus discontinuous.
Next, the attention process features neglect, or, in Gabaix’ terminology, the at-
tention vector is sparse (Gabaix (2011)). Technically, for any decision problem (A, v)
there exist vectors of cognitive costs κ satisfying our assumptions such that there exist
dimensions j ∈ J : mj = 0 whenever |J | ≥ 2. So, for any complex choice problem,
i.e. one that involves at least two dimensions, cognitive costs may lead to the neglect
of at least one dimension. Similarly, for any vector of cognitive costs κ satisfying our
assumptions there exist choice problems (A, v) : |J | ≥ 2, such that at least one of the
dimensions is ignored.
In addition, due to our assumptions on κ, for any choice problem (A, v) there exist
attributes j ∈ J : mj > 0. So, there is no complete neglect. As we seek to model
the need to simplify a complex choice problem, the DM always considers at least one
dimension as this amounts to solving a simple choice problem. This directly implies
that complexity costs, as modeled here, will never lead to the choice of an alternative
that fares worse than another in all dimensions.
The attention hierarchy is not just implicit. Any two dimensions that are considered
receive a different weight: mj 6= mj′ , ∀j, j′ ∈ J : mj,mj′ > 0. More specifically, for
any two dimensions that are considered, the higher ranking dimension receives strictly
more attention.
This, together with the impossibility of complete neglect, implies that the attention
process always features over- and underweighting. Let m¯ = 1
n
∑
jmj. Then for
any complex choice problem and cognitive cost vector κ satisfying our assumptions
there exist dimensions that are overweighted and dimensions that are underweighted.
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Formally, ∀(A, v, κ) : ∃j ∈ J : mj > m¯ and ∃j ∈ J : mj < m¯. This is important as it
implies that under the derived attention function the decision utility of an alternative
is not just an affine transformation of experienced utility.
Proof of Proposition II.1
First, let us look at the case in which a monopolist equips his product only with a single
quality, say i. In this case, the price is constrained by the fact that the price must
rank second in the attention hierarchy: µi = viqi ≥ vpP = µp ⇒ r(i) = 1, r(p) = 2.
Otherwise the decision utility from buying the product would be strictly negative. This
yields a maximum price P ∗ = vixi/vp.3 Then it follows that the profit maximizing
choice of the quality level qi is:
q∗i =
vi
vpci
, (A.30)
while the resulting profit is
Π∗ =
v2i
2ci(vp)2
= pii. (A.31)
The value pii is the profit that a monopolist can extract from producing a product that
features only quality i. It exactly equals the maximum additional profit a monopolist
could make by adding this quality to his product under full attention. It is straightfor-
ward to see that a monopolist who is confined to produce only a single-quality product
will choose the quality with the largest pii. Since this is always possible the optimal
product design always features at least one quality i : pii = pi
(1).
Now, suppose the monopolist contemplates to let the product feature more than
a single quality. If the optimal design features more than a single quality, the price
dimension must rank first in the attention hierarchy. To see this, note that the price of
the optimal single-quality product equals the full value created by the most profitable
quality. If introducing more qualities is profitable, then the price of this multi-quality
product must exceed the price of the optimal single-quality product. Then the price
must also exceed the value of each single quality provided by the multi-quality product.
Knowing that r(p) = 1 and hence mp = 1, the nonnegativity constraint on the decision
value u˜(a) of the product yields the maximal price, the monopolist can charge for the
multi-quality product:
P ∗ =
1
vp
∑
i∈I
miviqi
3We assume here that the tie due to µi = µp is broken in favor of the quality dimension. If this is
not the case the price is set marginally below viqi/(vp).
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Plugging this back into the profit function allows for maximization with respect to the
levels of qi. It is easy to show that, if mi 6= 0 for some i ∈ I, then miviqi = viqi − κr(i)
and the optimal level of the quality is q∗i =
vi
vpci
. Similarly, it is rather straightforward
that if mi = 0, then q
∗
i = 0 since the production of a quality is costly. Plugging q
∗
i back
into the profit function yields
Π∗ =
∑
i∈I
(pii − κr(i)) (A.32)
where I denotes the subset of qualities of which a positive level is produced under
the optimal design. We still need to find the elements of I, i.e. which qualities are
produced under the optimal design of a multi-quality product. Note that for any I
with |I| = m ≥ 2 elements, above profit formula gives
Π∗ =
∑
i∈I
pii −
m∑
r=2
κr. (A.33)
We can therefore conclude that if I includes m elements, it must be the m most
profitable qualities
{
i| ∃t ≤ m : pii = pi(t)
}
. How large is m? It must be true that for
m ≥ 2,
pi(m) − 1
vp
κm+1 ≥ 0
and
pi(m+1) − 1
vp
κm+2 < 0.
If that was not the case you could increase profits by either decreasing or increasing I.
This proves part (ii) of Proposition II.1.
Finally, we need to determine whether it is more profitable to offer a single-quality
or a multi-quality product. Note that the maximal profit from a multi-quality product
with m qualities is given by
m∑
t=1
max
{
pi(t) − 1
vp
κt+1, 0
}
,
while the maximal profit from a single-quality product is given by pi(1). If and only if
the the latter is larger than the former, i.e.
∑m
t=2 max
{
pi(t) − 1
vp
κt+1, 0
}
< 1
vp
κ2, then
it is optimal to produce a single-quality product. This proves part (i) of Proposition
II.1.
Proof of Proposition II.2
Consider a monopolist whose product features |I| ≥ 2 qualities. Further suppose
that the optimal level of one of these qualities is below its technological frontier, i.e.
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∃l ∈ I : q∗l = vlvpcl < q¯l. Let the monopolist offer a second product, called bait good,
that has the same level of qualities qbi as the initial product, i.e. q
b
i = qi, ∀i. The price
of the bait good is set sufficiently high such that it is unattractive to consumers. This
introduction of the bait good has no impact on the attention levels with mp = 1 and
mi = 1 − κr(i)/(viqbi ), ∀i. However, the profit from the sale of the primary good now
has the following form:
Π∗ = P ∗ −
∑
i
c(qi) =
∑
i∈I
[
1
vp
miviqi − 1
2
ciq
2
i
]
,
with
mi =
max
{
0, 1− κr(i)/(viqbi )
}
for qi ≤ qbi ,
max
{
0, 1− κr(i)/(viqi)
}
for qi > q
b
i .
Then it holds that the new optimal level for quality l of the primary good is:
q∗l =
1
vpcl
(
vl − κr(l) 1
qbl
)
<
vl
vpcl
.
Since the original level of the quality was still feasible (ql =
vl
vpcl
) and the attention
allocation under the new design is the same as under the old design, it must hold by
revealed preference that the firm makes higher profits with the introduction of the bait
good.
Proof of Corollary II.1
We have ν1 ≥ ν2 > κ3. That means the more profitable quality also has the higher
technological frontier.4 Also, no matter which assignment is chosen, both qualities will
not be neglected if the bait good levels are set appropriately high.
Note that its always optimal to set qbi = q¯i for the quality i that has the highest rank
among all qualities, i.e. rank 2. Accordingly, m12 = 1 − κ2/ν1 and m22 = 1 − κ2/ν2.
When receiving the lower attention rank, rank 3, the two qualities receive attention
m13 = 1 − κ3/(min {ν1, ν2}) = 1 − κ3/ν2 = m23. The last equality is straightforward
given the insight that it is always optimal to maximize qbi if there is no danger to
change the attention order. The second equality stems from the fact that qb1 shall
attain the largest value possible at attention rank 3. Given that qb2 = q¯2 the level of q
b
1
is constrained not to exceed ν2/v1, otherwise quality 1 and 2 would switch rank. Thus
4More precisely, the utility that may be delivered through maximizing quality 1 by exploiting its
technological boundaries exceeds the utility that may be delivered through maximizing quality 2.
For simplicity, we will talk about comparing technological boundaries when comparing ν1 and ν2.
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the largest value qb1 can attain without distracting from quality 2 is ν2/v1.
5 Now, since
m13 = m23, m12 ≥ m22 because ν1 ≥ ν2, and pi1 > pi2 we conclude that it is strictly
more profitable to assign the more profitable quality 1 the higher attention rank.
Proof of Corollary II.2
With ν2 > ν1, we have m12 = 1 − κ2/ν1, m22 = 1 − κ2/ν2, and m13 = m23 = 1 −
κ3/min {ν1, ν2} = 1− κ3/ν1. We want to find a sufficient condition such that
pi1
pi2
<
m222 −m223
m212 −m213
⇔ pi1 − pi2
pi2
<
m222 −m212
m212 −m213
.
Consider the right-hand side of the inequality.
m222 −m212
m212 −m213
=
(m22 +m12)(m22 −m12)
(m12 +m13)(m12 −m13) (A.34)
>
m22 −m12
m12 −m13 =
(ν2 − ν1)κ2
ν2(κ3 − κ2) . (A.35)
The inequality in line 2 holds since m22 > m13. This gives us the sufficient condition
stated in the corollary.
Proof of Corollary II.3
For quality 1 to receive attention rank 2, we must have
pi1
pi2
>
m222 −m223
m212 −m213
.
With ν2 > ν1, we have m12 = 1 − κ2/ν1, m22 = 1 − κ2/ν2, and m13 = m23 =
1 − κ3/min {ν1, ν2} = 1 − κ3/ν1. Now, if ν1 converges to ν2, m12 converges to m22.
Therefore
lim
ν1→ν2
m222 −m223
m212 −m213
= 1.
Thus, since pi1 > pi2, the required inequality holds for ν1 sufficiently close to ν2.
5We make the technical assumption that if µj = µj′ , the firm may select which quality assumes the
higher attention rank.
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3. Appendix to Chapter III
Proof of Proposition III.1
If Assumption III.1 is satisfied, µp > µc(i), ∀i ∈ F and µp > µh(i), ∀i ∈ F¯ . Since
vhTi > vpci ≥ vp(1− α)ci, ∀α ∈ [0, 1] ,∀i ∈ F¯ this also means that µp > µc(i), ∀i ∈ F¯ .
This implies that r(p) = 1 and mp = 1. Consider the difference between the difference
in experienced utility U and the difference in decision-utility U˜ when mp = 1:
U − U˜ =
∑
i∈F
pii(1−mc(i))vpαci +
∑
i∈F¯
pii(1−mh(i))vhTi −
∑
i∈F¯
pii(1−mc(i))vp(1− α)ci.
(A.36)
The first and the second term are strictly positive while the third is strictly negative. If
α is (close to) one, thus the co-payment rate is zero (small), the third term is dominated.
We want to establish this formally.
Since we want to make a statement about a set of contracts differing in their degree
of coverage α, we need to make some assumptions on how the premium P varies with
α. Let P (α) denote the premium of a contract offering coverage of α. We assume
the premium to be weakly increasing in α: P (α) ≥ P (α′); ∀α > α′. Second, we
assume that P (1) < B, i.e. the premium for full coverage is affordable.6 Denote by
c¯ = maxi∈I ci the cost of the most expensive treatment and let α(F¯ ) be the largest
α ∈ [0, 1] such that B − P (α) = (1 − α)c¯.7 It must be true that B − P (α) ≥ (1 −
α)c¯, ∀α ∈ [α(F¯ ), 1], i.e. the decision-maker is able to afford the most expensive
treatment, which again implies he is able to afford treatment for all diseases, when
buying a contract with coverage α ≥ α(F¯ ).
Now, denote by α the infimum extent of coverage α ∈ [α(F¯ ), 1] such that the
following inequality holds for all i ∈ F¯ and all α ≥ α:
pii
[
(1−mh(i))vhTi − (1−mc(i))vp(1− α)ci
]
= min
{
κr(h(i)), piivhTi
}−min{κr(c(i)), piivp(1− α)ci} ≥ 0. (A.37)
This infimum exists8 and is bounded away from 1.9 For any level of coverage α ∈ (α, 1],
6We continue to abstract from the possibility that a premium is not affordable.
7We know - by Tarski’s fixed-point theorem - that such an α must exist since B − P (α) is weakly
decreasing in α, (1− α)c¯ is continuous and strictly decreasing in α, and B − P (1) > (1− 1)c¯ = 0
while B − P (0) < (1 − 0)c¯, since c¯ = ci for some i ∈ F¯ . We cannot rule out that there is more
than one intersection.
8The inequalities are satisfied for α = 1.
9κr(h(i)), piivhTi, κr(c(i)) are all strictly positive since we have established that the premium is
the highest-ranking dimension and all lower-ranking dimensions are associated with a strictly
positive threshold κ. Hence, there must exist an α < 1 such that piivp(1 − α)ci <
min
{
κr(h(i)), piivhTi, κr(c(i))
}
.
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the second and third part sum to a nonnegative number. Since the first part is strictly
positive as we established before, we must have U − U˜ > 0.
Finally, suppose F¯ 6= ∅ and U > 0. It is easy to see that the respective difference
in decision utility is negative, U˜ < 0, if mp = 1 and the cognitive costs κr, r > 1 are
sufficiently large.
Proof of Proposition III.2
We argue that there is scope for profitable undercutting if the difference (III.11) is
strictly negative and mp = 1. For as long as mp = 1, the difference in decision
utility U˜1 − U˜2 is continuous in P ′. Then there exists a third plan with premium
P ′′ such that P ′ < P ′′ < P and coverage rate α′′ = α′ for which U˜3 > U˜1 must hold.
Offering this plan attracts customers and is strictly more profitable than the incumbent
plan. At the same time it offers strictly lower experienced utility to customers since
P −P ′′ <∑i∈F∪A′(α−α′)piici−∑i∈A\A′ piiαci. In the following, we want to show that
under the conditions given in Proposition III.2 the difference U˜1− U˜2 given by (III.11)
is strictly negative and mp = 1.
Since insurance is voluntary, the customers have the possibility not to insure. Sup-
pose that, in addition to this outside option, only a single insurance plan that is priced
at (or above) the actuarially fair premium is offered and it is demanded by the cus-
tomers in absence of a second insurance plan. That is the decision utility of buying
this first insurance plan (weakly) exceeds the decision utility of remaining uninsured.
Construct a second insurance plan by slightly lowering the coverage rate to α′ and
lowering the premium to P ′ = P −∑i∈F∪A′(α−α′)piici−∑i∈A\A′ piiαci. The difference
in decision utility is given by (III.11). Health plan 2 is preferred to plan 1 (and thus
also to the outside option) if this difference is negative. Consider the attention param-
eters mj of this choice problem. The outside option of “no insurance” is an alternative
that is “extreme” on many dimensions. It is the best option in the premium dimen-
sion, while the worst one is the first insurance plan as it requires the highest premium
payment. Thus, µp = vpP . In the health dimensions for diseases i ∈ F all available
options feature the same consequences. Hence, these dimensions are neglected. In all
health outcome dimensions for which the incumbent plan provides access, h(i), i ∈ A,
the incumbent plan is the best and no insurance is the worst option: µh(i) = piivhTi.
In the co-payment dimensions for diseases with affordable treatment, c(i), i ∈ F the
best option is plan 1 (lowest co-payment) while the worst option is no insurance (full
payment): µc(i) = vppii(1−(1−α))ci. In the co-payment dimensions for diseases i ∈ A′,
the best option is no insurance (no expenditure) and the worst is plan 2 (highest co-
payment): µc(i) = vppii(1−α′−0)ci. Finally, in the co-payment dimensions for diseases
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i ∈ A\A′, the best option is no insurance (no expenditure) and the worst is plan 1
(highest co-payment): µc(i) = vppii(1 − α − 0)ci. The attention parameters are thus
given by
mp = max
{
0, 1− κr(p)/(vp(P − 0))
}
,
mh(i) = 0, ∀h(i) : i ∈ F,
mh(i) = max
{
0, 1− κr(h(i))/(piivhTi)
}
, ∀h(i) : i ∈ A,
mc(i) = max
{
0, 1− κr(c(i))/(vppii(1− (1− α)ci))
}
,∀c(i), i ∈ F,
mc(i) = max
{
0, 1− κr(c(i))/(vppii(1− α′ − 0)ci))
}
,∀c(i), i ∈ A′,
mc(i) = max
{
0, 1− κr(c(i))/(vppii(1− α− 0)ci))
}
,∀c(i), i ∈ A\A′.
Now suppose that α and α′ < α are such that A = A′. Then the second term in
(III.11) vanishes. A sufficient condition for (III.11) to be negative is then mp = 1. If
assumption III.2 is satisfied, then µp > µj, ∀j 6= p. This again implies that 1 = mp >
mc(i);∀i ∈ F ∪A′. As a result, the decision utility of the low-quality plan 2 will exceed
the decision utility of the high-quality plan 1, although the high-quality plan offers
higher experienced utility.
Now consider the case when any reduction in coverage entails a loss in access A′ ⊂
A, ∀α′ < α. That is, we assume the incumbent policy offers some coverage α such that
A(α′) ⊂ A(α), ∀α′ < α. In this case, profitable undercutting cannot always work out.
Since we assume that the first health plan is demanded in the absence of health plan
2, we know that mh(i) > 0 for some i ∈ A. Thus, even if we maintain the assumption
that vpP > maxi∈A piivhTi such that the premium dimension receives full attention, we
know that the access value of at least some diseases must be sufficiently large that they
make insurance desirable, even when underappreciated. Thus there must exist some
i ∈ A for which the removal of access is noticed and sufficiently undesirable to make
undercutting infeasible. However, it is not guaranteed that these are exactly the ones
that A′ lacks. There can be diseases i ∈ A for which undercutting an incumbent policy
with coverage α is feasible, in particular if the number of diseases covered |F∪A| is large.
Note that since an outside option is available the decision-maker may consider health
dimensions h(i) : i ∈ A′ in which the two insurance plans do not differ while paying
less or no attention to dimensions in which there are differences between the plans
h(i) : i ∈ A\A′. If he happens to neglect exactly the health dimension h(i) : i ∈ A\A′
then the loss in access due to the slight reduction of coverage remains unrecognized.
Thus, if mh(i) = 0 for i ∈ A\A′ and if assumption III.2 is satisfied for plan 1 and thus
mp = 1, then U˜1 − U˜2 is negative and, hence, profitable undercutting is feasible.
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Proof of Proposition III.3
Denote by ψ a dimension j ∈ {p, c(i) : i ∈ F, h(i) : i ∈ F¯} for which µj > 0, yet mj = 0.
If ψ 6= p, denote by ι the disease i ∈ I of which ψ is either a monetary or health conse-
quence. Denote by g¯ ∈ argmaxg∈Γu(g, ψ) one of the available alternatives with max-
imal utility in dimension ψ. Denote by g ∈ argming∈Γu(g, ψ) one of the alternatives
with minimal utility in dimension ι. Construct a plan g′ such that u(g′, ψ) = u(g, ψ)
and u(g′, j) = u(g¯, j), ∀j ∈ B\ψ. More precisely, if ψ = p, set the price of g′ equal
to the price of the most expensive plan available, g, and set the levels of coverage α′i
equal to the levels of coverage αi of the cheapest plan available, g¯. Alternatively, if
ψ 6= p construct g′ by equating the level of coverage for disease ι to the lowest level of
coverage for ι available (under g) while equating the price P ′, and the levels of coverage
α′i, i ∈ I\ι to the levels provided by the plan g¯ that offers highest coverage of ι. It is
easy to see that extending Γ by g′ does not change the attention allocation since the
range of utility µj in each dimension remains unchanged. It follows that dimension ψ
remains neglected if g′ is included in the choice set. g′ is constructed to be equal to g¯
in all dimensions but ψ, in which it is inferior, hence g¯ dominates g′. But since ψ is
neglected by the decision-maker, he is indifferent between these two alternatives.
Proof of Corollary III.1
The stated condition requires that there exists a dimension j ∈ {p, c(i) : i ∈ F, h(i) : i ∈ F¯},
call it ψ, in which an alternative g∗ that would be chosen from Γ holds an advantage
over some other available alternative, yet this advantage is neglected. In this case the
dominated alternative g′ is constructed as in the proof of Proposition III.3 by replac-
ing g¯ with g∗. The newly constructed alternative g′ will be dominated by g∗, yet the
decision-maker will be indifferent between g∗ and g′. Since g∗ is maximizing decision-
utility among all alternatives from the choice set Γ, and, since the attention allocation
remains unchanged, also from the choice set Γ∪g′, it follows that g′ must also maximize
decision-utility among all alternatives from Γ ∪ g′. It follows that the decision-maker
would be willing to choose g′ despite it being dominated.
Proof of Proposition III.4
We consider insurance plans that fully pay the treatment cost for the diseases they
cover. The difference between the decision utility of buying insurance covering the
nonempty set of diseases S and the decision utility of not buying insurance is then
given by U˜(S) =
∑
i∈Smi,Sbi − mp,SvpP . mj,S denotes the attention a dimension j
receives when the choice set is given by Γ = {(S, P ), (∅, 0)}. bi denotes the benefit
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of of having insurance covering the full treatment cost for disease i. That means,
bi = piicpci, ∀i ∈ F and bi = piivHTi, ∀i ∈ F¯ .10
Let W (S) = max
{
P : U˜(S) ≥ 0
}
be the maximum willingness-to-pay for an insurance
that fully covers treatment costs of diseases i ∈ S. We make the following technical
assumption. If µp = µj, j 6= p, then r(p) > r(j). That is, if the premium dimension
ties with another dimension, this other dimension gains higher rank in the attention
hierarchy. This assumption ensures that that the maximum premium P : U˜ ≥ 0 always
exists.
We now establish that W (S) = max
{
maxi∈S bi/vp,
∑
i∈S m¯i,Sbi/vp
}
where m¯j,S is the
attention parameter of dimension j if the attention rank rank of the premium is bound
to be r(p) = 1, while the remaining ranks are determined as usual according to µj >
µj′ ⇒ r(j) < r(j′).
It is easy to see that W (S) ≥ maxi∈S bi/vp. Suppose not and consider P < maxi∈S bi/vp
and let j be disease i ∈ S with maximum expected benefit bi. Then µp ≤ µj and
thus mp,S < mj,S. This suffices to let U˜(S) > 0. As this holds true for all levels of
P ≤ maxi∈S bi/vp, the premium could be increased up to the amount maxi∈S bi/vp with
U˜ remaining strictly positive. Now, if W (S) > maxi∈S bi/vp then the premium must
rank first in the attention hierarchy as µp = vpP > maxi∈S bi = maxi∈S µi and thereby
mS,p = 1. Then, from U˜ = 0 one can easily verify that W (S) =
1
vp
∑
i∈S m¯i,Sbi must
be true since mj,S = m¯j,S.
Next, we show that W (C) < W (A) + W (B) for any disjoint, nonempty sets of
diseases A,B and C = A ∪B.
First, suppose thatW (C) = maxi∈C bi/vp. ThenW (C) < maxi∈A bi/vp+maxi∈B bi/vp ≤
W (A) +W (B).
Second, suppose that W (C) = 1
vp
∑
i∈C m¯i,Cbi. Then
W (C) <
1
vp
∑
i∈A
m¯i,Abi +
∑
i∈B
m¯i,Bbi ≤ W (A) +W (B). (A.38)
The second inequality holds by definition of W (·). The first strict inequality is due to
the fact that adding further benefit dimensions to the choice problem can never increase
the attention rank of (and thus the attention attributed towards) the previous benefit
dimensions. Moreover, when “merging” two insurance plans into one comprehensive
plan, some of the benefit dimensions must lose rank as the attention hierarchy is strict.
In contrast, as the willingness-to-pay for the comprehensive insurance will be at least
as high as the willingness-to-pay for each of the individual insurances the premium
10As the two options only differ in either the health consequence or the monetary consequence in
case of a disease, we refrain from differentiating between subscripts c(i) and h(i) for the attention
parameters mj .
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dimension cannot lose rank through the merger.
We now show that at least one benefit dimension receives strictly less attention which
implies the first strict inequality in (A.38). First, suppose W (A) = 1
vp
∑
i∈A m¯i,Abi and
W (B) = 1
vp
∑
i∈B m¯i,Bbi, i.e. that the premium dimension ranks first for both insurance
plans before the merger. Consider for each of the two plans that are merged the benefit
dimension i that ranks highest in the attention hierarchy. For both of these dimensions,
call them a and b, it must be that m¯a,A > 0 and m¯b,B > 0. Otherwise, e.g. if m¯a,A = 0,
then 1
vp
∑
i∈A m¯i,Abi = 0 6= W (A). One of the dimensions must lose rank through the
merger since it cannot be that both maintain the rank two as the attention hierarchy is
strict. From the definition of the attention parameters mj it is easy to see that: If (and
only if) a dimension receives attention, i.e. mj > 0, then a loss in rank implies a loss in
attention (mj). Therefore, as both highest-ranking benefit dimensions were considered
before the merger and one of them loses rank, say a, it must be that this dimension
receives strictly less attention, so that ma,C < ma,A. As all benefit dimensions receive
weakly less attention and there is at least one dimension that receives strictly less
attention, it must be that W (C) < 1
vp
∑
i∈A m¯i,Abi +
∑
i∈B m¯i,Bbi.
Consider, on the other hand, the cases in which W (A) = maxi∈A bi/vp, or W (B) =
maxi∈B bi/vp, or both. W.l.o.g. suppose W (A) = maxi∈A bi/vp = bavp, where we
again call a the bi-maximal disease in set A. Since we consider the case in which
W (C) = 1
vp
∑
i∈Cmi,Cbi, we know that dimension a ranks first in the attention hierarchy
before the merger, while the premium ranks first after the merger. Thus, dimension a
must have lost rank through the merger, and since ma,A > 0, we know that this loss in
rank was accompanied by a loss in attention ma. Again, since all benefit dimensions
receive weakly less attention and there is at least one that receives strictly less attention,
we can conclude that W (C) < 1
vp
∑
i∈A m¯i,Abi +
∑
i∈B m¯i,Bbi.
As we have shown that W (C) < W (A) + W (B) for arbitrary non-empty, disjoint sets
A,B and C = A ∪B, the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition III.5
In the proposed equilibrium candidate, each firm earns zero profit. Also, the maximum
premium charged by any firm in the market is
∑
i∈I piici, the premium charged for the
comprehensive insurance S = I, while the minimum premium payment is realized in
the outside option of no insurance. If
∑
i∈I piici > bi ∀i ∈ F¯ then µp > µi ∀i ∈ F¯ .
Since
∑
i∈I piici > bi = piici ∀i ∈ F always holds, we conclude that r(p) = 1 and
mp = 1. Hence, customers always recognize premium differences. In this case, no firm
can profitably deviate. To show this, we first want to establish that no deviation can
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change the attention allocation mj, j ∈ I ∪ p prevailing in the equilibrium candidate.
For the benefit dimensions j ∈ I, we have µi = bi−0 = bi since there are firms that offer
plans including insurance against i, thus offering bi, and there are options, specifically
the outside option, that do not include this benefit. No deviation by a single firm could
change µi since there is neither a way to offer lower utility in dimension i than zero
nor a way to offer higher utility than bi in dimension i. Now, consider the premium
dimension p. The maximum utility in this dimension is zero given by the outside option.
The lowest utility is set by the comprehensive plan that covers all diseases. It is thus
possible to further increase µp if the deviant plan would include a premium payment
larger than
∑
I piici. However, since the premium dimension already ranks first in the
attention hierarchy in the equilibrium candidate, r(p) = 1, and thereby mp = 1, such a
deviation could not further increase the attention allocated to the premium dimension.
We conclude that the attention allocation induced in the equilibrium candidate cannot
be changed by any deviant plan. We now want to argue that no deviant plan could earn
a strictly positive profit. Suppose the contrary, i.e. the exists a plan (S¯, P¯ ) S¯ ⊆ I that
is not in the set of plans offered in our equilibrium candidate to which one of the firms
could deviate and earn a strictly positive profit. Then P¯ >
∑
i∈S¯ piici must hold for this
plan. However, in the equilibrium there exists a firm offering the plan (S¯,
∑
i∈S¯ piici),
i.e. a firm offering the same insurance benefits at an actuarially fair premium. Since
premium differences are recognized because mp = 1, no customer would choose the
deviant plan. The deviant firm would thus make zero profits, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition III.6
In the equilibrium of Proposition III.5, the attention hierarchy is given by
r(p) = 1,
r(i) = | {i′ ∈ I : bi′ > bi} |+ 1,
since µi = bi ∀i ∈ I. This means that the diseases with the highest insurance benefits
receive more attention. This implies mi = max
{
0, 1− κr(i)
bi
}
, ∀i ∈ I. Customers will
purchase the plan with the highest decision utility given this attention allocation.11
We want to establish that the plan maximizing decision utility cannot include any
insurance of diseases i ∈ I with bi − vppiici < κr(i). Suppose otherwise and ∃i ∈ S∗ :
bi − vppiici < κr(i). Then consider the plan S ′, P ′ with S ′ = S∗\i and P ′ =
∑
i∈S′ piici.
The difference in decision-utility between the two plans is given by
U˜(S∗)− U˜(S ′) = mibi −mpvppiici = max
{
bi − κr(i), 0
}− vppiici < 0.
11We will consider the outside option of no insurance as the “plan” (∅, 0).
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The plan (S ′, P ′) would thus give higher decision utility to the consumer, a contradic-
tion to (S∗, P ∗) maximizing decision utility.
Now, suppose in contrast to the claim that ∃i ∈ I\S∗ : bi− vppiici ≥ κr(i). Construct
the plan (S ′, P ′) with S ′ = S∗ ∪ i. The difference in decision utility between the two
plans is given by
U˜(S∗)− U˜(S ′) = mpvppiici −mibi = vppiici − (bi − κr(i)) ≤ 0,
where the second equality holds since bi− vppiici ≥ κr(i) ⇒ bi > κr(i). Hence, customers
would choose (S ′, P ′) over (S∗, P ∗). Again, we have a contradiction.
Proof of Claim: If only plans covering i ∈ F¯ are offered in the market,
profitable deviations may occur.
Suppose there are only plans available that cover diseases i ∈ F¯ , the most compre-
hensive being (F¯ ,
∑
F¯ piici). Further suppose that
∑
F¯ piici > bi, ∀i ∈ F¯ , such that
the premium dimension ranks first again: r(p) = 1. The attention hierarchy amongst
dimensions on which the available options differ will be given by
r(p) = 1, (A.39)
r(i) = |{i′ ∈ F¯ : bi′ > bi} |+ 1 (A.40)
Let (S∗, P ∗) denote the plan customers would choose from the available set. Denote
by ι = mini∈S∗ bi the disease with the lowest insurance benefit covered under this plan.
Assume that bι < κr(ι)+1, i.e. this benefit would we neglected at the next lower attention
rank. Now, suppose there exists a disease i ∈ F such that ∑F¯ piici > bi > bj,∀j ∈ F¯ .
Construct an additional plan that includes coverage of i yet excludes coverage of ι and
suppose it is priced actuarially fair. The difference in decision utility between this new
plan and the plan (S∗, P ∗) is given by
mDi bi −mDι bι −mDp vp(piici − piιcι),
where mDj , j = p, i, ι denotes the attention paid to dimension j after the inclusion of the
newly constructed plan into the choice set. Note first that since bi > bj,∀i ∈ F¯ it must
be true that mDi = 1 − (κ2/bi). Second, mDι = 0. After the inclusion of the new plan
there is now an additional dimension, i, that incorporates a larger utility difference.
Hence, dimension ι loses a rank in the hierarchy and is now neglected. Finally, since
mp = 1 before, we now must have m
D
p ≤ 1. Thus,
mDi bi −mDι bι −mDp vp(piici − piιcι) ≥ bi − κ2 − vp(piici − piιcι) (A.41)
= vppiici − κ2 − vp(piici − piιcι) (A.42)
= vppiιcι − κ2. (A.43)
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Therefore, if vppiιcι > κ2, the customers strictly prefer the new plan to (S
∗, P ∗). This
would allow a small increase in the premium of the new plan without breaking the
strict preference. Hence, the newly constructed plan could attract the whole market
while making a positive profit.
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